Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury
Decision Date | 04 September 2001 |
Docket Number | (SC 16456) |
Citation | 257 Conn. 865,778 A.2d 204 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION v. CITY OF DANBURY |
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, JS. Elliott B. Pollack, with whom was Marjorie S. Wilder, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Daniel E. Casagrande, with whom, on the brief, was Kim E. Nolan, for the appellee (defendant).
This is a tax appeal from the determination by the defendant, the city of Danbury, of the fair market value of certain of the plaintiffs real property, as of October 1, 1987. The plaintiff, Union Carbide Corporation, appealed to the defendant's board of assessment appeals (board) from the valuation of its property as of October 1, 1987. The board dismissed that appeal, and the plaintiff appealed to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a.1 The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
The plaintiff claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly: (1) relied on an agreement between the plaintiff and a real estate assessment firm hired by the defendant as to the value of the plaintiffs property; (2) accorded presumptive validity to the defendant's assessment; (3) relied on sale-leaseback market evidence to determine the value of the plaintiffs property; and (4) ruled on the admissibility of certain evidence. Because we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff was estopped from seeking a reduction in the valuation of its property, it is not necessary to reach the remaining issues raised by the plaintiffs appeal. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The property at issue in this case, which is located at 39 Old Ridgebury Road in Danbury, consists of a 1,308,721 square foot corporate headquarters building (building) and a 99.5 acre parcel of land on which the building is located. The building and 99.5 acre parcel are surrounded by 546 acres of undeveloped land.
The defendant conducted a revaluation of the plaintiffs property in 1987, and, on October 1, 1987, the building was valued at approximately $294,827,400 and the 99.5 acre parcel of land and a substantial portion of the undeveloped land, comprising a total of 626 acres, were valued at approximately $51,231,000, for a total valuation of approximately $346,058,400. The defendant's grand list of October 1, 1988, separated the undeveloped land from the building and the 99.5 acre parcel, and placed the value of the building and 99.5 acre parcel at $306,803,857. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 12-62a (b), the building and 99.5 acre parcel were assessed at a rate of 70 percent of that value, bringing the assessed value to about $214,762,700.
The defendant retained the firm of Cole, Layer and Trumbull (firm) to assist in the 1987 revaluation. Harold J. Maddocks, a senior commercial and industrial appraiser with the firm, supervised the revaluation. At the time of the revaluation, Maddocks had more than thirty years experience in the fields of assessment and appraisal, including the appraisal of facilities of large corporate headquarters.
At an October 22, 1987 meeting involving, among others, Maddocks and David Keating, the plaintiffs director of general services and manager of taxes, Maddocks and Keating agreed on a fair market value of between $350,000,000 and $355,000,000 for the building, 99.5 acre parcel and surrounding undeveloped land. Maddocks figured that his calculation would result in an annual tax savings of approximately $600,000 for the plaintiff.
Maddocks testified that, as a result of this agreement, Maddocks expressed to Keating that he would submit a figure of between $350,000,000 and $355,000,000 to the defendant for assessment purposes provided that the plaintiff understood, inter alia, that the agreed upon value would remain in effect throughout the period covered by the October 1, 1987 revaluation.
Maddocks was succeeded by Daniel Thomas in November, 1987, who issued an assessment notice to the plaintiff that allegedly set the value of the plaintiffs property higher than the value agreed upon by Maddocks and Keating at the October 22, 1987 meeting. After Keating contacted Thomas in December, 1987, about the discrepancy and informed Thomas about his prior agreement with Maddocks, Thomas agreed to reduce the value of the plaintiffs property by approximately $10,000,000 for assessment purposes.
Before considering the merits of the parties' arguments, we set forth the basic legal principles and standard of review applicable to this appeal. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 110, 117-18, 733 A.2d 817 (1999), quoting Ireland v. Wethersfield, supra, 556-59.
An appellate court's review of a trial court's decision is circumscribed by the appropriate standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeSena v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 63, 72-73, 731 A.2d 733 (1999).
On the basis of the agreement between Keating and Maddocks, the defendant asserted, as a special defense, that the plaintiff was estopped from seeking a reduction in the October 1, 1987 valuation of the plaintiffs property. In its articulation, the trial court found the following facts regarding this special defense:
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that the defendant had established its special defense of estoppel. We disagree.
Our jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of equitable estoppel is well established. In Canfield v. Gregory, 66 Conn. 9,33 A. 536 (1895), this court stated: Id., 17.
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.... . . DeSena v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 63, 72-73, 731 A.2d 733 (1999)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury, 257 Conn. 865, 870-71, 778 A.2d 204 (2001). The Ps claim specifically that the trial court, in its memorandum of decision, "found that [the department] e......
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