Keegan v. Green Giant Co.

Decision Date12 November 1954
Citation110 A.2d 599,150 Me. 283
PartiesCarolyn KEEGAN v. GREEN GIANT COMPANY. William KEEGAN v. GREEN GIANT COMPANY.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Edward Stern, Bangor, for plaintiffs.

James E. Mitchell and John W. Ballou, Bangor, for defendant.

Before FELLOWS, C. J., and WILLIAMSON, TIRRELL, WEBBER and TAPLEY, JJ.

TAPLEY, Justice.

On Exceptions. Action is brought by plaintiff, Carolyn Keegan, against defendant, Green Giant Company, for damages alleging that the defendant negligently prepared, manufactured, packed and distributed a can of peas which contained a sharp piece of metal concealed in the peas and that the plaintiff while eating them swallowed the piece of metal, it lodging in her throat. Plaintiff, William Keegan, husband of Carolyn Keegan, seeks recovery for expenses of his wife and loss of consortium. The cases were tried before a jury at the November Term, A. D. 1953 of the Superior Court in the County of Penobscot and State of Maine.

At the close of the plaintiffs' cases, the defendant rested without submission of evidence and requested the Court to direct a verdict for the defendant in both cases.

The plaintiffs excepted to the refusal of the presiding Justice to admit certain evidence in the nature of a proposed exhibit in the form of a tin can encircled with a label, and also to the direction of the verdicts in favor of the defendant.

The record discloses that on the fourth day of February, 1953, Carolyn Keegan was living in Jonesport, Maine and working at D. O. Hall's Grocery Store and that the store purchased Green Giant Company canned peas from T. R. Savage & Company of Bangor, a distributor.

Mrs. Nettie R. Alley, mother of Carolyn, purchased a can of peas from the store in which her daughter was employed on the day that the peas from this can were served to her daughter in Mrs. Alley's home. Mrs. Alley opened the can, poured the peas into a pan, warmed them and later served a portion to her daughter Carolyn at the evening meal. Carolyn in eating the peas, along with other food, suddenly experienced a choking sensation and then dislodged a triangular piece of steel identified as 'Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.'

The exceptions in these cases concerning the direction of verdicts for the defendant will be determined by the disposition of those exceptions pertaining to the refusal of the presiding Justice to admit the can with the label thereon and marked 'Plaintiff's Exhibit 1' (for identification).

The can is described as the usual sized tin can ordinarily used to contain green peas. It has imprinted on the bottom portion the following:

'A C f C 5'

and directly underneath these letters and number is:

'3 L Y'

The can is encircled by a label. The pertinent and important material printed thereon are the words:

'Green Giant Brand Great Big Tender Sweet Peas.

Distributed by Green Giant Company Le Sueur, Minn.

C GG Co. Reg. U. S. Pat. Off. Packed in U. S. A. Replacement or refund of money

* * *

* * *

Guaranteed by Good Housekeeping If not as advertised therein.'

There is other printed matter on the label which is not material or germane to the issue.

The plaintiffs contend that 'Plaintiff's Exhibit 1' (marked for identification), being the can with label thereon, should have been admitted as evidence for the purpose of showing that the Green Giant Company was the distributor of this can of peas and for the further purpose that the can of peas by reasonable inference was packed by the defendant, Green Giant Company, and that the jury should have had an opportunity of determining if these were the facts. The defendant contends that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (marked for identification) should not have been admitted without extrinsic evidence connecting the defendant with the case other than through the medium of the label on the can.

Exceptions to the refusal of the presiding Justice to admit Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 are stated in the record as follows:

'Mr. Stern: Your Honor, I would like to introduce Plaintiff's Exhibit Number One in evidence for the purpose of showing that it is self evident that the Green Giant Company was the distributor of this can of peas and also for the purpose of showing that if the jury did find that the Green Giant Company was the distributor that the jury could reasonably infer that this can of peas was also packed by the Green Giant Company.

'The Court: I will exclude it and you may have an exception.'

Plaintiff's mother, Nettie R. Alley, testified that she purchased the can of peas from D. O. Hall's Grocery Store in Jonesport on the morning of the day she served them to her daughter and that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the same can which contained the peas that she purchased.

The question here to be determined is whether or not Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (marked for identification) is admissible in and of itself as evidence to prove that the defendant manufactured, packed and distributed the peas.

The plaintiffs in their brief cite a number of cases which they argue sustain their contention that this label is sufficient by itself to establish that the company whose name and other information appears upon the label is the manufacturer and packer of the contents of the can upon which it is placed. A careful analysis of the cases cited shows that in addition to the printed matter on the...

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2 cases
  • Smith v. Ariens Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1978
    ...name on a product should be sufficient to identify that corporation as the manufacturer. See Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 288-289, 110 A.2d 599 (1954) (Williamson, J., dissenting). The presence of Ariens's name on the snowmobile is thus sufficient to identify it as the manufactur......
  • State v. Rines
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • August 5, 1970
    ...Kan. 406, 89 P. 1046 (1907). Contra are Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 62 F.2d 564 (1 CCA 1933) and compare Keegan v. Green giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954) (with dissent). As early as 1895, Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Callaghan, 157 Ill. 406, 41 N.E. 909, held that the lett......
2 books & journal articles
  • § 28.11 SELF-AUTHENTICATING DOCUMENTS: FRE 902
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 28 Authentication of Writings
    • Invalid date
    ...of the publication may, of course, leave still open questions of authority and responsibility for items therein contained.").[67] 110 A.2d 599 (Me. 1954).[68] See Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee's note ("Cattle brands have received similar acceptance in the western states.").[69] See F......
  • § 28.11 Self-Authenticating Documents: FRE 902
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (2018) Title Chapter 28 Authentication of Writings
    • Invalid date
    ...of the publication may, of course, leave still open questions of authority and responsibility for items therein contained.").[66] 110 A.2d 599 (Me. 1954).[67] See Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory committee's note ("Cattle brands have received similar acceptance in the western states.").[68] See F......
1 provisions
  • 28 APPENDIX U.S.C. § 902 Evidence that Is Self-Authenticating
    • United States
    • US Code Federal Rules of Evidence Article IX. Authentication and Identification
    • January 1, 2023
    ...(1938), same. And see W.Va.Code 1966, §47-3-5, trade-mark on bottle prima facie evidence of ownership. Contra, Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954); Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 62 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1933). Cattle brands have received similar acceptance in the western......

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