Karson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 December 1881
• Citation: 29 Minn. 12,11 N.W. 122
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: KARSON v MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RY. CO.

29 Minn. 12

11 N.W. 122

KARSONvMILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed December 30, 1881.

Appeal by defendant from order of district court, county of Mower, denying motion for new trial.

D. B. Johnson, Jr., for appellant.

Joseph McKnight, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This is an action for damages for the destruction of two stacks of hay by fire, alleged to have been set by a coal or spark from defendant's engine, through negligence in operating its road. The only question for consideration is whether the verdict against defendant was sustained by the evidence.

The first point raised is that there was no evidence that the fire which caused the injury was set by defendant's engine. The evidence tended to show that the fire started in the grass near and to the leeward of defendant's track a few minutes after a train had passed; that there was quite a stiff breeze; that there was no person, and no other fire than that of the passing engine, in the vicinity at the time.

It being a matter of common knowledge that engines do emit sparks which start fires in this way, and there being no other apparent probable explanation of the origin of the fire, we think these facts rendered it highly probable that this fire was set from the passing engine, and fully warranted the jury in so finding. Smith v. London & S. W. R. Co. L. R. 6 C. P. 14;Burke v. Louisville R. Co. 7 Heisk. 451;Woodson v. M. & St. P. R. Co. 21 Minn. 60.

The further contention of defendant is that, even if it was established that this fire was set from its engine, yet the presumption of negligence arising from that fact was fully rebutted by satisfactory and uncontradicted evidence that its engine was properly constructed, in good condition, and carefully and skilfully operated. This presents the only question of any difficulty in the case. Chapter 30, Gen. Laws 1874, (Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, § 60,) enacts that “all railroad companies or corporations operating or running cars or steam-engines over roads in this state shall be liable to any party aggrieved for all damages caused by fire being scattered or thrown from said cars or engines, without the owner or owners of the property so damaged being required to show defects in their engines, or negligence on the part of their employes; but the fact of such fire being so scattered or thrown shall be construed by all courts having jurisdiction as prima facie evidence of such negligence or defect.”

This statute, in our opinion, establishes the same rule which has been established by similar statutes in a number of other states, and which has been by many courts held to be a common-law principle, in the absence of statute, viz., that where damage is caused by fire which is proven to have escaped from the engine of a railroad company, a presumption of negligence on the part of the company arises which casts the onus or burden of proof upon the railroad company to show affirmatively that they were not guilty of any negligence in the matter. We do not think or hold that the mere fact that the fire was set by an engine has such an effect as direct evidence of negligence as would warrant a jury in finding negligence, if the otherwise uncontradicted evidence on the part of the railroad company showed satisfactorily that it had fully performed its duty in the premises. And if a jury should so find, it would be the right and duty of the court to set aside the verdict, as in any other case where it was not justified by the evidence.

The statute creates what is sometimes called a disputable presumption of law; that is, where the law itself, without the aid of a jury, infers one fact from the proved existence of another fact, in the absence of all opposing evidence. 1 Greenl. Ev. c. 4, § 33. The effect of the statute is that where it is established that the fire causing the damage was scattered or thrown from the company's engine, the burden of proof is cast upon the company to show affirmatively that it did its duty in the premises, and was not in fact guilty of any negligence. This it must do by satisfactory evidence, as in any case where a party holds the affirmative of an issue, or where the burden of proof is cast upon him. And whether it has done so is...