Condit v. Maxwell
| Decision Date | 18 January 1898 |
| Parties | Condit et al. v. Maxwell et al., Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis County Circuit Court. -- Hon. Rudolph Hirzel Judge.
Affirmed and judgment modified.
John D Johnson and Joseph S. Laurie for appellants.
The agreement between H. Clay Sexton and Thos. Maxwell, under which the land in controversy was conveyed to the latter, did not, according to the pleadings and proofs in the case create a constructive trust in Maxwell for the benefit of plaintiffs, as found by the trial court. (1) Constructive trust only results from imposition or fraud practiced by the one sought to be charged as the trustee in acquiring title to the trust property, and there was no misrepresentation or other fraud practiced by Thomas Maxwell in procuring the conveyance to himself, or in procuring the making of the agreement with H. Clay Sexton respecting the same. Perry on Trusts, sec. 166, et seq. (2) Said conveyance and agreement did not create a constructive trust in favor of H. Clay Sexton and his heirs, even if it did in favor of Margaret Condit and R. E. Lee Sexton; for, according to the averments of the petition and evidence, H. Clay Sexton was a party to the fraud, if there was fraud, out of which the trust arose. Obear v. Howard, 11 Mo. 425; Sell v. West, 125 Mo. 621; 1 Perry on Trusts [4 Ed.], sec. 165. (3) If, however, said conveyance and agreement was in fraud of the rights of plaintiffs, then they can not maintain this action, because they and the said H. Clay Sexton waived the fraud and failed to rescind the agreement as soon as the fraud became known to them. Taylor v. Short, 107 Mo. 384; Bobb v. Wood, 50 Mo. 95; Melton v. Smith, 65 Mo. 315; State ex rel. v. Jones, 53 Mo.App. 207; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., sec. 897; Fry on Spec. Perf. [2 Ed.], secs. 703, 704; Lawson on Contracts, sec. 249. (4) The trust, if any, created by said agreement, was an express trust and therefore not enforcible by reason of not having been in writing. Rogers v. Ramey, 137 Mo. 598; Price v. Kane, 112 Mo. 419; Weiss v. Heitkamp, 127 Mo. 23; Green v. Cates, 73 Mo. 115. (5) The transfer of the said land made by Thomas Maxwell did not authorize the judgment of forfeiture, for there was no limitation in the agreement of his right or power to dispose of the property before the ten years expired. The conveyances made by him should be considered as an election on his part to take and pay for the same, as contemplated by the agreement, and not as an assertion of title adverse to plaintiffs. (6) All of said beneficiaries were guilty of such delay and laches in commencing proceedings to redeem the property as to estop them from setting up the trust now. Tatum v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 422; Stevenson v. Saline County, 65 Mo. 425; Klein v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239; Burgess v. Railroad, 99 Mo. 508; Ferguson v. Soden, 111 Mo. 215; Schradski v. Albright, 93 Mo. 48; Laudrum v. Bank, 63 Mo. 48. (7) If it be held that the plaintiffs are not estopped by reason of their laches, then appellant is entitled to be reimbursed out of the said property for the $ 21,661.78, amount of Thomas Maxwell's indebtedness to him, and which was the consideration paid by appellant for the conveyance of the property to him. Eoff v. Ironie, 108 Mo. 378, and cases cited.
W. C. & J. C. Jones for respondents.
(1) A resulting trust is clearly established in Thomas Maxwell and in his grantee, Joseph Maxwell. Peacock v. Nelson, 50 Mo. 256; Key v. Jennings, 66 Mo. 356; Shaw v. Shaw, 86 Mo. 598; Johnson v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 426; Baumgartner v. Guessfield, 38 Mo. 41; Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo. 109; Dailey v. Dailey, 285 S.W. 330; Wilson v. Orr, 27 S.W. 394; Kelley v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249; Forrester v. Moore, 77 Mo. 651. (2) Joseph Maxwell's title was acquired by quitclaim deed; therefore he takes the property subject to all outstanding equities, and the plaintiffs' rights are superior to his. Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 385; Flynn v. Herye, 4 Mo.App. 366; Fox v. Hall, 74 Mo. 316; Hope v. Blair, 105 Mo. 95; Stofel v. Shroeder, 62 Mo. 150; Mann v. Best, 62 Mo. 498; Ridgeway v. Halliday, 59 Mo. 455; Shradski v. Albright, 93 Mo. 48. (3) Joseph Maxwell gave no valuable consideration for his first quitclaim deed from Thomas Maxwell. He took it as security for an old, outstanding and existing indebtedness due to him by Thomas Maxwell. He took it, not in payment of the debt, nor did he agree to extend the time of payment. An antecedent debt is not a valuable consideration. Martin v. Jones, 22 Mo. 25; Broadwell v. Merritt, 87 Mo. 101; Mason v. Black, 87 Mo. 329; Harkless v. Barton Co., 85 Mo. 619; Morrison v. Harrington, 25 S.W. 568; Hope v. Blair, 105 Mo. 95. (4) Joseph Maxwell had actual notice of the plaintiffs' claims prior to the time of acquiring any title to this property. Actual notice charges him with the equities that actually existed, irrespective of the question of "no valuable consideration" and irrespective of the effect of acquiring title by "quitclaim deed." Darling v. Potts, 24 S.W. 464; Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106; Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 564; Martin v. Jones, 22 Mo. 25; Sergeant v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. St. 340. (5) First. The plaintiffs were not called upon to assert their claim to the property to Joseph Maxwell until he acquired some title to the property. Second. Laches is a defense available only to an innocent holder without notice of equities. Third. Plaintiffs were not called upon to assert their claims sooner because, under the verbal contract, Thomas was to have the farm for ten years. Napton v. Leaton, 71 Mo. 369; Smith v. Hutchinson, 61 Mo. 83; Kelly v. Hurt, 61 Mo. 466; Butler v. Lawson, 72 Mo. 249; Spurlock v. Sproule, 72 Mo. 249; Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 510; Henroid v. Neusbanner, 69 Mo. 102; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 69 Mo. 621; Burdett v. May, 100 Mo. 18. (6) Thomas Maxwell was guilty of fraud in law and in fact. Joseph Maxwell claims through Thomas Maxwell and can not apply the doctrine of laches in view of his knowledge of the method by which Thomas Maxwell acquired title. Ames v. Gilmore, 59 Mo. 543; Shaw v. Shaw, 86 Mo. 598; Baumgartner v. Guessfield, 38 Mo. 41; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 494; Perry on Trustees, sec. 211, 217; Conn. Mut. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261.
The suit is in equity to set aside certain deeds conveying a tract of about fifty-three acres of land situate in St. Louis county. The pleadings are quite lengthy, and a statement of the facts upon which they are predicated will only be necessary in order to make the issues understood.
Prior to March, 1884, H. Clay Sexton owned the undivided half of a tract of land in Clinton county, Illinois, and plaintiff Margaret Sexton (who afterward married Condit) and R. E. Lee Sexton owned each the undivided one fourth of the same, as heirs of John Sexton, deceased. Defendant Thomas Maxwell was the son-in-law of the said H. Clay Sexton. At the same time one Carrie Hewitt owned the tract of land in question, the title thereof being in her trustee B. F. Webster. On the sixth day of March, 1884, H. Clay Sexton, Margaret Sexton and Robert E. Lee Sexton conveyed the Illinois land to Webster as trustee for the said Carrie Hewitt. The said Robert was at that time a minor, about twenty years of age. On the fourth of March, 1884, Carrie S. Hewitt and her trustee conveyed the St. Louis county land to Thomas Maxwell. This deed was dated January 29, but was not acknowledged until March 4, 1884. The expressed consideration was $ 12,000 and the grantee assumed the payment of a mortgage on the land amounting to $ 2,500. That the conveyance of the Illinois land was the consideration for this conveyance, is undisputed. H. Clay Sexton was the uncle of the said Margaret and Robert, with whom they lived at the date of these transactions. Thomas Maxwell paid the $ 2,500 mortgage on the St. Louis land January 3, 1885. In January, 1887, Thomas Maxwell purchased about forty-seven acres adjoining the land he acquired from the Hewitts, and on March 3, 1892, he mortgaged both tracts to defendant, the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, to secure an indebtedness of $ 15,000. It is conceded that said company had no notice, at the time of taking this mortgage, of any equities claimed by plaintiffs in the Hewitt land. In May, 1893, Thomas Maxwell executed and delivered to a trustee a deed of trust to secure to defendant Thomas T. Ruby an indebtedness of $ 3,000 then due, and advances that might thereafter be made.
On the fourteenth day of June, 1893, Thomas Maxwell, by quitclaim deed, for an expressed consideration of $ 1, conveyed both tracts of land to his brother, the defendant Joseph A. Maxwell. The wife of the grantor did not join in this deed. On March 6, 1894, Thomas Maxwell, his wife joining, by another quitclaim deed, for a like consideration, conveyed both tracts to the said Joseph A. Maxwell. On February 5, 1894, the land was sold under execution on a judgment against Thomas Maxwell, and Charles C. Garrett was the purchaser to whom the sheriff made a deed. Garrett conveyed to Ruby and Ruby to Joseph Maxwell. Garrett, Ruby and Maxwell, all had notice of plaintiffs' claim, when these purchases and deeds were made. Thomas Maxwell had possession of the land from the date of the conveyance to him by Hewitt and her trustee until his conveyance to his brother, and while in possession made valuable and lasting improvements upon it. H. Clay Sexton died December 21, 1893, and his heirs join in this suit as plaintiffs.
These facts were recited in plaintiffs' petition, and were not controverted at the trial. Plaintiffs charge that the consideration for the conveyance of the Hewitt land to Thomas Maxwell was paid by the exchange of the Illinois land which belonged to H. Clay Sexton...
To continue reading
Request your trial