Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel

• Decision Date: 24 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 26308.,26308.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: Kitty K. KAMAKA, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. GOODSILL ANDERSON QUINN & STIFEL, a Law Corporation, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

176 P.3d 91

Kitty K. KAMAKA, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. GOODSILL ANDERSON QUINN & STIFEL, a Law Corporation, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 26308.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

January 24, 2008.

As Corrected January 25 and February 14, 2008.

Ke-Ching Ning, Jared N. Kawashima, Jeannie H. Jang, and Valerie M. Kato (of Ning, Lilly & Jones), on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee.

Wilma Sur (of Miller Tokuyama Kralik & Sur), on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellant on the appeal and cross-appeal and David J. Dezzani, Lindalee K. (Cissy) Farm, Edmund K. Saffery, and Emily Reber Porter (of Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel), on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellant, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, on the cross-appeal.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and DUFFY, JJ.; Circuit Judge WONG, in Place of ACOBA, J., Recused.

Opinion of the Court by MOON, C.J.

Following a jury trial, plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee Kitty Kamaka appeals' and defendant-appellee/cross-appellant Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel (Goodsill) cross appeals—from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's¹ December 24, 2003 final judgment entered in favor of Goodsill and against Kamaka in this wrongful termination case, as well as the December 24, 2003 order awarding attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Goodsill. Briefly stated, Kamaka had been employed by Goodsill, a Honolulu law firm, as an associate attorney, since October 1994. On February 21, 1996, Goodsill terminated Kamaka's employment because of alleged misconduct, for which she was also referred by Goodsill to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC) Rule 8.3(a) (1999).² Since December 1995 and up until the time of her termination, Kamaka was on a leave of absence from the firm due to pregnancy and childbirth.

Subsequent to her termination, Kamaka filed an amended ten-count complaint, asserting twelve claims for relief. Prior to trial, Goodsill successfully disposed of seven of Kamaka's claims via motions to dismiss or for summary judgment or partial summary judgment; during trial, two additional claims were dismissed by the trial court. Eventually, the three remaining claims—violation of civil rights (pregnancy discrimination), breach of implied contract based on Goodsill's employee manual, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)—were submitted to the jury. Ultimately, the jury found in favor of Kamaka solely on her claim for breach of implied contract and awarded her $209,937.91 in special damages.

Subsequent to trial, Goodsill renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the implied contract claim, pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 50(b) (2000), quoted infra, which the trial court granted.³ Consequently, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Goodsill as to all claims and entered an order granting Goodsill's motion for attorneys' fees and costs; Kamaka appealed.

On appeal, Kamaka contends, inter alia, that the circuit/trial court erred in: (1) excluding evidence of the ODC Case; (2) granting certain of Goodsill's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment; (3) denying her motions to amend complaint; (4) granting Goodsill's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (5) granting Goodsill's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Although Goodsill's position is that the final judgment in this case should be upheld in its entirety, Goodsill cross appeals in apparent recognition of the possibility that this court may not agree with its position. On cross-appeal, Goodsill contends that the trial court erred in a number of evidentiary rulings and in issuing erroneous and prejudicial jury instructions.

For the reasons discussed more fully infra, we affirm the trial court's December 24, 2003(1) final judgment and (2) order granting Goodsill's attorneys' fees and costs. In light of the aforementioned disposition, Goodsill's cross-appeal need not be addressed.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following factual background is gleaned from the evidence adduced at trial, including the trial testimonies of: (1) Kamaka; (2) Barbara Petrus, a partner at Goodsill and Kamaka's supervisor; (3) Robert Hackman, a partner member of Goodsill's Associate Development Committee (ADC);⁴ and (4) David Reber, a partner member of Goodsill's Management Committee.⁵

Kamaka began her employment with Goodsill on October 3, 1994, after leaving another Honolulu law firm. According to Kamaka, she left her former firm because she thought the move to Goodsill would be good for her career. At the time she joined Goodsill, Kamaka had been "practicing for approximately five years, primarily in the area of employment law.

Kamaka became pregnant in early 1995. At trial, Petrus testified that, by May 1995, she began to question Kamaka's honesty based upon her observations of Kamaka's work. At about that time, Kamaka failed to timely prepare certain legal documents to meet an upcoming deadline prior to taking leave from work to attend a conference. In order to meet the deadline, Petrus and other associates stepped in and generated the required documents. In so doing, Petrus discovered that Kamaka had not completed work that she had previously claimed to have done. As a result, Petrus testified that she began "pulling cases away from" Kamaka, which cases were then assigned to other associates. As the newly assigned associates familiarized themselves with these cases, additional discrepancies were discovered and reported to Petrus. Eventually, on September 12, 1995, Petrus prepared Kamaka's written evaluation wherein she stated that Kamaka had regularly made entries on billing time sheets for work not done and should be immediately terminated.

Kamaka testified that Petrus had developed an antagonism toward her. According to Kamaka, her pregnancy announcement on August 3, 1995 was the event that marked a deterioration in her employee-supervisor relationship with Petrus. On October 5, 1995, Kamaka received a negative annual review from the ADC, specifying Petrus' concerns about Kamaka's billing practices. On November 20, 1995, Goodsill, expressing further concern about Kamaka's billing practices, placed her on probation pending further review of the matter. In the probation letter, dated November 20, 1995, Goodsill stated that:

[Kamaka's] performance to date has been unacceptable. Therefore, you will be on probation for a period of six months beginning today. Your supervising partner will be Larry Song.[⁶] If there are any continued deficiencies in the areas listed below,[⁷] or in any other areas identified to you by Larry Song, you will be subject to immediate termination.

By December 19, 1995, Goodsill's Management Committee had concluded that Kamaka had falsified her time records and should be terminated. However, based on the recommendation of the ADC, the Management Committee decided to delay Kamaka's termination until after Kamaka gave birth in order to minimize stress on Kamaka and her unborn child. Kamaka's last day at work before commencing her family leave was December 29, 1995. Kamaka gave birth on January 3, 1996. On February 21, 1996 Goodsill called Kamaka in from family leave, formally terminated her employment, and informed her that Goodsill was referring, her to the ODC because of her allegedly fraudulent billing practices.⁸ According to Kamaka, after her termination, she had difficulty finding employment, and, at one point, was refused employment purportedly based upon false statements made to the interviewing firm by a Goodsill partner.

B. Procedural History

For present purposes, we summarize only briefly the chronology of material events in this intensely litigated action. A more detailed recitation of these events is set forth in the discussion section, infra, as they become necessary to the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.

1. Kamaka's Complaint and First Amended Complaint

Kamaka filed the instant action on October 1, 1997, originally setting forth nine counts and asserting eleven separate claims for relief as follows: (1) defamation; (2) tortious interference with business relations; (3) injurious falsehood; (4) invasion of privacy; (5) breach of implied contract based on Goodsill's employee handbook; (6) breach of implied contract based on Goodsill's employee manual; (7) violation of family leave law; (8) violation of civil rights (pregnancy discrimination); (9) TIED; (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED); and (11) malicious prosecution.⁹ Thereafter, on February 4, 2002, Kamaka amended her complaint to add a tenth count—and twelfth claim for relief—for negligent investigation.

2. Goodsill's Substantive Motions

During the course of the litigation, Goodsill filed numerous motions for summary judgment, partial summary judgment, or dismissal, The circuit/trial court granted all of Goodsill's motions with respect to the following claims: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) tortious interference with business relations;¹⁰ (3) negligent investigation; (4) injurious falsehood; (5) breach of implied contract based on Goodsill's employee handbook; (6) violation of family leave law; and (7) NIED. On court's rulings with respect to the first three appeal, Kamaka challenges the circuit/trial claims listed above, which are discussed in further detail below.

a. Kamaka's malicious prosecution claim

Kamaka's claim of malicious prosecution was based upon Goodsill's complaint to the ODC. On November 23, 1998, Goodsill moved for partial summary judgment as to, inter alia, the malicious prosecution claim, based upon the immunity provision of Rules of the Supreme Court of Hawai`i (RSCH) Rule 2.8 (1998), which provides in pertinent part that "[c]omplaints submitted to the Board or Counsel [of the ODC] or testimony given with respect thereto . . . shall...