Keenan v. Com.
Decision Date | 05 December 1963 |
Parties | Edward Peter KEENAN, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Monroe L. Inker, Boston, for petitioner.
James W. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
Before SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.
Keenan seeks by writ of error, petition for which was filed October 16, 1962, to vacate judgments and sentences arising from his plea of guilty to four indictments, three of which were for assault with intent to murder and one of which was for murder in the second degree. On October 5, 1954, he was sentenced to life imprisonment upon the second degree murder indictment and for varying terms of years for the assaults.
A single justice made findings of fact and reserved the case on the pleadings, the assignments of error, the return, and the findings for the consideration of the full court. The facts are stated upon the basis of the findings.
Keenan, in respect of the indictments, was represented by the late Mr. Herbert F. Callahan, a lawyer with great experience in criminal matters. He had been retained by Keenan's mother. The Commonwealth was represented by District Attorney Hugh A. Cregg, also now dead.
with possible '[p]sychiatric damage to' Keenan. Keenan's for Keenan, who can now read and write. 1
1. The Commonwealth does not contend that a writ of error will not lie in this case where the petition and assignments of error assert facts which raise a substantial question whether, in a matter going to the basis of the sentence (which is the judgment, see Whitney v. Commonwealth, 337 Mass. 722, 723, 151 N.E.2d 272), Keenan has been denied due process of law. See Garabedian v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass. 119, 124-126, 142 N.E.2d 777; Sandrelli v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 129, 143, 172 N.E.2d 449, 88 A.L.R.2d 450; Letters v. Commonwealth, Mass., 193 N.E.2d 578. 2 The vital issue is whether there has been such governmental inducement of Keenan's plea as to make it in effect involuntary and voidable despite the fact that he was represented by able counsel of his own choosing.
2. There is no basis in the facts found for concluding that Keenan's confession was in any sense coerced. The Guilmette case (344 Mass. 527, 183 N.E.2d 298) and the Letters case (Mass., 193 N.E.2d 578 a have no application here. To us, the fair implication of the findings is apparent. A competent lawyer, experienced in the defence of persons charged with crime, found himself confronted with a difficult case, to which the only possible defense could be insanity. The district attorney was certainly not unreasonable in refusing, at Mr. Callahan's request, to reduce the major charge to manslaughter, for one man had been killed and three others assaulted. Yet the district attorney was prepared to assist Keenan 'with a view to obtaining * * * [his] release' from prison 'if he learned to read and write * * * and behaved himself otherwise.' Mr. Callahan, Keenan's mother, and Treadway obviously decided that a plea of guilty with this assurance was the best course for Keenan to pursue. No lawyer could reasonably believe that the district attorney's contingent willingness to be helpful, even if expressed as an offer to 'reopen the case,' could possibly mean more than that the district attorney in five to seven years would lend his support to efforts to having Keenan released on parole or by executive clemency (or by a combination of the two methods), if then rehabilitated and if he could then read and write. No other methods of release would then be available and it is inconceivable that Mr. Callahan did not know this.
In such a matter, where a district attorney without threat or coercion, discusses a possible plea with competent defence counsel (and not directly with an unrepresented person charged with crime) the defendant must be taken to be bound by his counsel's...
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