Kaczorowski v. Town of N. Smithfield

Decision Date01 October 2013
Docket NumberC.A. No. 12–327–M.
PartiesPhilip KACZOROWSKI, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lori C. Silveira, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

Lori C. Silveira, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Providence, RI, Marc Desisto, Michael A. Desisto, Desisto Law, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. McCONNELL, JR., District Judge.

This case presents the question of whether a town council can eliminate a Charter-mandated department director position. The answer to that question in this case is that it cannot.

Plaintiff Philip Kaczorowski filed this case against Defendants the Town of North Smithfield, Town Administrator Robert Lowe, and Town Council Members Linda Thibault, Edward Yazbak, and Paul Zwolenski in their individual and official capacities stemming from the Town Council's approval of a budget that eliminated the position he held as Director of the Department of Public Works. His Complaint contains six counts, including claims for violation of the Charter, age discrimination, due process and equal protection claims, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants move for summary judgment on each count. (ECF No. 12.) Mr. Kaczorowski objects to the Defendants' motion and moves for summary judgment on Counts I, IV and V. (ECF No. 16.)

I. FACTS

Mr. Kaczorowski was the Director of the Department of Public Works (“DPW”) for the Town of North Smithfield (“the Town”) for over 16 years from December 1, 1989 through June 30, 2005. (ECF No. 18 at ¶ 1.) Mr. Kaczorowski was reappointed at the beginning of each election cycle throughout this period. ( Id. at ¶ 2.) This lawsuit involves events beginning in January 2005 when newly-elected Town Administrator Robert Lowe reappointed Mr. Kaczorowski on January 5, 2005. ( Id. at ¶ 3.) In his reappointment letter, Mr. Lowe “advised [Mr. Kaczorowski] that [his] status as Director of Public Works has been changed to permanent.” (ECF No. 17–1 at 2.)

In June 2005, the North Smithfield Town Council (“the Town Council) met to address the Town budget for the upcoming fiscal year. (ECF No. 16 at 5.) Mr. Lowe submitted a preliminary budget in February of 2005 and a post-audit budget in June 2005. (ECF No. 18 at ¶ 4.) Council Member Edward Yazbak objected to Mr. Lowe's budget claiming it proposed a 6.5% to 7% tax increase. (ECF No. 16–4 at 40.) While the reason Mr. Yazbak took on the task is disputed, he ultimately prepared and presented a budget to the rest of the Town Council that reduced the proposed tax increase to 4%. (ECF No. 18 at ¶ 5.) In his proposed budget, Mr. Yazbak recommended several cuts to the Town's expenditures, specifically to the DPW's budget. ( Id. at ¶ 6.) He proposed cutting the DPW's budget by eliminating the funding for the Director position and eliminating a laborer position. ( Id. at ¶ 7.) 1

The Town Council held a meeting on June 20, 2005 to discuss Mr. Yazbak's proposed budget. The Town Council tabled the budget proposal to give Town Administrator Lowe, who was dissatisfied with the elimination of the DPW Director position, the chance to propose an alternative restructuring of the DPW that would preserve Mr. Yazbak's budget numbers. ( Id. at ¶ 10.) Mr. Lowe met with Mr. Kaczorowski the next day to discuss the proposed cuts. ( Id. at ¶¶ 11.) He asked Mr. Kaczorowski for alternatives to eliminating his position, suggesting the termination or retirement of the Director of the Highway Department. ( Id.) Ultimately, Mr. Lowe, in considering alternatives, decided that he needed to retain the Highway Department Director because of his years of experience and expertise. ( Id. at ¶ 12.) He further concluded that Mr. Kaczorowski's supervisory duties could be assumed by one of Mr. Kaczorowski's subordinates, Ray Pendergast, the Head of the Department of Parks and Recreation. ( Id.)

On June 25, 2005, the Town Council received Mr. Lowe's recommendation and voted to approve the budget that eliminated the funding for the position of the DPW Director. ( Id. at ¶ 14.) On June 27, 2005, Mr. Lowe forwarded Mr. Kaczorowski a letter advising him that, due to budgetary constraints, his services would no longer be needed. ( Id. at ¶ 15.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs this Court to grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “A genuine issue of fact exists where ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir.2009)). This Court “must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Griggs–Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).

When there are cross motions for summary judgment “all facts, as well as reasonable inferences therefrom, are reviewed in the light most favorable to the respective non-moving parties.” Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2005). In other words, when there are cross motions, “each party's motion for summary judgment must be addressed by examining the facts and inferences in favor of the other party.” Berger v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 832 F.Supp. 515, 517 (D.R.I.1993) (quoting Continental Casualty Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir.1991)).

III. ANALYSIS

Before the Court gets to the controlling question of whether the Town Council violated the Town Charter by eliminating the position of the DPW Director, the Court will first consider the parties' motions on the other Counts.

A. Constitutional Claims—Counts IV, V, and VI

Mr. Kaczorowski alleges that he had a property interest in his position as DPW Director giving rise to his allegation of a due process violation in Counts IV and V. He alleges in Count VI that Defendants treated him differently from similarly situated individuals such that they violated his right to equal protection. Before the Court engages in a complete analysis of the merits of Mr. Kaczorowski's federal constitutional claims, it is most expedient to consider Defendants' assertion of immunity from those claims, both legislative and qualified, in light of the summary judgment record.

1. Legislative Immunity—Council Members

Defendants argue that Messrs. Thibault, Yazbak, and Zwolenski 2 are entitled to legislative immunity because their roles in passing the budget that eliminated Mr. Kaczorowski's position was a legislative act protected from suit. Mr. Kaczorowski counters that these individuals were not acting as legislators, but as administrators, when they eliminated his position in a thinly disguised budgetary decision.

“Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.” Bogan v. Scott–Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998). “The purpose of this immunity is to insure that the legislative function may be performed independently without fear of outside interference.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). Because “immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches [,] Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988), an individual's motive when conducting legislative activities is irrelevant. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951); Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (“Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.”). “Acts ... that are administrative in nature do not ‘give rise to absolute immunity from liability in damages under § 1983.’ Negron–Gaztambide v. Hernandez–Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S.Ct. 538);see also Romero–Barcelo v. Hernandez–Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir.1996)

The Supreme Court has determined that voting for legislation, introducing budgets, and signing ordinances into law are “quintessentially legislative” functions. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. While employment decisions, however, generally are administrative in nature, when those decisions are made in the context of a “quintessentially legislative” function such as passing a budget, they become legislative. Acevedo–Garcia v. Vera–Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2000)See also Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950 (1988) (“Almost all budget decisions have an effect on employment by either creating or eliminating positions or by raising or lowering salaries. This reality, however, does not transform a uniquely legislative function into an administrative one.”).

Looking at the nature of the acts in question, Defendants Thibault, Yazbak, and Zwolenski were without a doubt performing legislative functions when they prepared and passed the North Smithfield budget that ultimately eliminated Mr. Kaczorowski's position. Despite Mr. Kaczorowski's assertions that they were acting in their personal interests, as opposed to acting as legislators when they eliminated his position, the Court cannot and should not consider the motive or intent of the official performing those acts in determining whether those acts are legislative or administrative. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966. [T]he fact remains that their alleged acts were committed in the course of performing their discretionary functions or duties as government officials in crafting and then presenting proposed municipal legislation [the budget] for its potential adoption by the town council. As a result, such activities are...

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