Kaczmarek v. Rednour
| Decision Date | 17 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-2417,09-2417 |
| Citation | 627 F.3d 586 |
| Parties | Henry KACZMAREK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dave REDNOUR, Warden , Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Carl P. Clavelli (argued), Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Leah Myers Bendik (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
Henry Kaczmarek was convicted of murder in Illinois state court in 1996. At that time, the maximum sentence for murder in Illinois was forty years, with the possibility of a sentence enhancement up to natural life if the crime was determined to be "accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." 730 ILCS § 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b). Kaczmarek was sentenced to life in prison based on the trial court's finding that the murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous. After exhausting his appeals in the Illinois state court system, Kaczmarek petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), entitled him to have a jury decide the factual issue underlying the sentence enhancement. The district court denied Kaczmarek's petition, but granted a Certificate of Appealability.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
On October 16, 2007, Kaczmarek filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of his custody in the Menard Correctional Center, where he is serving a sentence of natural life for his state court conviction of first-degree murder. Kaczmarek contends that, under Apprendi, the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by imposing the extended-term sentence without submitting the underlying factual issue to a jury. Our review is controlled by the restrictive standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the AEDPA, state court factual findings that are reasonably based on the record are presumed correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2002). The following summary of the facts is based on the Illinois Supreme Court's factual findings, which Kaczmarek does not challenge.
In 1987, Kaczmarek broke into the apartment of 86-year-old Millie Nielsen. Kaczmarek stabbed, beat, and strangled Nielsen in the course of an attack that started in Nielsen's kitchen and concluded in her bedroom. Kaczmarek stole items of minimal value from the apartment, and was later apprehended while in possession of some of Nielsen's bloodstained personal belongings. At the time of his arrest, the shirt that Kaczmarek was wearing had bloodstains on it. Bloodstained jeans were found in the trunk of his car. At Kaczmarek's trial, a witness testified that, on the night of the murder, he saw Kaczmarek carrying a bag through the backyard of Nielsen's apartment building and placing it in the trunk of his car before driving away.
An expert in serology and DNA analysis, Pamela Fish, testified that the blood found on Kaczmarek's jacket and jeans was consistent with Nielsen's blood type and could not have come from Kaczmarek himself. Rod Englert, an expert in crime scene reconstruction and blood splatter, reviewed the physical evidence and crime scene photographs. He testified that blood smears on the kitchen floor indicated a struggle in that area, and that blood splatter on the kitchen wall suggested that Nielsen had received numerous blows while on the kitchen floor. Englert also testified that the stains on Kaczmarek's clothing were not consistent with the defendant having picked up a bag with blood on it or a bag having been placed on top of the clothing. Finally, he stated the stains were not consistent with Kaczmarek having kneed another person in the nose.
Kaczmarek testified in his own defense, offering an explanation for the blood on his clothes and his possession of Nielsen's belongings. He stated that he had been involved in three fights on the night of Nielsen's murder, and suggested that the blood on his clothing came from one or more of those altercations. Kaczmarek testified that, in one of the fights, he struck a man who was attempting to break into his car three or four times in the face, and kneed the man in the nose. Kaczmarek also testified that he found a bag containing items taken from Nielsen's apartment next to her apartment building, and carried it to the trunk of his car. Based on that evidence, the jury found Kaczmarek guilty of murder.
The statutory maximum for murder at the time of Kaczmarek's conviction was forty years, with the possibility of a sentenceenhancement up to natural life if the crime was determined to be "accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." 730 ILCS § 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b). The trial judge found that the crime was brutal and heinous and enhanced Kaczmarek's sentence to a term of natural life. The judge made that determination without the assistance of the jury. After Kaczmarek's trial, but before his direct appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi, holding that any fact that increases the maximum punishment for a crime must be determined by a jury. Kaczmarek argued that his sentence violated Apprendi in his appellate brief.
On December 27, 2000, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld Kaczmarek's conviction but vacated his sentence, finding that the trial judge violated Apprendi by making his own factual finding on the question of whether Kaczmarek's crime was exceptionally brutal and heinous. The State appealed the vacated sentence, and on October 2, 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated Kaczmarek's sentence of natural life. People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill.2d 288, 278 Ill.Dec. 329, 798 N.E.2d 713 (2003). The Illinois Supreme Court found that Kaczmarek's sentence violated Apprendi because the trial judge, and not a jury, made the finding that provided the basis for the sentence enhancement. Id., 278 Ill.Dec. 329, 798 N.E.2d at 722. However, because Kaczmarek did not object at the time of sentencing as required by Illinois law, the court applied plain error review to determine whether resentencing was warranted. Id. The court concluded that Kaczmarek could not demonstrate that the Apprendi violation was prejudicial, as he must under plain error analysis, because his conduct "qualifie[d] as exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty under any definition." Id. In particular, the court found that Kaczmarek's "senseless, vicious murder of [an] elderly woman, effected by means of beating, stabbing and strangling, in order to perpetrate a robbery that could have been easily accomplished without killing her, undoubtedly qualifie[d] as exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior," and that "[t]he manner of the murder clearly indicate[d] that the defendant consciously inflicted unnecessary mental and physical suffering on his victim, indicative of wanton cruelty." 278 Ill.Dec. 329, 798 N.E.2d at 723. The court further concluded that "a jury, presented with these facts, would have found that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty." Id. The United States Supreme Court denied Kaczmarek's petition for a writ of certiorari on February 23, 2004.
Kaczmarek next filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Illinois state court. That petition, which raised issues not presented in this appeal, was dismissed on June 14, 2004. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal on November 16, 2006, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Kaczmarek's petition for leave to appeal on May 31, 2007.
On October 16, 2007, Kaczmarek filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising seven arguments, including that his sentence enhancement is unconstitutional under Apprendi. In an opinion dated February 9, 2009, the district court granted habeas relief on Kaczmarek's claim that his natural life sentence violated Apprendi, finding that subjective judgments-such as whether the "heinous and brutal conduct" requirement was met-could not be subject to plain error review. The district court denied habeas relief as to Kaczmarek's other claims.
Respondent filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court granted on April21, 2009, reasoning that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in this case did not represent an unreasonable application of Apprendi and its progeny, such that habeas relief was unavailable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The district court denied the habeas petition in full, and sua sponte granted a certificate of appealability on the Apprendi issue. Kaczmarek timely appealed.
We review the district court's denial of a habeas petition de novo. Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir.2008). Under the AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus "shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state court decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Kaczmarek invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and argues that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
Before we can reach the merits of Kaczmarek's claim, we must consider the State's contention that we are precluded from doing so because the Illinois Supreme Court's decision rests on an adequate and independent state...
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