84 Century Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Rocky Hill
Decision Date | 26 April 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 13209,13209 |
Citation | 541 A.2d 478,207 Conn. 250 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | 84 CENTURY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. BOARD OF TAX REVIEW OF the TOWN OF ROCKY HILL. |
Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Susan M. Cormier, Hartford, and Daniel H. Kennedy, Jr., Rocky Hill, for appellant (defendant).
I. Milton Widem, with whom was Emily N. Roisman, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
George C. Hastings and Lori R. Wilson, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.
Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and HULL, JJ.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether a municipal assessor has the power, under General Statutes § 12-55, 1 to increase a real property assessment between decennial revaluations on the ground that a sale of the property in question demonstrates that the property has greatly increased in value in relation to other properties in the municipality. We conclude that although an assessor, absent unusual circumstances that do not exist in this case, cannot be required to make such an interim revaluation of real property, he may do so in accordance with § 12-55, under appropriate circumstances.
This action involves a tax appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the defendant which affirmed the town assessor's upward reassessment of the plaintiff's property for the 1984, 1985 and 1986 tax years. The plaintiff claimed that the reassessment was excessive and illegal and that, as a result, the plaintiff's property bore a disproportionate share of the tax burden in the town of Rocky Hill. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that as a matter of law the defendant was barred from reassessing the plaintiff's property under the provisions of General Statutes § 12-62. 2 The court denied that motion. The court, in its memorandum of decision, stated that the plaintiff's reliance on Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 182 Conn. 619, 438 A.2d 782 (1981), for its claim that § 12-62 precludes interim revaluations, was misplaced. The court noted that, despite dicta in Uniroyal, Inc. that pursuant to § 12-62 "revaluation ... need only be available once each decade," the Uniroyal, Inc. court did not hold that more frequent revaluations are illegal.
The court noted that a judgment of the Superior Court in 1982 found the fair market value of the property in question for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 to be $23,820,950. It further noted that in 1984 the plaintiff purchased the property for $57,539,739, an increase in value of 141 percent. The court relied on the affidavit of the Rocky Hill tax assessor that stated that he had examined that sale The court then concluded that the language of § 12-55 providing that "[t]he assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of property as named in any of such lists or in the last-preceding grand list," when read with the language in § 12-64 providing that all property "shall be liable to taxation at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual valuation ... to be determined by the assessors," empowered assessors to make interim adjustments in assessments. Finally the court stated that "a question of fact exists as to the method the assessor used in making his revaluation and whether or not it conformed to Sec. 12-64."
The plaintiff then moved for reargument of its motion for summary judgment, claiming that the case of Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 439-41, 525 A.2d 91 (1987), held that assessors are "precluded" from making interim revaluations based on a change in the fair market value of the property "attributable solely to changes in the market conditions." The court concluded that Ralston Purina Co. supra, "clearly holds that the decennial revaluations of real property mandated by General Statutes § 12-62 [are] the exclusive remedy for the town to deal with changes in market values, and more frequent adjustments are not permitted." The court then rescinded its earlier decision denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted it. The defendant appealed from the judgment granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, claiming that the assessor had the power under § 12-55 to adjust the assessment in the interim years between decennial revaluations on the ground that the sale of the property in question shows that the property has greatly increased in value in relation to other properties in town.
The facts as found in the court's memorandum of decision, dated June 30, 1987, on the plaintiff's motion for reargument are not in dispute. The plaintiff is the owner of a 941 unit apartment complex known as Century Hills located in Rocky Hill. Pursuant to General Statutes § 12-62, the town of Rocky Hill conducted a general revaluation of local real estate, effective October 1, 1979. The plaintiff's predecessor in title had contested the 1979 revaluation for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981, which resulted in a final judgment that the true and actual valuation of the property for those years was $23,820,950 and that the assessment should be 70 percent of that figure. The plaintiff purchased the property on March 29, 1984, for $57,339,737. After that purchase, the tax assessor revalued and reassessed the plaintiff's property, finding the true valuation of the property as of October 1, 1984, to be $41,987,500 and the assessed value $29,391,250.
The assessor stated in his affidavit that he
In Ralston Purina Co., the plaintiffs 3 appealed to the Superior Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-118, 4 from the refusal of the defendant board of tax review of the town of Franklin to reduce the October 1, 1982 tax assessments on their real and personal property in that town. The plaintiffs had claimed that the fair market value of their property had declined substantially since the last decennial revaluation conducted by the town, as evidenced by the subsequent sale of the property in 1983 at a price significantly below its assessed value. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 203 Conn. at 428, 525 A.2d 91. The trial court did not discuss whether either of the plaintiffs was entitled to an interim adjustment of its property assessment, but adopted the implicit conclusion of an earlier judge in the case that the defendant was obligated to make such adjustments. The trial court sustained the appeals and ordered a reduction in the assessed values of the properties. This court found error in the court's ruling that the board of tax review was required, as a matter of law, to adjust the plaintiffs' tax assessments in the interim between decennial revaluations of the real property. We noted that an appeal under General Statutes § 12-118 conditions relief upon proof of failure to comply with § 12-64, which in turn provides that all real estate " 'shall be liable to taxation at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual valuation ... to be determined by the assessors.' " Id., 434, 525 A.2d 91. The defendant in Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 435, 525 A.2d 91, relied principally on the language of General Statutes § 12-62 and this court's interpretation of that statute in Uniroyal, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, supra. The defendant board conceded that, under certain circumstances, such as the destruction or expansion of property, a substantial change in its use or zoning classification, or a decision by the taxpayer to go out of business, it would be required to conduct an interim revaluation of property. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 436, 525 A.2d 91.
The plaintiffs in Ralston Purina Co. argued that although § 12-62 requires revaluation of real estate at least every ten years it does not preclude such revaluation in appropriate circumstances. They emphasized particularly the express language of § 12-64 which provides that all nonexempt real property shall be taxed at its "present true and actual valuation," defined in General Statutes § 12-63 as the "fair market value thereof and not its value at a forced or auction sale." The plaintiffs then claimed that an adjustment in their assessments was required pursuant to General Statutes § 12-55 which states in part that "assessors may increase or decrease the valuation of property as named in ... the last-preceding grand list." The plaintiffs conceded that § 12-55 appeared to be permissive but that when read in context with §§ 12-62 through 12-64 it mandates the reassessment they sought. Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, supra, 436-37, 525 A.2d 91.
This court noted that the issue of whether assessors are required to conduct interim revaluations of property to account for the effect of changes in market conditions was not addressed by the pertinent statutes. The court then stated: (Emphasis added.) Id., 437, 525 A.2d 91.
We then stated: ...
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