Kan. City Area Transp. Auth. v. Donovan

• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: WD 82459
• Parties: KANSAS CITY AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Respondent, v. Gerard H. DONOVAN, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

601 S.W.3d 262

KANSAS CITY AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Respondent,

v.Gerard H. DONOVAN, et al., Appellants.

WD 82459

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Opinion filed: February 4, 2020

Bernard J. Rhodes, Kansas City, for Respondent.

Sherry D. DeJanes, Kansas City, for Appellants.

Special Division: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE

Sherry DeJanes Donovan and Gerard Donovan appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent the Kansas City Area Transit Authority ("KCATA"). At issue in this case is ownership of a parcel of real property: the KCATA claims that the property is part of the right of way it owns in fee simple and upon which it maintains the Harry Wiggins Trolley Track Trail and the Donovans claim ownership in the property as part of their backyard. The trial court determined that the KCATA owns the property at issue in fee simple, the Donovans did not acquire title to the property by adverse possession, and the Donovans’ affirmative defenses of laches, waiver, and estoppel were inapplicable to the "issues in this case." Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background¹

The KCATA is a bi-state public agency created by an interstate compact between Missouri and Kansas, and approved by the United States Congress. The KCATA is "a body corporate and politic and a political subdivision of the States of Missouri and Kansas." § 238.010.²

Sherry DeJanes Donovan and Gerard Donovan, husband and wife, reside at 6209 Brookside in Jackson County, Missouri. This property was originally platted as Lot 3, Block 13, Wornall Homestead, and we refer to their property throughout this opinion as Lot 3. Sherry³ acquired a fee simple interest in Lot 3 in 1983. Two years later she married Gerard. In 1999, Sherry conveyed Lot 3 via quit-claim deed to herself and Gerard.

In 1989, the Donovans erected a wooden privacy fence that extended approximately 40 feet beyond what was originally platted as the rear property line of Lot 3. The area enclosed by the fence that is situated outside the original property line is approximately 1,800 to 2,000 square feet in size. In 2016, the Donovans replaced most of the fence due to deterioration and erected a new fence in essentially the same place and in the same style as the 1989 fence.

As shown on the recorded plat for Wornall Homestead, the rear property line of Lot 3 abuts the Kansas City and Westport Belt Railway Right of Way ("Right of Way"). The Right of Way is a 100-foot-wide strip of land; railroads had previously operated upon the Right of Way, but now it is home to the Harry Wiggins Trolley Track Trail (the "trail"), a six-mile-long trail for walkers, runners, and bicyclists. The KCATA is the current record titleholder of the Right of Way. The KCATA installed the trail and maintains it by providing trash removal, mowing, utilities, and general upkeep.

The property in dispute in this action is the parcel of property enclosed by the Donovans’ fence that extends beyond Lot 3's original rear property line. The KCATA asserts that this parcel of property is part of its Right of Way, and that it acquired a fee simple interest in the Right of Way in 1981. The Donovans assert that "the KCATA never received fee simple title to the right of way that abutted the [Donovans’] property because the right of way was merely an easement which had been abandoned prior to the attempted transfer to the KCATA." The Donovans further assert that "[a]s a result of the abandonment, ownership of the property formerly burdened by the easement vested in [them] as abutting landowners." In light of this disagreement as to ownership of the property, we recount its chain of title.

In 1892, John Wornall passed away and left real property to his four sons: Frank Wornall, Thomas Wornall, John Wornall, Jr. and Charles Wornall (the "Wornall sons"). We refer to this property as the "Wornall property."⁴ Included in the Wornall property was what is now Lot 3 and the portion of the Right of Way that abuts Lot 3. In 1898, by "Warranty Deed," the Wornall sons conveyed the fee simple interest in the Wornall property to Roma Wornall, their father's widow, "excepting the right of way of the Kansas City and South Eastern Railway Company through said land the title to which said right of way is in dispute between said Railway Co. and the heirs of Jno [sic] B. Wornall, Decd."

In 1901, by a "Deed of Right of Ways," the Wornall sons and Roma together "d[id] grant bargain and sell" to the Kansas City and Westport Belt Railway Company "a strip of land Fifty feet in width on each side of the Center line of the Railroad of said Company as the same is or may be located over and across" the Wornall property, for consideration of $3,250.

In 1909, by "General Warranty Deed," Roma conveyed her fee simple interest in the Wornall property to the J.C. Nichols Land Company, excepting "the right of way of the Kansas City and South Eastern Railway Company now known as the Kansas City and Westport Belt Railway Company through said land." The J.C. Nichols Land Company platted the Wornall property as the Wornall Homestead subdivision, dividing the property into various tracts, including Lot 3.

In 1962, the Kansas City and Westport Belt Railway Company (the "Railway") transferred all of its property to James Ashley, Sr. and James Ashley, Jr. The Ashleys operated a railroad on the Right of Way until 1968. In 1970, James Ashley, Sr. passed away, leaving the Right of Way to James Ashley, Jr. In 1981, by Quit-Claim Deed, James Ashley, Jr. and his wife Pamela Ashley conveyed their interest in the Right of Way to the KCATA.

In 2016, the KCATA filed this action against the Donovans, asserting three claims. In Count I, the KCATA sought a declaratory judgment that the Donovans had no interest in the parcel of property at issue and that they were encroaching upon the KCATA's property. In Count II, the KCATA requested the trial court quiet title to the property in favor of the KCATA, and in Count III the KCATA requested the trial court order the Donovans "to vacate the property on which they have encroached."

In response, the Donovans filed answers asserting various affirmative defenses, including laches and waiver, statute of limitations, equitable estoppel, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The Donovans also asserted three counterclaims. In Counterclaim I, they sought a declaratory judgment that the KCATA had no interest in the parcel of property. In Counterclaim II, they requested the trial court "quiet[ ] the fee simple title of the property which is the subject of this litigation and bar[ ] [the KCATA] from any right, title or interest in the property." In Counterclaim III, they asserted that their "open, hostile, notorious and exclusive possession and dominion over the subject real property continuously since 1989 constitute[d] adverse possession, thereby, vesting title in the [Donovans]."

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After extensive briefing,⁵ the trial court entered its judgment granting the KCATA's motion and denying the Donovans’ motion. The trial court found that the interest conveyed to the Railway "in the 1901 deed was a fee simple interest." The trial court further found that "the property at issue is public land and therefore the Counterclaim of Adverse Possession as asserted by the [Donovans] fails." The trial court based this finding on section 516.090, which prohibits the taking of public land by adverse possession. Finally, the trial court found that "[t]he same logic applies to the [Donovans’] Counterclaims of Laches and Waiver"⁶ and "that the other Affirmative Defenses asserted do not as a matter of law apply to this [sic] issues in this case." The trial court thus sustained the KCATA's Motion for Summary Judgment "as to Counts I, II, and III of the Petition, and as to the Counterclaims" of the Donovans. This appeal followed.

Additional facts are set forth as necessary in our analysis.

Standard of Review

Entry of summary judgment is proper where the moving party has demonstrated "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 74.04(c)(6).⁷ "The right to summary judgment is solely an issue of law that does not require any deference to the trial court." City of St. Louis v. State , 382 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993) ). "Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. " Id.

In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court "will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, according the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record." Id. (internal marks omitted). "Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party's motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. , 854 S.W.2d at 376. The appellate court "may affirm if the record shows that summary judgment was appropriate either on the basis it was granted by the trial court or on an entirely different basis, if supported by the record." Brehm v. Bacon Twp. , 426 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. banc 2014).

Analysis

The Donovans raise four points on appeal. In their first point, they assert that the "trial court erred in finding that the interest conveyed in the 1901 deed was a fee simple interest" in that "the cumulative facts demonstrate that the 1901 deed merely conveyed an easement." In their second point, they assert that the "trial court erred in finding that the counterclaim of adverse possession against KCATA fails" in that "the KCATA is not the type of entity to which the protections of RSMo § 516.090 are extended." In...