Karling v. Samsara Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22 C 295 |
| Citation | 610 F.Supp.3d 1094 |
| Parties | David KARLING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SAMSARA INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Gary M. Klinger, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Chicago, IL, Jason Louis Lichtman, Sean Petterson, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
David Charles Layden, Elena Marie Olivieri, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff David Karling, on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleges that Defendant Samsara Inc., violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS § 14/1, et seq. ("BIPA"), by: collecting his information from facial scans without notice or release; disseminating that information to third parties; failing to create, disclose and adhere to a written policy for data retention and destruction; and profiting from these actions. Karling sued in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and Samsara removed the case to this Court. Samsara now moves to dismiss Karling's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the Court finds that it requires a fuller factual record to consider Samara's preemption and dormant Commerce Clause arguments and that Karling has sufficient alleged various BIPA violations, the Court denies Samsara's motion to dismiss.
Samsara provides facial recognition software and sensors to commercial fleets and industrial operations. The Samsara cameras capture the actions of the drivers to monitor for fatigue and distraction. Karling worked in Illinois as a driver for Lily Transportation, a customer of Samsara. In 2021, Lily Transportation installed an AI Dash Camera, provided by Samsara, in Karling's truck. The AI Dashcam extracted biometric identifiers from Karling's face while he drove and sent them to the Samsara Cloud Dashboard, where Samsara stored the images. The Samsara Camera includes a feature called Camera ID, which automatically performed facial recognition to identify Karling by extracting biometric identifiers and comparing those to the stored data. Karling never gave permission for the collection and storage of his biometric data. Samsara never provided Karling with a written release, the required statutory disclosures, or a retention and destruction policy. Karling never signed a written release or had an opportunity to prevent this collection and use of his biometric data.
BIPA, enacted in 2008, protects a person's biometric identifiers, including facial scans. 740 ILCS § 14/10. It also separately protects biometric information, which is information based on these identifiers that is used to identify an individual. Id. Specifically, BIPA makes it unlawful to: "collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifiers and/or biometric information, unless [the company] first:
Id. at § 14/15(b).
BIPA requires a publicly available limited retention and destruction policy:
A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.
Id. at § 14/15(a). It prohibits a company from "sell[ing], leas[ing], trad[ing] or otherwise profit[ing] from a person's or the customer's biometric identifier or biometric information." Id. at § 14/15(c). And it requires the subject's consent to disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate that information. Id. at § 14/15/(d).
Karling alleges that Samsara's camera and software collected his and other putative class members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information without their permission, and that Samsara, through its contracts with transportation-industry customers, profited from this use. He further alleges that Samsara disseminated those biometrics to third parties, including Karling's employer, Lily Transportation.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; Gibson v. City of Chicago , 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim and provide fair notice to the defendant of the claim's basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Adams v. City of Indianapolis , 742 F.3d 720, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2014). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Samsara first seeks dismissal of the complaint on the basis that Karling's proposed application of BIPA would disrupt "a uniform scheme of federal regulation of truck safety technology" and "frustrate Congress's specific, expressed intent to encourage the use of biometric technology to authenticate truck drivers’ identities in connection with ELD [electronic hours logging device] operation." Doc. 17-1 at 14 (emphasis in original). Karling argues that it is premature to decide Samsara's affirmative defense of preemption without a factual record. Karling further argues that there is no preemption because Samsara does not point to a federal law and explain how it conflicts with BIPA or how BIPA forecloses federal encouragement of biometric safety devices. The Court agrees that it cannot, at this stage of the litigation, find that conflict preemption bars Karling's claims.
Under the Supremacy Clause, lawfully created federal statutes may preempt conflicting state statutes. DeHart v. Town of Austin , 39 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1994) (). Federal law may preempt state law in three situations: when Congress expressly states so, when a federal regulatory scheme implies exclusive congressional legislative power, and in cases of "actual conflict." Cap. Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp , 467 U.S. 691, 699, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). Samsara argues a kind of conflict preemption, in which a "state or local law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ " DeHart , 39 F.3d at 721 (citations omitted). The ultimate task in a preemption inquiry "is to ascertain the intent of Congress." Id. at 722. The Seventh Circuit has further directed that a "court should not find conflict preemption ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ " C.Y. Wholesale, Inc. v. Holcomb , 965 F.3d 541, 547 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Samsara does not argue that BIPA conflicts with a particular federal statute; rather, it urges the Court to find "a uniform scheme of federal regulation of truck safety technology" disrupted by BIPA's Illinois-specific requirements. Doc. 17-1 at 14. Samsara states that Congress has tasked various federal agencies to create a uniform system of interstate trucking safety regulations and points to the long history of Congressional regulation of trucking safety generally. Samsara also cites a recent Department of Transportation ("DOT") "National Roadway Safety Strategy," published on the DOT website, and its initiative to incentivize vehicle safety technology including systems to deter distracted driving. Samsara lists the recent Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 23006, 135 Stat. 429 (2021), which directed DOT to research driver monitoring systems (with the goal of reducing driver distraction) and authorized DOT rulemaking on these systems (to include privacy and data security safeguards). Samsara also refers to a 2012 Congressional mandate that DOT issue regulations requiring most commercial vehicles to be equipped with an electronic logging device ("ELD") designed to assure compliance with hours-of-service requirements and further directing that those regulations include considerations of driver privacy and data confidentiality. Finally, as proof of this uniform scheme, Samsara points to a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Privacy Impact Assessment for the ELD Rule in which the agency notes that biometric identifiers are one possible way to log into an ELD. Karling counters that Samsara's collection of references does not create a uniform regulatory scheme such that the clear, preemptive purpose of Congress is evident. The Court agrees.
Preemption is "an affirmative defense upon which the defendants bear the burden of proof." Benson v. Fannie May Confections Brands, Inc. , 944 F.3d 639, 645...
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