Kasica v. Town of Columbia

• Decision Date: 25 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18968.,18968.
• Citation: 70 A.3d 1,309 Conn. 85
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Gene KASICA v. TOWN OF COLUMBIA.

309 Conn. 85

70 A.3d 1

Gene KASICA

v.TOWN OF COLUMBIA.

No. 18968.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 16, 2013.

Decided June 25, 2013.

Laura Pascale Zaino, with whom was Michael C. Collins, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Gene Kasica, self-represented, with whom, on the brief, was Elisa J. Pensavalle, Hebron, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Jeffrey J. White and Kathleen E. Dion, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and ESPINOSA, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

The primary issue in this tax appeal is whether a municipal assessor has the authority, under General Statutes § 12–55(b),¹ to conduct an interim assessment of a property and increase its valuation based on partially completed construction. The defendant, the town of Columbia (town), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Gene Kasica, in his appeal from the decision of the town's Board of Assessment Appeals (board) upholding the town assessor's interim valuations of the plaintiff's property under § 12–55. On appeal, ² the town claims that the trial court improperly applied General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 12–53a,³ to the facts of the present case and incorrectly concluded that, because § 12–53a only applies to “completed new construction,” the assessor did not have statutory authority to assign value to the partially completed construction on the grand lists for the years in question.⁴ We agree with the town and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal. The plaintiff owns 163 acres of land located in the town. Several years after purchasing the property, the plaintiff cleared a 3.44 acre portion of the land to create a building lot.⁵ The present appeal concerns only this 3.44 acre lot.

On the grand list of October 1, 2008, the assessor for the town valued the 3.44 acre lot at $255,000. During the 2008 assessment of the plaintiff's property, the assessor observed that the building lot was improved with a “partially-constructed, three-story, plantation-style house.” The assessor determined that the construction was 35 percent complete for purposes of the October 1, 2008 assessment date, and valued the partially completed house at $569,500. The assessor adjusted the property's assessment on the 2008 grand list to reflect the value of the partially completed construction. The assessor returned to the property the following year and determined that construction of the house was 40 percent complete for purposes of the October 1, 2009 assessment date. The assessor valued the partially completed house at $601,600, and adjusted the property's value accordingly for the 2009 grand list.

The plaintiff appealed the assessor's 2008 valuation to the board, which denied the appeal. The plaintiff then appealed ⁶ from the board's denial to the Superior Court, claiming that the valuation of his property was “not that percentage of its true and actual value, but was grossly excessive, disproportional and unlawful.” ⁷

The plaintiff thereafter appealed ⁸ from the assessor's 2009 valuation, which also was denied by the board. The plaintiff then appealed from the board's denial to the Superior Court, claiming, inter alia,⁹ that the town violated § 12–53a by taxing “incomplete new construction” during the 2009 assessment year and, therefore, the 2009 assessment “was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of ... § 12–53a.” The town subsequently filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which was granted.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court stated that “[t]he main focus of the plaintiff's appeals is that the assessor disregarded ... § 12–53a by increasing the assessment value of the [property], as of the grand lists of October 1, 2008 and 2009.” The trial court then concluded that the assessor improperly relied on § 12–55 as authority to conduct the interim assessments of the plaintiff's property and determined that she should have been guided by § 12–53a. In rejecting the town's claim that § 12–55 authorized the interim assessments, the court, quoting Evans v. Guilford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–06–4021995–S, 2009 WL 5698121 (December 29, 2009) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 63, 66), concluded that the assessor “could not legally increase the assessed value of the property based solely on the new construction because interim assessments for new construction are governed by § 12–53a (a).... [T]he specific terms of § 12–53a (a), governing new construction, prevail over the broad terms of § 12–55. Because an interim assessment under § 12–53a (a) cannot commence until after new construction is completed, the assessor acted outside of [her] statutory mandate by performing an interim assessment when the property was [incomplete].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, due to the fact that the construction of the house was incomplete, the trial court concluded that the assessor did not have statutory authority to: “(1) value the subject premises as partially improved and (2) add this amount to the [town's] assessment rolls.”

Additionally, the trial court concluded that, if, as the town argued, § 12–55(b) required an assessor to include “any property” within the town on the date of each revaluation and, thus, authorizes an assessor to assess partially completed construction, then the language in § 12–53a (a) providing for an interim assessment of “[c]ompleted new construction” would be superfluous. The court stated: “The fact that the legislature enacted § 12–53a to provide for the assessment of new construction, but only after the completion of the construction upon issuance of a certificate of occupancy, evinces an intent to carve out an exception to the ‘any property’ language contained in § 12–55(b).” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the assessor's valuations for the 2008 and 2009 grand lists should have contained only the valuation of the land and not the valuation of the partially completed house. Thus, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and set the fair market valuation of the 3.44 acre lot at $175,000 for the 2008 and 2009 grand lists. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the town claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the town lacked authority under § 12–55 to conduct an assessment of the partially completed construction. Specifically, the town claims that, in 84 Century Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Tax Review, 207 Conn. 250, 262, 541 A.2d 478 (1988), superseded by statute on other grounds, DeSena v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 63, 84, 731 A.2d 733 (1999), this court concluded that § 12–55 unambiguously provides municipalities with broad authority to conduct interim assessments of property and that this authority extends to interim assessments of partially completed construction. Thus, the town contends that the assessor had the authority, pursuant to § 12–55, to assess the plaintiff's property and to assign value to the partially completed construction for purposes of the 2008 and 2009 grand lists.

In response, the plaintiff disagrees with the town's reliance on 84 Century Ltd. Partnership and claims that § 12–55 does not provide municipal assessors with broad authority to conduct interim assessments but, rather, is an administrative statute that only authorizes an assessor to conduct any assessment “omitted by mistake” or “required by law....” The plaintiffcontends that incomplete new construction is not a circumstance which requires an assessor to conduct an interim assessment pursuant to § 12–55(b) and, therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the assessor lacked statutory authority to conduct the assessments. We agree with the town.

Before considering the merits of the parties' arguments, we set forth the basic legal principles and standard of review applicable to this appeal. “[I]n Ireland v. Wethersfield, 242 Conn. 550, 698 A.2d 888 (1997), we [set forth] the legal tenets governing tax appeals brought pursuant to [General Statutes] § 12–117a.... [T]he trial court tries the matter de novo and the ultimate question is the ascertainment of the true and actual value of the [taxpayer's] property.... At the de novo proceeding, the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that the assessor has overassessed its property.... The trier of fact must arrive at his own conclusions as to the value of [the taxpayer's property] by weighing the opinion of the appraisers, the claims of the parties in light of all the circumstances in evidence bearing on value, and his own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury, 257 Conn. 865, 870, 778 A.2d 204 (2001).

“An appellate court's review of a trial court's decision is circumscribed by the appropriate standard of review. ‘The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’ ” Id., at 870–71, 778 A.2d 204, quoting DeSena v. Waterbury, supra, 249 Conn. at 72–73, 731 A.2d 733.

Whether § 12–55 provides a municipality with authority to conduct interim assessments of real property and to assign value to partially completed construction for tax purposes presents a question of statutory construction. “[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary...