Kauntz v. Hca-Healthone, LLC

• Citation: 174 P.3d 813
• Decision Date: 31 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05CA2341.,05CA2341.
• Parties: Carol KAUNTZ and Dennis Kauntz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HCA-HEALTHONE, LLC, d/b/a North Suburban Medical Center, a Colorado limited liability company, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

174 P.3d 813

Carol KAUNTZ and Dennis Kauntz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HCA-HEALTHONE, LLC, d/b/a North Suburban Medical Center, a Colorado limited liability company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05CA2341.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

May 31, 2007.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing August 16, 2007.

Cristiano Law, LLC, Francis V. Cristiano, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Dickinson, Prud'Homme, Adams & Ingram, LLP, Gilbert A. Dickinson, Molly P. Tighe, Porya Mansorian, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

Leventhal Brown & Puga, P.C., Jim Leventhal, Benjamin Sachs, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Antonio L. Snipes.

Kutak Rock, LLP, Melvin B. Sabey, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Health and Hospital Association.

Kennedy Childs & Fogg, P.C., John R. Mann, Denver Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Health and Hospital Association.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

In this action against a hospital asserting negligence in permitting an untrained physician to practice there, the issue is whether § 12-36.5-203, C.R.S.2006, precludes the claim for damages asserted by plaintiffs, Carol Kauntz and Dennis Kauntz, against defendant, HCA-HEALTHONE, LLC, doing business as North Suburban Medical Center (NSMC). Concluding that it does, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This action was initially filed as a medical negligence claim against a physician who treated plaintiff Carol Kauntz. Plaintiffs asserted that the physician negligently performed an elective epidural procedure that caused her to develop adhesive arachnoiditis, a condition that left her in severe pain and with limited movement. Following discovery, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a claim for negligent credentialing against NSMC, asserting that NSMC was negligent in granting the physician privileges to perform epidural procedures because his training was inadequate.

NSMC moved for summary judgment, asserting that a provision of the Colorado Professional Review Act (CPRA), § 12-36.5-101, et seq., C.R.S.2006, precluded the claim. The CPRA, among other things, encourages hospitals to use professional peer review committees staffed by physicians in making credentialing decisions, and provides for immunity to those persons and entities, among others, under certain conditions. Specifically, NSMC argued that § 12-36.5-203, which provides that professional review bodies "shall not be liable for damages in any civil action," dictated that it could not be liable for decisions made during the physician peer review process, which includes the granting of credentials. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. The claim against the physician was settled and is not before us.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that § 12-36.5-203 does not limit the liability of NSMC to one of its patients but, instead, governs only physician-physician and physician-hospital relationships. Specifically, they argue that the statute is ambiguous as to its applicability, and the legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly did not intend the liability limitation to apply to a patient's suit against a hospital for negligent credentialing. In response, NSMC argues that the statutory language clearly and unambiguously provides immunity from damages for professional review bodies "in any civil action" wherein a professional peer review has been conducted concerning the credentialing decision for the particular physician. We agree with NSMC.

I. Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is proper only upon a showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c); McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346 (Colo.2000).

Likewise, statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Ryals v. St. Mary-Corwin Reg'l Med. Ctr., 10 P.3d 654 (Colo.2000).

II. Principles of Statutory Construction

In construing a statute, our primary duty is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly and adopt the statutory construction that best effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme, looking first to the plain language of the statute. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162 (Colo.2005).

To effectuate the legislative intent, a statute must be read and considered as a whole and should be interpreted in a manner that will give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 501 (Colo.2000). There is a presumption that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and a statutory construction that defeats the legislative intent will not be followed. Section 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S.2006; see Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, 37-38, 510 P.2d 891, 892 (1973). If the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written, unless it leads to an absurd result. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Kortum Inv. Co., 121 P.3d 331, 333 (Colo.App.2005).

If the statutory language unambiguously sets forth the legislative purpose, we need not apply additional rules of statutory construction to determine the statute's meaning. People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 354 (Colo.2001). If, however, the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear, a court may apply other rules of statutory construction to determine which alternative construction is in accordance with the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990). If the language of a statute is ambiguous or conflicts with other provisions, we then look to legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a given construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo.2002); Allely v. City of Evans, 124 P.3d 911, 912-13 (Colo. App.2005).

"[W]here the interaction of common law and statutory law is at issue, we acknowledge and respect the General Assembly's authority to modify or abrogate common law, but can only recognize such changes when they are clearly expressed." Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo. 2004). Thus, "[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, so that if the legislature wishes to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under the common law, it must manifest its intent either expressly or by clear implication." Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997) (quoting Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992)).

For purposes of our analysis, we will assume that under Colorado's common law, a hospital may be liable for negligently extending certain staff privileges to a physician. See Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 54 (Colo. 1984); Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374, 383, 570 P.2d 544, 550 (1977).

III. Analysis and Application

We start by reviewing the plain language of the statute. Section 12-36.5-203 provides in pertinent part:

(1) The following persons shall not be liable for damages in any civil action with respect to their participation in, assistance to, or reporting of information to a professional review body in connection with a professional review action in this state, and such persons shall not be liable for damages in any civil action with respect to their participation in, assistance to, or reporting of information to a professional review body which meets the standards of and is in conformity with the provisions of the federal "Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986" . . . [HCQIA], upon implementation of such act by the federal government:

(a) The professional review body . . . .

Section 12-36.5-203(1)(a), C.R.S.2006. A "professional review action" means:

an action or recommendation of a professional review body which is taken or made in the conduct of professional review activity and which is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual physician, which conduct affects or may affect adversely the clinical privileges of or membership in a professional society of the physician. "Professional review action" includes a formal decision by the professional review body not to take an action or make a recommendation as provided in this paragraph (a) and also includes professional review activities relating to a professional review action.

Section 12-36.5-203(3)(a), C.R.S.2006.

A "professional review body" is defined as a "health care entity and the governing body or any committee of a health care entity which conducts professional review actions and includes any committee of the medical staff of such an entity when assisting the governing body in a professional review activity." Section 12-36.5-203(3)(b), C.R.S. 2006.

Thus, as applicable here, the plain words of the statute essentially state that a professional review body is immune from damages in any civil action brought against it with respect to its participation in a professional peer review proceeding.

Here, there is no dispute that NSMC, a health care entity, is a professional review body within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable in "any civil action" in connection with a professional review action. "Any" means "all." See Rios v. Mireles, 937 P.2d 840, 843 (Colo. App.1996); Austin v. Weld County, 702 P.2d 293, 294 (Colo.App.1985). "Civil action" certainly encompasses a lawsuit asserting negligence brought by an injured person against a hospital. See C.R.C.P. 2. And plaintiffs do not dispute that NSMC conducted a professional review action in which it granted credentials to the involved physician to practice at NSMC and perform the procedure that injured them. Accordingly, subject to issues not raised here, plaintiffs' claim is barred by the plain language of the statute. See St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.1997)(statutory language providing that a...