Perkinson v. State, S00A1710.
Decision Date | 05 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. S00A1710.,S00A1710. |
Citation | 273 Ga. 491,542 S.E.2d 92 |
Parties | PERKINSON v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
William E. Nethery, Maryann F. Blend, Corinne M. Mull-Milsteen, Decatur, for Appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, Dist. Atty., Barbara B. Conroy, Asst. Dist. Atty., John H. Petrey, Decatur, for Appellee.
This case arises from a series of crimes committed or allegedly committed by Eric Perkinson on the same day in two counties. Perkinson was convicted in Bartow County of malice murder and other offenses and he received the death penalty for the murder. In the present case, DeKalb County is seeking to try him on several charges arising out of the same criminal transaction. Perkinson unsuccessfully filed a plea in bar claiming that the DeKalb County prosecution is barred by double jeopardy. While awaiting trial in DeKalb County, Perkinson exercised his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his plea in bar on grounds of double jeopardy. See Torres v. State, 270 Ga. 79, 508 S.E.2d 171 (1998); Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 287 S.E.2d 7 (1982).
For the purposes of the plea in bar, the parties stipulated to the following facts, which were essentially taken from the evidence presented at the Bartow County trial. On June 6, 1998, the victims, Dakarai Sloley and Louis Nava, were parked in DeKalb County in a BMW automobile belonging to Sloley's aunt, when Perkinson and an accomplice entered the back seat of the car. At gunpoint, Perkinson and the accomplice forced the victims to drive a short distance. While still in DeKalb County, Perkinson demanded and received cash from both victims. Perkinson then ordered Sloley to stop the car in a church parking lot in DeKalb County, where they rendezvoused with a green Toyota driven by two more accomplices. Sloley was made to sit in the front passenger seat of the BMW and Nava was forced into the BMW's trunk. The four perpetrators then drove the two cars north on I-75 to Bartow County, where they stopped in a wooded, secluded location. Perkinson and an accomplice marched Nava into the woods where Perkinson shot him several times, killing him. Perkinson returned to the BMW and told Sloley it was his "turn." While being marched into the woods, Sloley attempted to escape. Perkinson fired several times and a bullet broke Sloley's arm, but he kept running and got away. Perkinson and his three accomplices were arrested shortly thereafter.
Perkinson was tried separately in Bartow County and was convicted of malice murder, three counts of felony murder (the underlying felonies were the armed robberies of the cash from both victims, the kidnappings with bodily injury of both victims, and motor vehicle hijacking), aggravated battery, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of false imprisonment for confining the victims in the BMW, theft by taking of a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions into Perkinson's other convictions. The trial court also vacated Perkinson's felony murder convictions as required under Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369(4), 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993) ( ). Perkinson received the death penalty for the malice murder and consecutive sentences totaling 60 years imprisonment for his remaining convictions.
Following the Bartow County trial, the DeKalb County grand jury indicted Perkinson for two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury (the "bodily injury" alleged is the shooting of Nava and Sloley), two counts of armed robbery (for taking cash from both victims), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Perkinson filed a plea in bar claiming that double jeopardy barred the DeKalb County prosecution because Bartow County had "used up" all the evidence for the crimes in its prosecution and because the Bartow County convictions for false imprisonment are lesser-included offenses of kidnapping with bodily injury. The trial court denied the plea in bar with regard to the armed robbery and kidnapping with bodily injury charges, but granted it with regard to the firearm possession charges. It ruled that the firearm charges applied to the entire criminal transaction and that Perkinson was already convicted of these charges in Bartow County.
After Perkinson filed his appeal with this Court, we informed the parties of our particular concern with the following questions:
1. Perkinson claims that in obtaining his felony murder convictions in Bartow County the State "used up" the evidence that would be presented to obtain convictions for kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery in DeKalb County. See Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119(2), 288 S.E.2d 185 (1982). He avers that the underlying felonies for two of his felony murder convictions in Bartow County are the kidnappings with bodily injury and armed robberies alleged in DeKalb County.1 Indeed, the Bartow County indictment specifies that the underlying felonies for two of the three counts of felony murder for which Perkinson was convicted are the kidnappings with bodily injury of Nava and Sloley which originated in DeKalb County and the armed robberies of the cash from Nava and Sloley which took place in DeKalb County. The parties have also stipulated that the evidence from the Bartow County trial was essentially the same as would be presented in a DeKalb County trial on the offenses alleged there. Upon review, we conclude that the proscription against double jeopardy bars the DeKalb County prosecution. A prosecution for a lesser-included offense after a conviction for the greater offense in a different county violates OCGA § 16-1-8(a), Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth [Amendment], provides that no person shall `be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'" Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164(II), 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). This protection encompasses not just multiple punishments by a single sovereign for the same offense, but also successive prosecutions for the same offense. Id. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696(II), 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). A defendant is protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause from attempts to re-litigate the facts after an acquittal and from attempts "to secure additional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence." Brown, supra at 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221. In addition to the risk of enhanced punishment for the same offense, successive prosecutions allow the State to unfairly rehearse its presentation of the evidence and hone its trial strategy, while also incrementally increasing the burden on the defendant to defend himself. Unless each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not (the same-elements test to determine if two charges or convictions constitute the "same offense" under the Fifth Amendment as outlined in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)), "the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punishment." Brown, supra. See also Dixon, supra.
It is clear that the underlying felony of a felony murder conviction is a lesser-included offense of the felony murder. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977); Atkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 330(3), 216 S.E.2d 89 (1975); Woods v. State, 233 Ga. 495, 501, 212 S.E.2d 322 (1975); Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 401 (5th Cir.1980) (), rev'd on other grounds 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). For double jeopardy purposes, a lesser-included and a greater offense are the "same offense" under the Fifth Amendment because the lesser offense requires no proof beyond that which is required for the conviction of the greater offense. See Brown, supra at 168(II), 97 S.Ct. 2221; Blockburger, supra at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180; Harris, supra at 682-683, 97 S.Ct. 2912. It is also clear that Bartow and DeKalb counties are not separate sovereigns. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-89(II), 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985); Brown, supra at 164, n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2221; Potts v. State, 261 Ga. 716(1)(b), 410 S.E.2d 89 (1991) (). Although more than one county and prosecutor are involved, all the criminal charges against Perkinson were brought on behalf of the State of Georgia. See id.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, is on point. In Brown, the defendant stole a car in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Nine days later, he was arrested while driving the car in Wickliffe, Ohio, which is in Lake County. He...
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