Keener v. State, 31555
| Decision Date | 03 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 31555,31555 |
| Citation | 238 Ga. 7,230 S.E.2d 846 |
| Parties | Louis Wayne KEENER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Vickers Neugent, Dist. Atty., Pearson, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., B. Dean Grindle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
This appeal is from the denial of appellant's double jeopardy pleas to two armed robbery indictments.
The circumstances of the case are as follows. On July 13, 1972, appellant waived indictment, entered guilty pleas to five accusations arising out of one criminal transaction, and received sentences thereon, namely: (1) No. 9214, armed robbery of Harrell Wood by use of a sawed-off shotgun. Life sentence. (2) No. 9215, armed robbery of Mrs. Harrell Wood by use of a sawed-off shotgun. 10-year sentence, (3) No. 9216, burglary of Harrell Wood's house. 10-year sentence. (4) No. 9217, possession of a sawed-off shotgun during an armed robbery. 2-year sentence. (5) No. 9218, possession of a sawed-off shotgun. 2-year sentence.
The guilty pleas to accusations No. 9214 and No. 9215 for armed robberies were, upon appellant's mandamus action, held invalid because indictment may not be waived in capital felony cases. Keener v. MacDougall, 232 Ga. 273, 206 S.E.2d 519 (1974). See also Keener v. MacDougall, 233 Ga. 881, 213 S.E.2d 835 (1975); Keener v. MacDougall, 235 Ga. 288, 219 S.E.2d 377 (1975). On November 5, 1975, the trial court entered a consent order setting aside the guilty pleas and sentences on accusations No. 9214 and No. 9215 for lack of jurisdiction because of the absence of indictments. On February 3, 1976, appellant was indicted for the two armed robberies for which his previous guilty pleas to accusations had been vacated. Appellant then filed the double jeopardy pleas under review here. He contends he stands convicted and punished under accusation No. 9217 for possession of a sawed-off shotgun during the armed robberies that this crime is legally and factually the same offense as the armed robberies; and that the Federal and State Constitutions as well as the Georgia statutes bar his further prosecution under the armed robbery indictments.
The rule against double jeopardy is a fundamental principle which was probably known in a primitive form in early Greek and Roman civilizations. In moderncriminal jurisprudence in the United States it is expressed in various terms but basically provides that no person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense. It is a simple and concise statement of law. Unfortunately it has become confused because many courts have not distinguished its application to the bar of successive prosecutions and the bar to multiple convictions. The bar to successive prosecutions is referred to as the procedural aspect of the double jeopardy rule. The rationale behind the bar to successive prosecutions is to prevent harassment of the accused. The bar to multiple convictions is referred to as the substantive aspect. The rationale behind the bar to multiple convictions is to prevent multiple and excessive punishments.
The bar to multiple convictions usually arises where several crimes arising out of one criminal transaction are tried at the same time. In such cases the rule does not operate until after the verdicts. Under Georgia law it bars the conviction and therefore the punishment of all crimes which are as a matter of law or a matter of fact included in a major crime for which the defendant has been convicted. State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 206 S.E.2d 475 (1974). However, the bar to multiple convictions may have a procedural aspect where the crimes arising out of the same criminal transaction are tried separately. Where crimes are tried separately it is generally held that if multiple convictions arising out of a single prosecution are barred they will likewise be barred from successive prosecution. Therefore when crimes are to be prosecuted separately the more serious known crimes should be prosecuted first to avoid the conviction of a lesser crime barring a subsequent prosecution for a more serious...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Marlowe
...820 (2002). 2. Pearson, 258 Ga.App. at 657-658, 574 S.E.2d 820. 3. Marlowe, 258 Ga.App. at 153, 572 S.E.2d 685. 4. Keener v. State, 238 Ga. 7, 8, 230 S.E.2d 846 (1976). 5. State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 318, 206 S.E.2d 475 (1974); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.E......
-
Williams v. State
...convictions or punishments" for such crimes. Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 598-599 (1), 247 S.E.2d 92 (1978) ; Keener v. State, 238 Ga. 7, 8, 230 S.E.2d 846 (1976). See also Carman v. State, 304 Ga. 21, 26 (2) n.3, 815 S.E.2d 860 (2018). When a court is "presented with the question of wh......
-
Pryor v. State
...public interest. This provides for broader protection to an accused than does the Federal Constitution. See generally, Keener v. State, 238 Ga. 7, 230 S.E.2d 846 (1976). Against this background, we conclude that the succession of three shots which first wounded and then killed Pryor's victi......
-
Perkinson v. State
...a mistrial on that count or if that conviction is reversed on appeal. See Brown, supra at 165, n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2221; Keener v. State, 238 Ga. 7, 230 S.E.2d 846 (1976); State v. LeMay, 186 Ga. App. 146, 367 S.E.2d 61 (1988). A defendant may also be prosecuted for the greater offense after a c......