Kane v. Landscape Structures Inc.

Decision Date03 October 2011
Docket NumberNo. A10A2105.,A10A2105.
Citation11 FCDR 1167,309 Ga.App. 14,709 S.E.2d 876
PartiesKANE et al.v.LANDSCAPE STRUCTURES, INC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Cynthia Lynn Parker, Douglas Alvin Bennett, for appellants.Holland & Knight, John Michael Hamrick, Leland Hiatt Kynes, for appellee.BLACKWELL, Judge.

Steven Kane, who was nine years of age at the time, was injured when he fell from playground equipment that he was attempting to climb in a Gwinnett County park. Like most children nine years of age, Steven appreciated the obvious risk of falling that is associated with climbing to high places, and he voluntarily chose to assume the risk. Consequently, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the manufacturer of the playground equipment, Landscape Structures, Inc.

Landscape Structures designed the playground equipment from which Steven fell—known as the “Infant Maze”—for children between the ages of approximately eighteen months and three years. The structure consists of several vertical panels, each of which is approximately 31 inches in height, has cutouts of various shapes and sizes for the entertainment of toddlers, and has handholds to help toddlers maintain their balance as they play. The structure also features a pitched roof—which is, at its peak, approximately seven feet in height—that is mounted atop four posts and covers some of the panels. This photograph depicts the structure as it appeared in Mountain Park on the day that Steven fell while standing atop one of the panels:

Image 1 (4.53" X 3.28") Available for Offline Print

Steven and his family visited Mountain Park on March 30, 2006. While his parents and sister attended a softball game, Steven and his brother, who was 13 years of age at the time, went to a nearby playground, which had play equipment for children of all ages, including the “Infant Maze” for toddlers and swings, slides, and other structures for older children. Steven had visited the playground on many occasions, and his father said that Steven and his brother could visit the playground so long as they remained within his sight, although the father acknowledged that he “really never paid attention to [the children] once they were in the playground.”

After playing a game of tag with some older children, Steven noticed that several of them had climbed atop the “Infant Maze.” According to his brother, children between the ages of nine and twelve years often climbed the structure, and his parents testified that they too had seen other children climb atop the “Infant Maze” and that, on the day Steven fell, they saw some children sitting atop the structure and jumping from it. Steven denied that he had tried to climb the structure before the day he fell, but his brother said that Steven had tried unsuccessfully to climb it on two prior occasions.

In any event, Steven knew that the “Infant Maze” was not designed for children of his age, admitting that it obviously is intended for “little kids.” Steven also knew that his mother would “probably not” approve of him climbing it. Indeed, his mother had warned him before about the danger associated with climbing various things, including structures that are not as high as the roof of the “Infant Maze.” And his parents testified that, as Steven suspected, they would not allow their children to climb atop the “Infant Maze.” Even their own expert witness in this case admitted that Steven “had some awareness of the fact that [climbing to the roof of the ‘Infant Maze’] was something that wasn't intended by the manufacturer.”

Encouraged by the older children atop the structure, Steven attempted to climb to its roof. Steven acknowledged that it is “fair to say” that the roof of the structure is not something onto which one ought to climb, but he explained that the “Infant Maze” did not bear any warnings about the danger of climbing it, that “everyone else was climbing on it,” and that he “wasn't really thinking because [he was] a kid.” The older children told him to use the horizontal handholds to climb atop a panel, and he did so. He then was able to stand upright atop the panel—which is approximately one inch in width—and while standing with his left foot on the panel, he swung his right foot upward, toward the roof, and simultaneously reached with his right hand toward the older children atop the roof, so that they could pull him up. Steven says that he did not think at the time that he was likely to fall as he attempted to climb from the panel onto the roof, but his left foot slipped, and he fell onto a panel below. As a result, Steven sustained serious injuries.

The Kanes filed a lawsuit against Landscape Structures and others, seeking to recover damages for the losses that the family sustained as a result of Steven's fall. The Kanes asserted claims against Landscape Structures for negligent design of the “Infant Maze” and for failure to warn of the dangers associated with climbing it. Following discovery, Landscape Structures moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Steven assumed the risk of falling from the structure when he attempted to climb it. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and ultimately granted summary judgment to Landscape Structures. Based on the undisputed facts in the record, the trial court did not err in doing so.

When a motion for summary judgment is premised on the existence of an affirmative defense—such as assumption of the risk—the defendant must come forward with proof sufficient to establish each element of the affirmative defense. Fedeli v. UAP/Ga. Ag. Chem., 237 Ga.App. 337, 337, 514 S.E.2d 684 (1999). If the defendant does so, the plaintiff then must come forward with some evidence that shows a genuine, disputed issue of fact as to some element of the affirmative defense. Id. See also Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991). [I]f the plaintiff is unable to meet this burden of production, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Fedeli, 237 Ga.App. at 337, 514 S.E.2d 684. (citation and punctuation omitted). Although assumption of the risk often presents a question for the jury, the issue should be decided by the court as a matter of law “where the evidence shows clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably draw but one conclusion.” Tennison v. Lowndes–Echols Assn., etc., 209 Ga.App. 343, 344, 433 S.E.2d 344 (1993).

To establish that Steven assumed the risk of falling from the “Infant Maze,” Landscape Structures was required to come forward with evidence establishing that (1) [Steven] had some actual knowledge of the danger; (2) he understood and appreciated the risks associated with the danger; and (3) he voluntarily exposed himself to the danger.” Sayed v. Azizullah, 238 Ga.App. 642, 644, 519 S.E.2d 732 (1999). The specific danger of which a plaintiff must be actually aware for purposes of assumption of the risk is “the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury,” Sones v. Real Estate Dev. Group, 270 Ga.App. 507, 509(1), 606 S.E.2d 687 (2004), which, in this case, is the danger of falling from an elevated place onto some object below. The Kanes contend on appeal that the evidence does not show that Steven had actual knowledge of, and appreciated, the danger of falling from the “Infant Maze” onto a panel beneath him, and the dissent agrees, concluding that, while Steven may have understood the general risk of falling, the evidence is less than “plain and palpable” that he had a particularized and subjective awareness of the risk involved in climbing the structure, particularly given its “seemingly innocuous” appearance and that he had not observed any other children fall from the structure. In other words, the Kanes assert that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Steven knew that standing atop a narrow, vertical panel on one foot while trying to climb onto the roof of the playground structure several feet above—a roof that, as Steven admitted, is not meant for climbing—involves a risk of falling onto a visible panel beneath the roof. In the light of the undisputed evidence in the record, the relevant law, and the dictates of common sense, we find that the trial court properly rejected these contentions and awarded summary judgment to Landscape Structures.

Although the law does not expect children always to appreciate dangers to the same extent as adults, the Georgia courts have recognized that children as old as Steven are quite capable of appreciating certain obvious dangers. See, e.g., Abee v. Stone Mountain Mem. Assn., 252 Ga. 465, 465, 314 S.E.2d 444 (1984); O'Neal v. Sikes, 271 Ga.App. 391, 392, 609 S.E.2d 734 (2005); Spooner v. City of Camilla, 256 Ga.App. 179, 182(2)(a), 568 S.E.2d 109 (2002); Stewart v. Harvard, 239 Ga.App. 388, 397(4)(b), 520 S.E.2d 752 (1999); Riley v. Brasunas, 210 Ga.App. 865, 867(1), 438 S.E.2d 113 (1993). And for more than 50 years, the Georgia courts consistently have held that the danger associated with climbing, or jumping from, an elevated place is so obvious that a young child can be found as a matter of law to sufficiently appreciate the danger,1 at least in the absence of evidence of a special circumstance—whether a special circumstance of the child or the place from which the child falls—that renders the child unable to appreciate the danger. As this Court explained in 1956:

No danger is more commonly realized or risk appreciated, even by children, than that of falling; consciousness of the force of gravity results almost from animal instinct. Certainly a normal child nearly seven years of age—indeed any child old enough to be allowed at large—knows that if it steps or slips from a tree, a fence, or other elevated structure, it will fall to the ground and be hurt. It may be that some children, while realizing the danger, will disregard...

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    ...Liles v. Innerwork, Inc. , 279 Ga. App. 352, 354 (2), 631 S.E.2d 408 (2006) (punctuation omitted) accord Kane v. Landscape Structures, Inc. , 309 Ga. App. 14, 18, 709 S.E.2d 876 (2011) ; O'Neal v. Sikes , 271 Ga. App. 391, 392, 609 S.E.2d 734 (2005) ; see Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151, 15......
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    ...that shows a genuine, disputed issue of fact as to some element of the affirmative defense." Kane v. Landscape Structures, Inc. , 309 Ga.App. 14, 16-17, 709 S.E.2d 876 (2011). McCormick failed to meet this burden of production because he pointed to nothing in the record to raise a genuine i......
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    ......2004) (quoting City of. Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. , 158 F.3d 548, 562. (11th Cir. 1998)). The Supreme Court has ... Kane v. Landscape Structures, Inc. , 309 Ga.App. 14,. 18-19 (2011) ......
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3 books & journal articles
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    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 63-1, September 2011
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