Karupaiyan v. Wipro Ltd.

• Docket Number: 3:23-2005 (GC) (TJB)
• Decision Date: 31 July 2023
• Parties: PALANI KARUPAIYAN, PP, RP[1]Plaintiffs, v. WIPRO LIMITED, THIERY DELAPORTE, ABIDALI NEEMUCHWALA, T.K. KURIEN, AZIM HASHIN PREMJI, WIPRO ENTERPRISE LTD, IDC TECHNOLOGIES, and PRATEEK GATTANI, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

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PALANI KARUPAIYAN, PP, RP^[1]Plaintiffs, v. WIPRO LIMITED, THIERY DELAPORTE, ABIDALI NEEMUCHWALA, T.K. KURIEN, AZIM HASHIN PREMJI, WIPRO ENTERPRISE LTD, IDC TECHNOLOGIES, and PRATEEK GATTANI, Defendants.

No. 3:23-2005 (GC) (TJB)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

July 31, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GEORGETTE CASTNER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff is a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, proceeding pro se against Wipro

Limited IDC Technologies, and various officers and ex-officers of these companies. (See ECF No. 1 at 1, ¶¶ 5-18, ¶¶ 28-36.) On April 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperise). (ECF No. 1-2.)

Plaintiffs Application to proceed IFP will be denied without prejudice because the Application is incomplete and internally inconsistent. For example, although a spouse is listed, (ECF No, 1-2 at 3), the fields relating to spousal income employment history, and expenses are left blank. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1, 4.)^[2] Additionally, a monthly expense of $3,800 is listed for “Alimony, maintenance, and support paid to others,” but “total monthly expenses” is listed as $890, indicating that the $3,800 figure was not used to calculate the total. (Id. at 4, 5.) Because the IFP application is incomplete and inconsistent, this Court will also administratively terminate this case for docket management purposes. Plaintiff may seek to reopen this action either by paying the Court's filing fee or by submitting a complete and consistent IFP application within 30 days with an amended Complaint curing the deficiencies set forth herein.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs complaint contains a wide variety of different claims and allegations, which will be partially summarized here. First, Plaintiff makes a complex series of allegations to the general effect that Defendants are conducting fake interviews of U.S. citizens in order to obtain additional H-1B visas. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 69-81.) Plaintiff further argues that Defendants committed tax evasion and money laundering because they outsourced labor to foreign employees, which decreased the amount of income and payroll that is taxable in the United States. (Id. at ¶ 81, 82.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants' recruitment officers admitted that they refused to hire him as a software engineer because he was too old, a U.S. citizen, and has diabetes. (Id. at ¶ 91-99.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court must screen complaints filed with IFP applications. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)” (“Rule”). Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). “[A] court has the authority to dismiss a case ‘at any time,' 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), regardless of the status of a filing fee; that is, a court has the discretion to consider the merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even simultaneously.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655,660 (3d Cir. 2019).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court conducts a three-part analysis. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675). “Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth,”' Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S, at 679). The court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Third, the court must determine whether the well-pleaded facts “plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief,” Malleus, 641 F,3d at 563 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Fowler, 578 F,3d at 211. A complaint that does not demonstrate more than a “mere possibility of misconduct” must be dismissed. Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Although courts construe pro se pleadings less stringently than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys, pro se litigants are still required to “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Rule 8 sets forth general rules of pleading, and requires (1) “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct.”

III. DISCUSSION

The Court recognizes that it must liberally construe Plaintiffs submission because he is pro se. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 373 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e must liberally construe the pro se litigant's pleadings, and we will apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether he has mentioned it by name.”) Plaintiffs claims fall into three main categories: first, actions brought under criminal and tax statutes which do not create private rights of action or do not create private rights of action for people in Plaintiff s circumstances; second, discrimination claims under federal law which require certain administrative steps prior to filing a civil action; and third, various other claims whose legal sufficiency the Court will not rule on at this time.

The claims under criminal and tax statutes which do not create a private right of action will be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Weeks v Bowman, Civ. No. 16-9050, 2017 WL 557332, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2017) (dismissing complaint based on criminal statutes for lack of a private cause of action). All other counts are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, any claims he brings will still be subject to the sua sponte Rule 12(b)(6) analysis described above.

A. Claims under laws which do not create private rights of action for Plaintiff

Counts 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 are all based on accusations of tax evasion and money laundering. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 313, 324-31.) Each is based on a subset of: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1956, 1957, 1960; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5324, 5332; and 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, 7206, 7623(d). (Id.) Criminal codes do not usually create private rights of action. See, e.g., Weeks, 2017 WL557332 at *2 (dismissing complaint based on criminal statutes for lack of a private cause of action). Further, each of the specific statutes Plaintiff cites has previously been found to lack an implied private right of action.

Plaintiffs claims under Title 18 of the United States Code relate to racketeering, money laundering, transactions involving criminally derived property, and unlicensed money transmitting businesses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1956, 1957, and 1960. None of these provide a private right of action. See Schwartz v. F.S. & O. Assocs., Inc,, Civ. No. 90-1606, 1991 WL 208056, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,1991) (“[Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952,1956 & 1957 do not create private rights of action”); Barrettv. City of Allentown, 152 F.R.D. 50, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“No civil action has been held to exist under either 18 U.S.C. § 1952 or 18 U.S.C. § 1956.”); Monge v. Nevarez L. Firm, Civ. No. 20-1118, 2020 WL 6485041, at *1 (D.N.M. Nov. 4, 2020) (Finding no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C, §§ 1952,1956, 1957, 1960 among others).

Likewise, there is no private cause of action under any of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5324, or 5332, See Kraft v. Off. of the Comptroller of Currency, Civ. No. 20-04111, 2021 WL 1251393, at *4 (D.S.D. Apr. 5, 2021) (“Under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321 and 5322, the United States is the only party authorized to seek civil or criminal penalties for any violation of the Bank Secrecy Act or accompanying regulation.”); Lundstedt v. Deutsche BankNat'l Tr. Co., Civ. No. 13-001423,2016 WL 3101999, at *5 (D. Conn. June 2, 2016) (“Bank Secrecy Act. . . 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(g) and 5322(a) . . . does not, however, create a private right of action.”); Bertsch v. Discover Fin. Servs., Civ. No, 218-00290, 2019 WL 1083773, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2019) (citing Martinez Colon v. Santander Nat. Bank, 4 F.Supp.2d 53, 57 (D.P.R. 1998)) (“Nor does a private right of action arise from the specific provision of Title 31 cited in Plaintiffs Complaint, § 5324.”); Deramus v. Shapiro Schwartz, LLP, Civ. No. 19-4683, 2020 WL 3493545, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, Civ. No. 19-4683, 2020 WL 3491960 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2020) (“[Because] 31 U.S.C. §§ . .. 5311-5332 ... do not display any indication of Congressional intent to create a private right and a private remedy, Plaintiffs claims for violation of these statutes should be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6)”).

Sections 7201, 7203, and 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code also do not grant a private right of action. Private civil actions for recovery of taxes are not permitted without special authorization from the Executive Branch. 26 U.S.C, § 7401; see also Woermer v. Hirsh, Civ. No. 18-01898 2018 WL 7572237, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2018) (“This statute [26 U.S.C. § 7201] does not create a private right of action.”); Johnson v. Cullen, 925 F.Supp. 244,251 (D. Del. 1996) (“[T]here is no private right of action available to plaintiffs under ... 26 U.S.C. § 7206.”); Gonzalez v. Auto Finders LLC, Civ. No. 12-2571, 2012 WL 1813466, at *1 (E.D. Pa, May 15, 2012) (citing Rumfelt v. Jazzie Pools, Inc., Civ. No. 11217, 2011 WL 2144553, at *5 (E.D.Va. May 31,2011)) (finding no private right of...