Keever v. Board of Ed. of Gwinnett County
| Decision Date | 14 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | 12767. |
| Parties | KEEVER et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GWINNETT COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The management and control of the public schools of the county is confined to the county board of education, and it is the tribunal for hearing and adjudicating all local controversies relating to construing and administering the school law, and is given wide discretionary powers.
2. In the exercise of its discretion, the board is authorized to transport school children from one school district to another, when in its judgment the education of such children will thereby be improved. The sole object of the schools is to educate the children, and the trustees of Braden school district were not entitled to an injunction to prevent the Board of Education of Gwinnett County from transporting children from Braden district to a school in Lilburn district.
D H. Keever, J. E. Lee, S. B. Payne, and J. H. Lanford, as trustees of Braden school district in Gwinnett County brought suit against the Board of Education of Gwinnett County, composed of Heard Summerour, J. A. Alford, J. E Johnson, A. W. Tucker, and J. G. Hood, and the trustees of Lilburn school district in Gwinnett County, J. E. Sheaffer, J. E. Pickens, W. J. Bryan, E. C. Johnson, J. A. Hopkins, Otis Goza, and Cleo Martin, alleging the following facts: Barden school district was established in accordance with law relating to the creation of public-school districts, and has been operating as such under the supervision of the county board of education. It is a local-tax district. The county board of education owns certain school buses, and by contract with the Lilburn school district is permitting the district to use buses on the basis of ten cents per mile until they are paid for, at which time they will become the property of the Lilburn district. The board of education is permitting the operation of said buses by the Lilburn district through Braden school district, thereby enticing children living in the Braden district into the Lilburn district where they are being taught in the schools of that district, which is being paid for out of public funds by the county board of education, and thereby giving to the Lilburn district funds that belong to the Braden district, thus breaking down and destroying the Braden district. A portion of the Braden district is inaccessible to buses, thus making it necessary that the children of the inaccessible portion of the Braden district attend school in that district; but unless the transportation of other children from the district is stopped, the school can not be maintained, and such children will be deprived of an education. The prayer was for an injunction.
The defendants filed a demurrer on the following grounds: (1) No cause of action is alleged. (2) There is no equity in the petition. (3) No acts of omission or commission by the defendants are alleged which will entitle petitioners to the relief sought. (4) There are no allegations showing legal or equitable grounds for injunction. (5) The matters complained of are by law vested in the sound discretion of the county board of education, and for the court to enjoin the members of the board would amount to usurpation by the court of the judgment and discretion of the board. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiffs excepted.
Pemberton Cooley, of Lawrenceville, for plaintiffs in error.
Marvin A. Allison, of Lawrenceville, for defendants in error.
1. Each county of the State is by law made a school district and the management and control of the schools of the county is confided in the county board of education. Code, §§ 32-404, 32-901. The county board of education is the tribunal for hearing and determining all matters of local controversy in reference to the construction and administration of the school law, but an appeal from the decisions of the board may be had to the State school superintendent. Section 32-910. While each county is subdivided into school districts, and the law encourages individual action and local effort by such subdivisions, it expressly provides that the general school laws as administered by the county boards of education must be observed. Section 32-1126. It thus appears that the operation and management of the schools of the county is vested in the county board of education, and that the trustees of the local...
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