Karrick v. Board of Ed. of Findlay School Dist.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37358,37358
• Citation: 190 N.E.2d 256,174 Ohio St. 467,23 O.O.2d 114
• Parties: , 23 O.O.2d 114 KARRICK et al., Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FINDLAY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Findlay Civil Service Commission, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 467

174 Ohio St. 467

190 N.E.2d 256, 23 O.O.2d 114

KARRICK et al., Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FINDLAY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Findlay Civil Service Commission, Appellant.

No. 37358.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 1, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Section 143.30, Revised Code, in extending civil service jurisdiction to nonteaching employees of city school districts, does not contravene Section 10 of Article XV of the Constitution of Ohio.

2. A municipal civil service commission, not being an 'agency' as defined by Section 119(A), Revised Code, is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 119, Revised Code) in promulgating rules.

3. Municipal civil service commission rules, which incorporate age and residence requirements for the examination of nonteaching employees of a city school district, are not inconsistent with the provisions of Section 143.01 to 143.48, inclusive, Revised Code, and hence are not unlawful.

Russell E. Rakestraw, City Sol., for appellant.

John J. Chester, Columbus, for appellees.

GIBSON, Judge.

The facts in this case are stated in the report thereof at page 73 of this volume, 174 Ohio St., at page 855 of 186 N.E.2d, where the majority of this court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring Section 143.30, Revised Code, so far as it extends civil service jurisdiction to nonteaching employees of city school districts, unconstitutional and void because it is in conflict with Section 10 of Article XV of the Constitution of Ohio.

Upon reconsideration following oral argument, the court unanimously concludes that for the reasons heretofore stated by Taft and O'Neill, JJ., in a concurring opinion (174 Ohio St. 73, 79, 186 N.E.2d 855), its prior judgment respecting the constitutionality of Section 143.30, Revised Code, was in error, and such judgment is hereby set aside.

In addition to the constitutional issue, appellees contend that (1) the rules of the appellant respecting age and residence requirements are void because they were not adopted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 119, Revised Code), and (2) the rules are unlawful because the age and residence requirements contained therein are unreasonable, discriminatory and constitute an abuse of discretion by the appellant. For the reasons stated herein, these contentions are not sustained.

With respect to the contention that the rules of the appellant herein question are invalid because of noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 119, Revised Code), the first sentence of Section 119.01(A), defining 'agency' for the purpose of the act, provides:

'(A) 'Agency' means, except as limited by this division, any official, board, or commission having authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in the bureau of unemployment compensation, the civil service commission, the department of industrial relations, the department of liquor control, the department of taxation, the industrial commission, the functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and the licensing functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling licenses.' (Emphasis supplied.) The remainder of Section 119.01(A) expressly sets forth limitations upon the term 'agency'. A careful reading of the above-quoted statutory language clearly indicates that only agencies at the state level of government are covered by the act. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the act was originally enacted in 1943 following a study by the Administrative Law Commission of state departments, commissions, boards and bureaus. Such commission made no attempt to examine the procedures and processes of local government boards, commissions, or departments. Prior to the court's Judgment of last December in this case, no municipal civil service commission had filed its rules and regulations with the Secretary of State.

Section 143.30, Revised Code, requires the establishment of municipal civil service commissions and grants to such commissions the powers and duties with respect to...