Kane v. Kane, 20648

Decision Date13 April 1964
Docket NumberNo. 20648,20648
Citation391 P.2d 361,154 Colo. 440
PartiesArthur J. KANE, Jr., Plaintiff in Error, v. Barbara O. KANE, Defendant in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Arthur J. Kane, Jr., Aspen, pro se.

Mason, Reuler & Peek, Denver, for defendant in error.

SUTTON, Justice.

This writ of error is a companion case to No. 20833 involving the same parties and which latter case they now have moved this court to dismiss. Therefore, concurrently with the announcement of the opinion in this case, No. 20833 is ordered dismissed forthwith.

This retained action relates to numerous questions concerning various orders stemming from a divorce action filed July 30, 1962 by Barbara O. Kane, wife of Arthur J. Kane, Jr., a licensed attorney and the plaintiff in error here. We will refer to the parties either by name or as husband and wife as appropriate herein.

Barbara's complaint alleged that the parties were married in Minnesota on August 29, 1950; that they have four minor children and that she is a fit and proper person to have their custody. She alleged physical and mental cruelty as her grounds and sought a divorce, a property settlement, temporary and permanent alimony and child support, attorney's fees and costs. On March 15, 1963, after a long and bitter preliminary battle with her husband and by virtue of a jury trial, Barbara was finally awarded a divorce. From the start, however, she had been awarded temporary custody of the four children as well as $460.00 per month child support. Arthur was awarded limited visiting rights which have long since expired. The parties, however, during part of the period since 1962 apparently have, from time to time, worked out other occasional visits or sought special court permission for visits; and, on at least one occasion, Arthur visited the family home in violation of a restraining order.

Shortly after the trial court entered its child support order, Arthur sought a stay thereof in this court. On his showing here that his net income at the time was only $500.00 per month, we stayed all proceedings until our further order and ordered him to pay $200.00 per month until the dispute was at issue and we could determine the matter on writ of error.

The following alleged errors are urged by Arthur on this writ of error:

I. Did the trial court err in awarding $460.00 per month as temporary child support;

II. Did the trial court err regarding its orders on custody and visitation rights;

III. Should and could the trial court have ordered psychiatric examinations of both the parties in this domestic relations dispute;

IV. Did the trial court err in denying the husband's motion for change of venue because of alleged prejudice V. Did the trial court err in dividing certain personal property between the parties prior to a full hearing on a property settlement; and,

VI. Did the trial court err in assessing the wife's preliminary attorney's fees to the husband?

We will consider these grounds seriatim.

I.

As to the child support payments, Barbara sought $889.00 per month and the court, after extended hearings, awarded her $460.00.

A full review of the record discloses that at that time the only certain evidence was that Arthur had either $500.00 or $520.00 net per month from his law practice and business ventures. Also, it is revealed that the parties had been and were then still living far beyond their means and often lived on borrowed money. The trial court, in making its award, stated that if the husband didn't make enought he could borrow still more money so that in effect the wife and children could continue to live beyond the family's means. The court itself stated several times that it wished it could reduce the payments, but if it did it didn't know how the wife and children would get along.

Unfortunately, as worthy as that thought may be with an expensive home to support pending its sale, (with payments of $303.00 per month) that is not the law. The applicable rule, which the court should have applied, is the father's ability to pay weighed against the reasonable needs of his children.

Modern society requires spouses to accept legal separations in as civil and decent a manner as possible, and it requires fathers to support their children as best they can. It does not, however, require a father in poor or moderate circumstances to support children on a higher scale just because the family once so lived or because the mother may desire to so live after the divorce or if she herself can, or the children's estates can, afford a higher scale.

We find therefore that at the time this particular support order was entered it was erroneous.

II.

We turn next to the subject of custody and visiting rights.

Here the trial judge heard the evidence and considered the needs of the children. Usually, it is both natural and right to award the custody of small children to the mother where she is a fit person. Though Arthur has asserted that emotional stress affected Barbara's ability in this regard, we are bound by the trial court's contrary determination, absent any showing of abuse of discretion--and we find none in this record. Wiederspahn v. Wiederspahn, 146 Colo. 214, 361 P.2d 125 (1961). We therefore affirm the custody part of the trial court's order.

As to the visiting rights, we also find there was no abuse of discretion. Arthur's present home is in Aspen, his former wife's home is in the Denver area. It was for the trial court to determine how often the minor children could be seen by their father and transported on occasion as far as Aspen for other visits.

Two erroneous concepts, however, are urged here on behalf of Barbara. The first one is that a trial court can punish a father, delinquent in his child support payments through no fault of his own, by denying him visitation rights until he becomes current in his payments; and, secondly, the corollary proposition that future support payments can not be reduced as long as a husband is in default, even though a proper showing can be made of...

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12 cases
  • Bill v. Bill
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 29 Diciembre 1972
    ...Md. 355, 113 A. 895; Webb v. Daiger (1961 D.C.Mun.App.), 173 A.2d 920; Woodward v. Woodward (1967 Wyo.), 428 P.2d 389; Kane v. Kane (1964), 154 Colo. 440, 391 P.2d 361. This recent tendency is not reflected in our statutory law. To the contrary Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3--1219 (Burns 1968), IC 1971,......
  • Stancill v. Stancill, 22
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 13 Diciembre 1979
    ...support, absent other circumstances, is not sufficient cause to deny companionship with the child. See, e. g., Kane v. Kane, 154 Colo. 440, 391 P.2d 361, 363 (1964) (en banc); Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 317, 330 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1958); Commonwealth v. Lotz, 188 Pa.Super. 241, 146 A.2d 36......
  • PEOPLE EX REL. AWR
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • 14 Septiembre 2000
    ...596 (1974). Determination of a motion filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 35 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kane v. Kane, 154 Colo. 440, 391 P.2d 361 (1964); Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., Here, on February 2, 1999, the first day of the permanency planning hearing, the fo......
  • Kelley v. Kelley
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 30 Enero 1967
    ...two of them with Barbara. While it is true that custody of children of tender years is ordinarily given to the mother, Kane v. Kane, 154 Colo. 440, 391 P.2d 361, and that custody of several children should normally not be split between the parents, Songster v. Songster, 150 Colo. 466, 374 P......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Federal Remedies for Sexual Discrimination Against Male Divorce Litigants
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 4-2, February 1975
    • Invalid date
    ...with the former statute that made it a felony for men (but not for women) to fail to support their minor children. See also Kane v. Kane, 154 Colo. 440, 391 P.2d 361, 364 (1964), in which the Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc held that female litigants must be given preference in custody m......

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