Keating v. Town of Burke

• Decision Date: 07 July 2011
• Citation: 927 N.Y.S.2d 411,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 05824,86 A.D.3d 660
• Parties: Mary E. KEATING, Appellant,v.TOWN OF BURKE et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

86 A.D.3d 660

927 N.Y.S.2d 411

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 05824

Mary E. KEATING, Appellant,

v.TOWN OF BURKE et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 7, 2011.

Lillian Anderson–Duffy, Malone, for appellant.Fischer, Bessette, Muldowney & Hunter, L.L.P., Malone (Matthew H. McArdle of counsel), for Town of Burke, respondent.Taddeo & Shahan, Syracuse (Anna C. O'Neil of counsel), for Burke Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., respondent.Before: MERCURE, J.P., SPAIN, KAVANAGH, GARRY and EGAN JR., JJ.MERCURE, J.P.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Demarest, J.), entered January 19, 2010 in Franklin County, which granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In July 2005, plaintiff attended an event sponsored by defendant Burke Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. (hereinafter BVFD) and held at a park owned by defendant Town of Burke. As she was placing her chair to watch an outdoor auction, plaintiff was struck and injured by a dead branch that had broken off from an overhanging tree. She filed a notice of claim and subsequently commenced this action against defendants alleging, among other things, that they had negligently inspected and maintained the tree in question. Following joinder of issue, defendants separately moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted the motions, and plaintiff now appeals.

In order to succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must ultimately “demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom” ( Solomon v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026, 1027, 499 N.Y.S.2d 392, 489 N.E.2d 1294 [1985] ). Initially, we note that it is undisputed that the Town owned the park. Inasmuch as there is no evidence showing that BVFD had “a contractual obligation to keep the land free from dangerous conditions,” the duties of a landowner cannot be imposed upon it ( Rosen v. Long Is. Greenbelt Trail Conference, Inc., 19 A.D.3d 400, 401, 796 N.Y.S.2d 130 [2005], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335, 844 N.E.2d 790 [2006]; see Nielsen v. Town of Amherst, 193 A.D.2d 1073, 1074, 598 N.Y.S.2d 878 [1993]; cf. Katz v. Queens Theater in the Park, 27 A.D.3d 623, 623–624, 811 N.Y.S.2d 446 [2006] ). Plaintiff contends, however, that BVFD owed a duty to her given its allegedly negligent misrepresentation of the site's safety to the auctioneer.

Assuming that BVFD owed any such duty, it would be breached only if BVFD failed to use reasonable care in conveying information upon which plaintiff detrimentally relied, such as where “one familiar with a hazard offers direct assurances of safety to one who is unfamiliar with the hazard and who foreseeably relies upon those assurances” ( Heard v. City of New York, 82 N.Y.2d 66, 74, 603 N.Y.S.2d 414, 623 N.E.2d 541 [1993]; see International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 337–338, 155 N.E. 662 [1927], cert. denied 275 U.S. 527, 48 S.Ct. 20, 72 L.Ed. 408 [1927] ). There is no indication that BVFD's representative made any such assurances; rather, he merely advised the auctioneer as to where the auction should be held. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the representative inspected the tree or otherwise possessed exclusive knowledge of its condition. Indeed, plaintiff does not claim that she even knew of the representative's direction at the time she placed her chair and, under these circumstances, she is unable to establish detrimental reliance ( see Heard v. City of New York, 82 N.Y.2d at 74–75, 603 N.Y.S.2d 414, 623 N.E.2d 541; Ward v. Edinburg Mar., 293 A.D.2d 887, 889, 741 N.Y.S.2d 304 [2002]; see also Webb v. Cerasoli, 275 App.Div. 45, 48–49, 87 N.Y.S.2d 884 [1949], affd. 300 N.Y. 603, 90 N.E.2d 64 [1949] ). Accordingly, Supreme Court properly granted BVFD's motion for summary judgment.

The Town, in contrast, owned the park and was duty-bound to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition ( see Rhabb v. New York City Hous. Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 200, 202, 391 N.Y.S.2d 540, 359 N.E.2d 1335 [1976]; Gagnon v. City of Saratoga Springs, 51 A.D.3d 1096, 1098, 858 N.Y.S.2d 797 [2008], lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 706, 868 N.Y.S.2d 598, 897 N.E.2d 1082 [2008] ). As a result, the Town was “required to establish as a matter of law that [it] maintained the property in question in a reasonably safe condition and that [it] neither created the allegedly dangerous condition existing thereon nor had actual or constructive notice thereof” in order to succeed on its summary judgment motion ( Richardson v. Rotterdam Sq. Mall, 289 A.D.2d 679, 679, 734 N.Y.S.2d 303 [2001]; accord Norse v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., 81 A.D.3d 1063, 1063–1064, 916 N.Y.S.2d 330 [2011] ). Notably, the proof submitted by the Town on its motion was largely limited to an attorney's affirmation, the pleadings, and plaintiff's statements regarding the accident. These submissions did not demonstrate “that a reasonable inspection would [not] have revealed...