Keith H., Matter of

• Decision Date: 14 December 1990
• Citation: 150 Misc.2d 470,569 N.Y.S.2d 555
• Parties: In the Matter of KEITH H. A Person Alleged to be in Need of Supervision, Respondent.
• Court: New York Family Court

Page 555

569 N.Y.S.2d 555

150 Misc.2d 470

In the Matter of KEITH H. A Person Alleged to be in Need of Supervision, Respondent.

Family Court, Dutchess County.

Dec. 14, 1990.

Ian G. MacDonald, County Atty., Christian R. Cullen, Asst. County Atty., Poughkeepsie David B. Sall, Law Guardian, Schisler, Sall & Schindler, Poughkeepsie.

for Presentment Agency, Dutchess County Dept. of Law.

DAMIAN J. AMODEO, Judge.

FACTS

Respondent is before the court on a petition alleging that he is a person in need of supervision (hereafter PINS) as provided in Article 7 of the Family Court Act. The petitioner is the principal of a local junior high school, where the respondent is a student. In substance the petition alleges that respondent is incorrigible and beyond the control of his parent and other lawful authority in that respondent was involved in a physical confrontation in the school hallway with another student; that respondent was involved in a number of other specific incidents at the school; and, that respondent walked out of a PINS assessment and refused to return to complete the assessment.

The entire factual basis for the petition is stated to be "upon information and belief" and the source of that belief is stated to be the school records. No supporting depositions or other documents were annexed to or made a part of the petition.

Respondent's law guardian made a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it does not contain any non-hearsay allegations relating to the misconduct charged. While acknowledging that Article 7 of the Family Court Act does not specifically require that a PINS petition be supported by non-hearsay statements (see, Family Ct Act sec 732), respondent urges that, since a significant liberty interest is at stake in a PINS proceeding, the standard applicable in a juvenile delinquency (hereinafter JD) proceeding should also apply in a PINS proceeding. Respondent argues that the provisions of section 311.2 of the Family Court Act, which require that every element of the crime charged be supported by non-hearsay statements, should be read into section 732. In the alternative, respondent contends that Article 7 should be declared unconstitutional to the extent that its provisions fail to parallel the notice requirements set forth in Article 3 of the Family Court Act.

In reviewing this matter the court has considered the oral arguments of counsel together with the affirmations and memoranda submitted. The Attorney General was afforded an opportunity to comment on the constitutional issues raised (CPLR sec 1012[b]; however, no pleadings or memoranda have been received from that office.

ISSUES

The questions presented are whether there is a constitutional requirement that the character of the notice given in a PINS proceeding must be coextensive with the notice required in a JD proceeding; whether any deficiency in the New York statutory scheme for handling PINS proceedings mandates a finding that the statute in question is unconstitutional or whether the court can cure any deficiency; if it is found proper to read the provisions of section 311.2 into section 732, whether the instant petition is adequate, when measured against that standard; and, if found to be inadequate, whether amendment of the petition should be permitted.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before a court of first instance may declare a statute unconstitutional, every other alternative must be exhausted (see, People v. Darry P., 96 Misc.2d 12, 16, 408 N.Y.S.2d 880 and cases cited).

(a) Due Process

The United States Supreme Court in Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-4, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1446-47, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 held that due process "does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his parent's right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance, of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet." At the same time, the Gault court did not specify the character of the notice which must be given to satisfy due process.

The presentment agency argues that because the court cannot issue a dispositional Notwithstanding the civil characterization given to JD and PINS proceedings and the laudable goals set by the framers of legislation pertaining to such proceedings, from an early date these matters have been treated as quasi-criminal. Not only must the criminal burden of proof be met in each type of proceeding (see, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; Matter of Richard S., 27 N.Y.2d 802, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861, 264 N.E.2d 353), but a host of other rights granted to an adult criminal defendant have been made applicable to juveniles charged with misconduct (See generally, Besharov, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Court Act, sec 711 at 9-15). As the court in Winship noted (397 U.S. at pp. 365-6, 90 S.Ct. at 1073), the "[c]ivil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in Juvenile Courts." At the same time, courts have recognized that every safeguard applicable in adult criminal proceedings need not be applied in all proceedings in which young people are charged with wrongdoing (see, e.g., Matter of Lawrence D., 125 Misc.2d 944, 952, 480 N.Y.S.2d 964 and cases cited).

                order placing respondent in a secure detention facility, the requirements relating to the content of a PINS petition should be subject to less stringent scrutiny than that applicable in a JD proceeding.   On the other hand, although secure detention is not a permissible disposition in a PINS proceeding, the alternatives available could have a profound impact on the right of a child to live in his own home;  to have daily contact with his family and friends;  to continue to be enrolled and participate in the activities of a local school;  to reside in the community in which he was raised;  or to otherwise be free to conduct him/herself as a youth, unburdened by an order of disposition directing placement in one form or another (See Family Ct Act, sec 756.)   The court in Matter of Andrew R., 115 Misc.2d 937, 939, 454 N.Y.S.2d 820, noted that a "PINS proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, involving the potential for significant governmental interference in the liberty of the child (Family Ct Act sec 754, 756).   Therefore, the [150 Misc.2d 473] due process rights accorded to a respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding apply with equal force to a PINS respondent (Matter of Cecilia R., 36 NY2d 317 [367 N.Y.S.2d 770, 327 N.E.2d 812];  Matter of Iris R., 33 NY2d 987 [353 N.Y.S.2d 743, 309 N.E.2d 140];  Matter of Theodore F., 47 AD2d 945 [367 N.Y.S.2d 103];  Matter of Renaldo R., 73 Misc2d 390 [341 N.Y.S.2d 998];   Matter of George C., 91 Misc.2d 875, 398 N.Y.S.2d 936)."   While the liberty interest at stake in a PINS proceeding may differ in degree from that at stake in a JD proceeding that difference is not of sufficient magnitude to change the fundamental principles and safeguards which must be applied
                

Prior to the legislation which transferred JD proceedings to Article 3, the court In Matter of Michael E., 68 Misc.2d 487, 489-90, 327 N.Y.S.2d 84 indicated that "there are no real distinctions between the judicial processing of a person in need of supervision and the treatment afforded a juvenile delinquent, save for that exercised by the judge at the dispositional hearing." While recognizing the capacity of the Legislature to adopt a meaningful distinction between the various classes of problem juveniles, the court held that until the philosophy, procedures and treatment of such problem juveniles was modified, an alleged PINS is entitled to no less due process than is an alleged juvenile delinquent.

The Legislature's creation of a separate article within the Family Court Act to deal with JD proceedings, codified much of the case law which had developed since the decisions in Gault and Winship. That case law evolved largely as a consequence of the shortcomings of the procedures set forth in Article 7 of the Act, previously applicable to both JD and PINS proceedings. While these changes indicated a clear Legislative intent to codify a more formal set of procedures in JD proceedings, did those changes also suggest an intent to relax the procedural safeguards applicable to PINS proceedings? If so, would it be proper to give effect to the distinction thus created?

Some courts appear to have made an attempt to dilute the due process and other

                constitutional rights of an alleged PINS by merely asserting that such proceedings are not criminal in nature (see, e.g., Matter of Mary Jane HH., 120 A.D.2d 906, 502 N.Y.S.2d 827).   However, the stated purpose of and procedures outlined in Article 7 make it clear that it was the intent of the Legislature to afford an individual accused of being a PINS with procedural safeguards which would protect fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution for an individual whose liberty interests are at stake (see, Family Ct Act secs 711;  741[a];  744[b]
                

(b) Equal Protection

Long before JD proceedings were removed to Article 3 of the Family Court Act, there had been a clear trend in matters dealing with juveniles under Article 7 to utilize an equal protection argument to support the application of various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law to juvenile proceedings in Family Court (see, generally, Besharov, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act, sec 711 at 9-15). Now that the...