Keegan v. Dir. Gen. of Railroads

• Decision Date: 29 November 1922
• Citation: 243 Mass. 96,137 N.E. 341
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: KEEGAN v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS. BACKER v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. R. MURPHY v. SAME.

243 Mass. 96

137 N.E. 341

KEEGAN

v.DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.

BACKER

v.NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. R.

MURPHY

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Nov. 29, 1922.

Report from Superior Court, Hampden County; Nelson P. Brown, Judge.

Three actions by James Keegan against the Director General of Railroads, and by Frederick M. Murphy, administrator of Edward L. Murphy, deceased, and by Delia F. Backer, administratrix, against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, in which it was sought to substitute James C. Davis, Agent, as defendant. Motions to dismiss were denied, and pleas in abatement overruled, and the cases reported for determination by the Supreme Judicial Court. Actions dismissed.

Each action was for injuries or death from injuries sustained in Connecticut by a resident of that state. The defendant in each action raised the objection that the court was without jurisdiction under General Order No. 18a of the Director General of Railroads, but the court in each case ruled against such objection.Gurdon W. Gordon, of Springfield (Theodore G. Lewis, of Springfield, of counsel), for plaintiff Keegan.

J. Lyman Gray and Paul E. Tierney, both of Springfield, for plaintiff Backer.

Raymond A. Bidwell, of Springfield, for plaintiff Murphy.

Madison G. Gonterman, of Boston, for defendant Davis.

RUGG, C. J.

The first of these actions is brought to recover damages for personal injury received in the state of Connecticut by a resident of that state while working, during the period of federal control, as an employee in the operation of the system of transportation commonly known as the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad. The second action is brought by the administrator resident in Connecticut of the estate of a deceased resident of that state to recover damages for personal injury and resultant death of the decedent, all occurring in that state during the period of federal control of the same railroad system while the deceased was working as an employee in its operation. The third action is by an administrator of a deceased resident of Connecticut to recover damages for the death of the decedent while a traveler upon a way in that state under circumstances which under a statute of Connecticut give rise to a cause of action. The first action was brought against the Director General of Railroads. Both the other actions originally were brought against the railroad corporation, but by amendment it was sought to substitute as defendant the agent of the United States.

Each action was brought in the superior court for our county of Hampden. Each cause of action is such that, if it had occurred and been brought against the railroad while in private ownership and control, the courts of this commonwealth would have possessed and exercised jurisdiction over it and the parties. Higgins v. Central New England & Western Railroad, 155 Mass. 176, 29 N. E. 534,31 Am. St. Rep. 544;Hanlan v. Frederick Leyland & Co., Ltd., 223 Mass. 438, 111 N. E. 907, L. R. A. 1917A, 34, and cases there collected.

By virtue of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, 39 U. S. Stats. at Large, 619, 645 (U. S. Comp. St. § 1974a) and the proclamation of the President of December 26, 1917, 40 U. S. Stats. at Large, 1733 (Proclamations of the President of the United States, 89), and under the Act of Congress of March 21, 1918, c. 25, 40 U. S. Stats. at Large, 451 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115 3/4a-3115 3/4p), possession of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad had been taken by the Railroad Administration of the United States and supervision of it exercised by the Director General through ‘one control, one administration, one power for the accomplishment of the one purpose, the complete possession by governmental authority to replace for the period provided the private ownership theretofore existing.’ Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 148, 39 Sup. Ct. 502, 505 (63 L. Ed. 897).

It is plain from recent decisions that none of these actions can be maintained against the railroad corporation. Nominsky v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 239 Mass. 254, 132 N. E. 30; AEtna Mills v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 242 Mass. 255, 136 N. E. 380;Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 593, 65 L. Ed. 1087. The United States through the Director General alone is liable for such actions. Dahn v. Davis, 258 U. S. 421, 42 Sup. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 696.

The federal government, being thus in complete control of the railroad, could not be impleaded in any court of this country except to the extent and upon terms to which it has consented. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 629, 34 Sup. Ct. 938, 58 L. Ed. 1506;Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 27 Sup. Ct. 388, 51 L. Ed. 510;Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 38 Sup. Ct. 317, 62 L. Ed. 755;McArthur Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass....