Bedingfield v. Parkerson

• Decision Date: 08 October 1956
• Docket Number: No. 19375,19375
• Citation: 212 Ga. 654,94 S.E.2d 714
• Parties: Robert B. BEDINGFIELD et al. v. W. D. PARKERSON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 714

94 S.E.2d 714

212 Ga. 654

Robert B. BEDINGFIELD et al. v. W. D. PARKERSON et al.

No. 19375.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 8, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. By the Constitution, art. 8, sec. 5, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-6801, and the provisions of law found in Ga.L.1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 282, 283, the Laurens County Board of Education was authorized to adopt the resolution, dated January 28, 1954, shown in the statement of facts, and to reorganize the schools therein referred to in the manner therein set out. The answer, showing compliance therewith, was not subject to demurrer.

2. The act of 1953, Ga.L.1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 282, 283, is not unconstitutional as contended by demurrer in that it is retroactive as applied here, is an attempt to usurp the judicial function to construe laws, fails to describe the law amended, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers, or lacks uniformity, and is not irreconcilably in conflict with Code Ann. § 32-915, Ga.L.1919, p. 326, 1946, pp. 206, 207, sufficiently to repeal the older law by implication.

3. The court did not err in sustaining the demurrers thereto and striking the amendment to the petition, which alleges that the 'new' high school is not authorized by Code, § 32-933, since such is not the only method provided by law for establishing and maintaining high schools.

4. The amendment to the petition, alleging that the board grossly abused its discretion by violating Code Ann. § 32-915 by failing to locate the 'NEW' HIGH SCHOOL NEAR THE CENTER OF THE district or school area to be served fails to show any reason why equity should take jurisdiction, there being an adequate remedy at law under Code Ann. § 32-414, Ga.L.1937, pp. 864, 867, and the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the amendment to the petition.

This is the second appearance of this case in this court, it having been held in the first appearance, Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 211 Ga. 386, 86 S.E.2d 215, that the writ of error was prematurely brought to this court, the petitioners having sought to review as a final judgment the overruling of demurrers to the defendants' answer which raised certain constitutional questions and attacked as unconstitutional the School Reorganization Act of 1953, Ga.L.1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 282. The petitioners, who were the plaintiffs in error in the first appearance and are the plaintiffs in error here, brought an equitable petition to enjoin the enforcement of alleged 'consolidation' orders and resolutions of the Laurens County Board of Education, in which petition it is alleged that the orders were adopted in 1951, 1952, and 1953, which was before the passage of the act of 1953. By amendments it is alleged that the board has 'grossly abused the discretion vested' therein by consolidation of the schools, disregarding and violating the plain provisions of Code Ann. § 32-915, Ga.L.1919, p. 326, 1946, pp. 206, 207, requiring a consolidated school to be located as near the center of the school district or districts as possible; that the high school here proposed to be established and maintained is not the type of high school authorized by Code, § 32-933, since it is to be built entirely from State funds furnished by the State School Building Authority, employ teachers to be paid entirely from State funds, and not from funds raised or made possible through local taxation funds; and that it will be a new, distinct and independent high school or education unit; and that it is not as a result of the reorganization or fixing of grades to be taught in or at existing schools or educational units. Demurrers were sustained to these amendments. The answer of the defendants being, in substance, that they were reorganizing and rearranging the schools of the county in a lawful manner in conformity with a resolution adopted January 28, 1954, under the authority of an act of the General Assembly approved December 18, 1953 Ga.L.1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 282, there was an issue of fact to be decided. The case proceeded to trial, and after hearing evidence--which was in the main excerpts from the minutes and resolutions of the Laurens County Board of Education for the years 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954, and the reorganization resolution of January 28, 1954, adopted under the authority of the School Reorganization Act of 1953, whereby the various schools of the county were reorganized and the number of grades fixed at each school in the respective system in accordance with the present plan now under attack--the court directed a verdict for the defendants and entered judgment and a decree based on said verdict. A motion for new trial and an amendment thereto were subsequently filed, heard, and overruled, and the exceptions here are to all the adverse rulings of the court against the petitioners.

Carl K. Nelson, Nelson & Nelson, Dublin, for plaintiff in error.

R. M. Daley, Dublin, Victor Davidson, Irwinton, for defendant in error.

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

1. The Constitution, art. 8, sec. 5, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-6801, in part provides: 'Authority is granted to counties to establish and maintain public schools within their limits. Each county, exclusive of any independent school system now in existence in a county * * * shall be confincd to the control and management of a County Board of Education.' (Italics ours.) Here is complete constitutional vesting of authority to manage and control county schools in the county board of education. It harmonizes perfectly with repeated and consistent rulings of this court. Any challenge of acts of the county board relating to control and operation of schools must be weighed in the light of this sweeping power, which clearly manifests an intent to entrust the schools to the boards of education rather than the courts. Unless the act of a board violates some law, or is such a gross abuse of discretion as amounts to a violation of law, courts should not and can not interfere.

By the 1953 act, Ga.L.1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 282, 283, it is provided that 'The board of education of any county or independent school system is hereby authorized and empowered, if, in their opinion, the welfare of the schools of the county or independent system and the best interest of the pupils require, to reorganize the schools within their jurisdiction and to determine and fix the number of grades to be taught at each school in their respective system.' (Italics ours.) The General Assembly had the power to confer upon county boards of education this right to consolidate schools in whole or in part. Crawford v. Irwin, 211 Ga. 241, 85 S.E.2d 8. And since the act was approved in 1953 the resolution adopted by the Laurens County Board of Education on January 28, 1954, if such as the act covers, was authorized by the 1953 act. The mere fact that the same reorganization had been undertaken before the 1953 act, and before this suit was filed, would in no wise prevent the adoption of the resolution on January 28, 1954, after the 1953 act, and proceeding under that act. This fact alone renders the decisions in Irwin v. Crawford, 210 Ga. 222, 78 S.E.2d 609; and Hobbs v. Bishop, 210 Ga. 818, 82 S.E.2d 839, inapplicable, neither of which cases comes under the 1953 act. When it is remembered that the board is here defending and that the procedure by the resolution adopted on January 28, 1954, is entirely apart from and independent of their previous steps to reorganize under the old law, it becomes apparent that no attempt to breathe life into that old procedure is made, and hence Southwestern R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356(4); Bennett v. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213(4), and Renfroe v. Butts, 192 Ga. 720, 723, 16 S.E.2d 551, cited and relied on by the plaintiffs in error, have no application.

But counsel for plaintiffs in error citing dictionary definitions of the word 'reorganize,' argue that as used in the 1953 act above it does not authorize the creation of a new school. While we accept the dictionary definition which is 'to organize again and anew,' we do not accept the contention that changing the schools as here contemplated is not 'reorganization' of the schools of the county. It is plainly within the definition of reorganization when applied to the schools of Laurens County to erect an entirely new building for use in the shifting of grades of those schools. No doubt placing all the high schools in one, rather than several schools, is economical and aids in the difficult job of making available funds to finance the public schools of the State sufficiently. We hold, therefore, that what is sought to be done by the resolution adopted January 28, 1954, is easily and completely within the authority conferred by the 1953 act. The anwer was not subject to the demurrers.

2. But the 1953 act is assailed upon nine constitutional grounds. First it is contended that if applied as is here undertaken, the act would be made retroactive, and would be unconstitutional and void under the decisions in Renfroe v. Butts, 192 Ga. 720, 16 S.E.2d 551, supra; and Davis v. Buie, 197 Ga. 835, 842, 30 S.E.2d 861. As pointed out in division 1, the procedure by resolution in January, 1954, under this act is in no wise applying it retroactively. This contention is without merit.

Secondly, it is contended that the act is an attempt by the legislature to construe the law, and repeal the decision of this court in Irwin v. Crawford, 210 Ga. 222, 78 S.E.2d 609, supra, and is therefore violative of the Constitution since it seeks to usurp powers exclusively vested in the Judiciary by the Constitution, and is void under the decisions in McCutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 35 S.E.2d 144, and Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883. Neither of the cited cases denied the legislative power to serve as a check upon the Executive and Judicial Departments. And this function is properly performed by enactment of laws. If the legislature...