Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 1915
• Docket Number: 136
• Citation: 174 S.W. 223,116 Ark. 455
• Parties: KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

174 S.W. 223

116 Ark. 455

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. STATE

No. 136

Supreme Court of Arkansas

January 25, 1915

Appeal from Benton Circuit Court; J. S. Maples, Judge; affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

Appellant brings this appeal from a judgment of conviction for violation of the "Full Crew Law" or "Three Brakeman Act" of Arkansas, Act No. 116, of the Acts of 1907, in Benton County, by operating a freight train consisting of more than twenty-five loaded freight cars and a caboose, over its line of road in said county, with a crew of less than three brakemen.

It admitted operating a freight train over its line of railroad in Benton County, which it alleged was only 28.8 miles in length, with only two brakemen, and that its entire line of railroad is more than fifty miles in length, but denied that it had over fifty miles of railroad in Benton County, stating that its line in the said county, starting at Sulphur Springs enters the State of Oklahoma at a distance of 28.8 miles, the exact mileage between the Missouri line and the Oklahoma line being 28.83 miles and denying that the train was operated unlawfully or in violation of the act, alleging that same was not applicable to such train or the operation of its road in that county. It alleged further that the act was not applicable to its trains operated upon its road in said county and if held to be, challenged the act as in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and as depriving it of its property without due process of law and denying it the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to said Constitution.

It further alleged said act was in conflict with the Interstate Commerce Act, approved June 26, 1906, and the amendments thereto.

From the agreed statement of facts upon which the case was tried it appears that appellant is a corporation of Missouri owning and operating a line of railroad from Kansas City through that State, Kansas, Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana to Port Arthur, a distance of over 700 miles. The road runs from Missouri through Benton County, Arkansas, 28.83 miles, into Oklahoma. On the date alleged, August 14, it was engaged in the transportation of freight over said portion of its line in Benton County, operating a train, consisting of twenty-six freight cars and a caboose, manned by a crew including only two brakemen. It operated a like freight train, consisting of twenty-seven cars and a caboose over its said line of road in Benton County on August 15, with a crew including only two brakemen, there being no strike among its employees at the time.

The line of road after leaving Benton County runs into Oklahoma and enters the State of Arkansas again near Fort Smith, where it extends into the State about half a mile in the limits of said city. This is a part of a branch line running from Spiro, Oklahoma, on the main line, to Fort Smith. The main line enters the State of Arkansas again from Oklahoma near Howard, on its western boundary and extends through this State southward for about fifty-five miles, where it crosses Red River into the State of Texas and runs through that State for a distance of about twenty miles, the road therein being owned by the Texarkana & Fort Smith Ry. Co., and then enters the State of Arkansas again and extends through the southwest corner of Miller County a distance of 7.4 miles and then on into the State of Louisiana.

Judgment affirmed.

James B. McDonough, for appellant.

By its terms the law does not apply to a road less than fifty miles in length. Acts 1907, p. 295. As applied to roads more than fifty miles in length the act was upheld by this court, 86 Ark. 412, and by the United States Supreme Court, 219 U.S 453, but the question raised here was not passed upon.

Section 1 of the act gives clearness and certainty of meaning to section 2, and necessarily refers to the length of line in Arkansas.

In the construction of a statute, the entire act must read as one; its meaning must be gathered from the whole, and such construction given to the several provisions as will render them consistent and give effect to each. 99 Ark. 149; 102 Ark. 213; 11 Ark. 44; 22 Ark. 369; 28 Ark. 200; 31 Ark. 119; 38 Ark. 205.

There is nothing in the act showing an intent to give extra-territorial effect to the statute, even if the Legislature had that power, and in the absence of language showing an intent to give it such effect, it will not be so construed. 95 Ark. 381; 66 Ark. 466; 82 Ark. 405; 101 N. E. (N. Y.) 894; 125 P. 812. No State has power to give its laws effect beyond its boundaries. 36 Cyc. 829, notes 21 and 23, and cases cited; 53 S.W. 809; 42 N.Y. 283; Sedgewick on Stat. Construction, 56, 57, and cases cited; 187 U.S. 617.

Statutes which impose burdens not known to the common law should be construed strictly in favor of those upon whom the burdens are imposed. 71 Ark. 556.

2. The full crew law, if applied to this line in Benton County, is void, because it is a burden upon interstate commerce. Art. 1, sec. 8, Const. U. S.; 210 U.S. 281; 95 U.S. 465; 201 U.S. 321; 202 U S. 543.

3. If applied to appellant's lines in Benton, Sebastian and Sevier counties, the act is unreasonable and denies to appellant the equal protection of the laws, and deprives it of its property contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 118 U.S. 356; 165 U.S. 150; 174 U.S. 96; 183 U.S. 79; 184 U.S. 540; 232 U.S. 626; 230 U.S. 139; 229 U.S. 397; 230 U.S. 340; 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 106.

Wm. L. Moose, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Assistant, for appellee.

1. The plain meaning and intent of the act was and is that all railroads authorized to do business in this State, whose roads are fifty miles or more in length and a part of which runs into or through this State, shall be subject to the provisions of the act. Acts 1907, p. 295, § 2; 86 Ark. 412; 219 U.S. 453; 165 U.S. 628.

2. It is not a burden on interstate commerce. 55 Law Ed., 290-296.

OPINION

KIRBY, J., (after stating the facts).

It is first contended for appellant that the act is not applicable to the operation of its road in Benton County, which is less than fifty miles in length within the State, therein. Section 1 of the act provides that no railroad company, etc., operating any line of railroad in the State, engaged in the transportation of freight, shall equip its freight trains, with a crew consisting of fewer men than an engineer, fireman, conductor and three brakemen, "regardless of any modern equipment of automatic coupler and air brakes, except as hereinafter provided." Section 2 provides the act shall not apply to any railroad company or officer of court, operating any line of railroad, whose line or lines are less than fifty miles in length, nor to any railroad in the State, regardless of length, where the freight train operated shall consist of less than twenty-five cars, and "it being the purpose of this act to require all railroads in this State whose line or lines are over fifty miles in length engaged in hauling a freight train, consisting of twenty-five cars or more, to equip the same with a crew, consisting of not less than an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and three brakemen, etc.," and permitting the increase of the number of the crew.

Section 3 provides...