Karnopp v. Karnopp

• Decision Date: 08 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 50770,50770,2
• Citation: 387 S.W.2d 527
• Parties: Elmer KARNOPP, Appellant, v. Mildred R. KARNOPP, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 527

387 S.W.2d 527

Elmer KARNOPP, Appellant, v. Mildred R. KARNOPP, Respondent.

No. 50770.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

March 8, 1965.

Robert L. Jackson, John G. Killiger, Kansas City, for appellant.

Lawrence R. Brown, Alvin D. Shapiro, Stinson, Mag, Thomson, McEvers & Fizzell, Kansas City, for respondent.

PRITCHARD, Commissioner.

Appellant, Elmer Karnopp, brought suit against his sister, the respondent Mildred Karnopp, a single woman, by which he sought to have a trust declared of a one-half interest in two parcels of real estate. This real estate was formerly owned by the mother of the parties, Mrs. Mattie J. Karnopp. One of the properties was the family residence at 421 West 49th Street Terrace, and the other was a storeroom and second story office structure (the Karnopp Building) at 4301 Main Street, in Kansas City, Missouri.

Respondent denied appellant's claim and also asserted a counterclaim against him by which she sought to have herself declared to be the sole owner of a third piece of real property, 4300 Walnut, just to the rear of the Karnopp Building. Respondent's theory was that of a resulting trust, she having furnished the entire consideration for the purchase of the property, the title to which was placed in the names of appellant and his wife, Willa, and respondent. Appellant's wife, Willa Karnopp, entered her appearance in the case and by specific signed and acknowledged instrument filed in the court disclaimed any interest in the third piece of real property. Respondent also prayed for an accounting of certain of her money claimed to have been expended by appellant, but she waived the right to an accounting in the court below after submission of the case.

The trial court heard the case, took it under advisement, and thereafter rendered a final decree against appellant on his petition and for respondent on her counterclaim.

We consider first appellant's claim on his petition. He pleaded that the mother of the parties, Mrs. Mattie Karnopp (of whom they are sole heirs), on or about March 15, 1956, made a quitclaim deed to a straw party, Mae R. Karnopp, of her two tracts of real estate; that Mae R. Karnopp, pursuant to Mrs. Karnopp's instructions, reconveyed on the same date the same property to Mrs. Karnopp and respondent 'as joint tenants and not as tenants in common.' That it was then the intent and purpose of Mrs. Karnopp that the deeds were made for convenience only and were not intended to convey the entire equitable interest to respondent. That the deeds were made in order to permit the immediate transfer of title in the event of Mrs. Karnopp's death, but with specific instructions and agreement that the joint tenancy of respondent was for the equal benefit and use of appellant. That the intent of the grantor was that in the event of her death the parties would enjoy full legal and equitable ownership of the two tracts of real estate. It was further pleaded that there was no consideration for the deeds and no gift was intended and that respondent took title with full knowledge that her interest was for the benefit of her and appellant. By reason of all the foregoing acts and agreements it was pleaded by appellant that a trust arose by implication of law as to a one-half interest for his benefit. The petition is further that the intent of Mrs. Karnopp 'was communicated to the defendant and the defendant received such joint tenancy on the express understanding and agreement that in the event of her mother's death the plaintiff would be given equal ownership in the said real estate with his sister and it was pursuant to such arrangement and agreement that such deeds were executed, made, delivered and recorded.' Appellant also pleaded that respondent had failed and refused to acknowledge the trust arrangement and refused to convey to appellant his one-half interest in the property, but claimed the entire fee in her own right. The prayer of the petition was that the court find that the 1956 transactions were intended and did create an equal ownership in the parties, and that respondent is the trustee of a constructive trust for the benefit of appellant of a one-half interest in the two tracts of real estate.

Appellant suggests in his brief that the nature of his remedy is that of a resulting trust. Such suggestion is without merit. A resulting trust usually involves only the situation where one person pays the purchase price of property, which raises a presumption that the purchase was for his own benefit. Appellant does not contend that he furnished anything for the deeds. See Swon v. Huddleston, Mo., 282 S.W.2d 18, 24, 55 A.L.R.2d 205.

We construe appellant's pleading to be at best one for the establishment of a constructive trust of the properties in question. If it is an express trust without more [done by the direct and positive acts of the parties, 89 C.J.S. Trusts Sec. 11, p. 722; Sanford v. Van Pelt, 314 Mo. 175, 282 S.W. 1022, 1031; Gwin v. Gwin, 240 Mo.App. 782, 219 S.W.2d 282, 285], appellant's case must fail because his evidence does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 456.010, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. Although respondent did not plead the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense as is ordinarily required, Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266, 44 S.W. 467, 469, she did make timely objection to the parol evidence tending to show an express trust established, and renewed that objection throughout the trial. The timely objection was sufficient to interpose the unpleaded defense of the Statute of Frauds. Long v. Conrad, Mo., 42 S.W.2d 357, 361[3, 4]. If there is, however, evidence of unconscionable conduct on the part of the grantee in inducing the conveyances, or causing the grantor not to make a provision by will which she would have made absent such conduct, then the Statute of Frauds is no bar to an action to establish a constructive trust. Mead v. Robertson, 131 Mo.App. 185, 110 S.W. 1095, 1096; Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 249 S.W. 946, 954; Jackson v. Tibbling, Mo., 310 S.W.2d 909, 915[4-6].

The only testimony bearing upon his claim is that of appellant himself. Mrs. Karnopp was killed in an automobile collision near Osceola, Missouri, in September, 1960. In that same collision respondent was severely and critically injured which occasioned her hospitalization at St. Luke's Hospital in Kansas City for about five months. Appellant came to Kansas City and took over the management of the business properties and attended to the illness expenses of respondent, using proceeds from the cashing of U. S. Bonds which had been jointly held by respondent and her mother. Appellant testified that respondent herself brought up the subject of the management or ownership of the property in November, 1960, while she was at St. Luke's Hospital. Appe...