Kansas City & Northern Connecting R. Co. v. Baker
| Decision Date | 20 June 1904 |
| Parties | KANSAS CITY & NORTHERN CONNECTING RAILROAD COMPANY v. BAKER et al.; HANNIBAL & ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from DeKalb Circuit Court. -- Hon. A. D. Burnes, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
Mosman & Ryan for appellant; O. M. Spencer of counsel.
(1) The court erred in instructing the jury that under the evidence the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company was not entitled to recover. (2) Baker, Duff, Osborn and Hayward, by making acknowledging, filing and recording their plats of the town of Osborn in the recorder's office of DeKalb county dedicated the land in controversy to public use for depot grounds. 5 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (1 Ed.), 395. (3) That the use of lands by the public for depot grounds and purposes is a public use, there can be no question. Swearingen v Railroad, 64 Mo. 76; Thompson v. Railroad, 110 Mo. 60; Railroad v. Totman, 149 Mo. 662; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 588; Baker v. Railroad, 122 Mo. 400; Daniels v. Railroad, 35 Iowa 129; Railroad v. Suter, 56 Tex. 496; Richey v. Railroad, 55 Kan. 54; Com. v. Church, 30 Kan. 620. (4) There is no question as to the right and power of the Hannibal Company to accept a donation or relinquishment of land for the purpose for which it was created. Its charter gave it power to "purchase, receive, have, hold and enjoy, to them and their successors, lands, tenements and hereditaments, goods, chattels and all estates real, personal and mixed, of what kind of quality soever." Baker v. Railroad, 122 Mo. 406. (5) Baker's intent to dedicate the ground is manifested in the most plain and unmistakable manner by his making, acknowledging and filing the plat. Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Price v. Breckenridge, 92 Mo. 378; Price v. Breckenridge, 77 Mo. 447; Lamar v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347. Even if the statute was not complied with in the making and filing of the town plat, still it would be a good dedication at common law. Heitz v. City, 49 Mo. 509; Rose v. City, 49 Mo. 509; Hill v. Sedalia, 64 Mo.App. 498; Perkins v. Fielding, 119 Mo. 160; Kaime v. Harty, 73 Mo. 316. (6) (a) Defendant Baker is estopped from claiming the damages awarded for this land. The evidence shows all the facts hereinbefore stated, respecting his relation to the company, his action in preparing, acknowledging and filing the plat. In addition it shows that he made sales of lots in the townsite by said plat; that he located the depot of the defendant company in 1858 substantially in its present position; that said depot was built under his supervision; that the sidetracks and stockyards were constructed on the tract so reserved for depot grounds; and that the Hannibal Company entered into the possession of the ground so reserved, and has ever since occupied, used, and enjoyed these lands as its depot grounds. This brings the case squarely within the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Morgan v. Railroad, 96 U.S. 716. Railroad v. Suter, 56 Tex. 496; Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Campbell v. City, 102 Mo. 340; McGinnis v. St. Louis, 157 Mo. 191. (b) On the facts the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company contends that said plat, considered simply as a written paper and not as a plat under the statute, was color of title, showing the extent of its possessions. St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536; Wilson v. Purl, 133 Mo. 367. The making and filing of the plat was certainly equivalent in law to a parol gift. The courts hold "continuous adverse possession under a parol gift for the statutory period will not only constitute a perfect defense as against the donor and those claiming under him, but it will confer title upon the donee." Campbell v. Braden, 96 Pa. St. 388; Moore v. Webb, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 282; Oidcalb v. Ludlow, 32 N. J. L. 239; Sumner v. Stevens, 6 Met. (Mass.) 337; Clark v. Gilbert, 39 Conn. 94; Allen v. Mansfield, 108 Mo. 348; Rannells v. Rannells, 52 Mo. 108; Bank v. Fife, 95 Mo. 118. (c) Even if we were to concede that Baker's possession was hostile to his employer and cotenant, and even if we were to concede that it had been brought to the notice of the railway company, still, under the statute he could have no title to the land or claim to the fund. The statutes declare that: Gen. Stat. 1865, chap. 191, p. 746; R. S. 1899, sec. 4270; Railroad v. Totman, 149 Mo. 327; Railroad v. Smith, 170 Mo. 327; Railroad v. French (Tenn.), 43 S.W. 771.
Brown & Dolman for respondent.
(1) The proceeding to appropriate land for railroad purposes is a proceeding against the owners. R. S. 1899, sec. 1342, et seq. The railroad company may be its own judge of the state of the title, and condemn the interest of any one it sees fit. The Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company has no standing in this appeal against Baker, its codefendant. (2) The filing of the plat could not constitute a statutory dedication of the "depot ground" to the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company. The statute in force at the time (2 R. S. 1855, p. 1536) not only negatives the proposition that there can be a dedication under this chapter to a quasi-public corporation, but it places the title, as it should, where the process of condemnation will not reach it. The defendant railroad company is not seeking the privilege of using this tract of ground for railroad purposes, but is seeking to be compensated in money for the use of it by another for the very purpose to which it is claimed to have been dedicated. (3) The only act by which a dedication is claimed being a statutory plat, the intention must be evidenced by the plat alone, and can not be proved by parol. Watson v. Railroad, 46 Minn. 321; Railroad v. Stephens, 76 Ky. 401; City v. Railroad, 130 Ind. 1. (4) A common-law dedication can only be made to the public. A railroad company can not acquire title by dedication either to depot grounds or right-of-way. Todd v. Railroad, 19 Ohio St. 514; Railroad v. Whitham, 155 Ill. 514; Watson v. Railroad, 46 Minn. 321; Railroad v. Stephens, 76 Ky. 401. (5) If there could be said to have been a dedication in this case to the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company by name, to the exclusion of all other railroad companies, it was never accepted. The acceptance by one party in such cases is as necessary as a proposition to dedicate. People v. Kellogg, 67 Hun 546; Cambridge v. Cook, 97 Ia. 599; Roseberger v. Miller, 61 Mo.App. 436; Vossen v. Dantel, 116 Mo. 385; Landis v. Hamilton, 77 Mo. 563; Baker v. Vanderberg, 99 Mo. 378. The claim that the construction of the road on the congressional right-of-way constituted an acceptance has no merit. "There may be an acceptance and appropriation in part, and not for the whole."
This is a proceeding under article 7, chapter 12, Revised Statutes 1899, to condemn, for railroad purposes, a certain parcel of land lying in the town of Osborn, in DeKalb county, and bounded on the north by Baker street, on the south by the one-hundred-foot right-of-way of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, on the east by Clinton street, and on the west by Hunt street. The property has a front of three hundred and twenty-five feet on the south line of Baker street and substantially the same frontage on the north line of said railroad right-of-way, a front of sixty-two feet on the east line of Hunt street, and a front of about eighty-three feet on west line of Clinton street.
The plaintiff is a railroad corporation, duly organized under the laws of this State. The Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company is a railroad corporation organized under special acts of the General Assembly of this State, approved January 27, 1837, and February 16, 1847. The defendant Baker is a civil engineer, and in 1858 had charge of the western division of the Hannibal & St. Joseph railroad. At that time John Duff and William Osborn were members of the firm of Duff & Co., who were the contractors for the construction of the Hannibal & St. Joseph railroad. J. T. K. Hayward was the land agent of said railroad. Baker, Duff, Osborn and Hayward were authorized by the railroad to select townsites and station grounds along the line of railroad. By an act of Congress the railroad had been granted a right-of-way one hundred feet wide running nearly east and west through the southeast quarter of section 15, and the southwest quarter of section 14 of township 57, range 31, in DeKalb county. By an act of Congress approved June 10, 1852, the Government donated to the railroad, to aid in its construction, every alternate section of land, designated by even numbers, for six sections on each side of the railroad, and under this grant the railroad acquired section 14 of township 57, range 31, in DeKalb county, and section 22 of township 57, range 31, in Clinton county. Charles Birch became the patentee, after the railroad right-of-way had been donated, of the southeast quarter of section 15 aforesaid, and some time prior to 1858 he conveyed the same to the defendant Baker. It appears, however, that Duff & Co. had furnished one-half of the money to buy said quarter section from Birch, so by deed, dated October 6, 1857, Baker conveyed a half interest in said quarter section to John Duff. Thereafter Duff conveyed the same to John L. Lathrop in trust for John M. Forbes, John Duff and John W. Brooks, or the survivor of them, by deed dated September 14, 1859. Thereafter, Brooks and Duff having died, Forbes, by virtue of the power conferred upon him by the deed, appointed J. Henry Brooks and ...
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