Kelen v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
| Decision Date | 03 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | 060839BLS1 |
| Citation | 2007 MBAR 180 |
| Parties | Edgar Kelen et al. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority et al. |
| Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
As-is Docket Number: 06-0839 BLS1
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): van Gestel, Allan, J.
The plaintiffs, Edgar Kelen ("Kelen") and Christopher Pachus ("Pachus"), have filed a class action complaint challenging the constitutionality of a toll discount program ("toll program") of the defendants, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority ("MTA") and the Massachusetts Port Authority ("Massport"). They rely on the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts State Constitution. The plaintiffs have alleged, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, that the defendants violated the constitutional rights of them and the class they purport to represent, by implementing and enforcing discount toll practices in and around Boston Massachusetts.
Pending under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) are the defendants' motions to dismiss:
Defendant Massport and Kinton's Motion to Dismiss, Paper #14; and Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and Matthew J. Amorello, Paper #18.
Kelen is a resident of the State of New York, and his non-commercial vehicle is registered to his place of residence. Pachus is a resident of Massachusetts, and his two non-commercial vehicles are registered to his place of residence. Both participate in the MTA's Fast Lane Discount Program ("Fast Lane"). The Fast Lane program enables customers to pay tolls without stopping by use of a small electronic device called a transponder.[1]
Currently, the toll for a non-commercial passenger vehicle that uses the Sumner or Ted Williams Tunnel is ordinarily $3.00, but is $2.50 when the vehicle is equipped with the standard Fast Lane transponder, and only $0.40 for residents of East Boston, South Boston, or the North End in Boston.[2] Similarly, the toll for a non-commercial passenger vehicle that uses the Tobin Memorial Bridge is $2.50 when equipped with the standard Fast Lane transponder, but only $0.30 for residents of Charlestown and Chelsea, Massachusetts.[3] The MTA administers the Sumner and Ted Williams Tunnels.
Massport is an independent authority and it administers the Tobin Memorial Bridge.
On September 26, 2005, Kelen paid a toll of $2.50 for transit through the Sumner Tunnel, and on the same day paid a $2.50 toll for passage over the Tobin Memorial Bridge. On February 27, 2003, Pachus paid a toll of $2.50 for transit through the Sumner Tunnel and a toll of $2.50 for transit through the Ted Williams Tunnel. Pachus has also used the Tobin Memorial Bridge, paying tolls of $2.50. Neither Kelen nor Pachus is eligible to receive the toll program discount because neither is a resident of the above identified areas.
Kelen and Pachus allege that the toll program violates (1) the Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses; (2) the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution; and (3) the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution; all under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Kelen and Pachus seek damages by way of a refund of user fees allegedly overpaid, on a theory of unjust enrichment. The MTA and its Chairman ("MTA defendants") and Massport and its Chief Executive Officer ("Massport defendants") each have filed motions to dismiss pursuant Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. §12(b)(6), this court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn in the plaintiffs' favor. Eyal v Helen Broad. Corp., 411 Mass. 426, 429 (1991). Kelen and Pachus "need only surmount a minimal hurdle to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 184 (1985). A "complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits a state from "denying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The equal protection clause prevents states from purposefully discriminating between individuals based on sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993); Cote-Whiteacre v Dep't of Pub. Health, 446 Mass. 350, 366 (2006). "[A] classification involving a suspect group or a fundamental right must be supported by a compelling State interest." Lee v. Comm'r of Revenue, 395 Mass. 527, 529-30 (1985). "Cases not involving a suspect group or fundamental right need be supported only by a rational or conceivable basis." Lee, 359 Mass. at 530. See also Cote-Whiteacre, 446 Mass. at 366-67.
Kelen and Pachus argue that due to the toll program, their right to travel has been violated. It is beyond dispute that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a fundamental right to travel. Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901-03 (1986). The right to travel "protects travelers against two types of burdens: 'the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement' and 'being treated differently' from intrastate travelers." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993), quoting Zobel v. Wilson, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982). See also Sanez v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). "A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel,... when impeding travel is its primary objective,... or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right." Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903.
Kelen and Pachus must meet the test established in Soto-Lopez to demonstrate that their claim is within the relevant zone of interest to be protected. Id. They must allege that the toll program (1) actually deters interstate travel by placing an unlawful burden on their right to enter and leave the state, (2) impedes interstate travel as its primary objective, or (3) uses an impermissible classification, such as race or religion, which penalizes the exercise of their right to interstate travel. See Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 470 F.Supp.2d 158, 176 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). Kelen and Pachus have failed to do so. They do not allege, nor could they prove, how the toll program places an unlawful burden on their right to enter and leave the Commonwealth, nor do they demonstrate how the toll program impedes interstate travel as its primary objective. The only "actual barriers to... movement" that result from the toll program are located on certain tunnels and a bridge entering and exiting the city of Boston, restricting movement from one area of Massachusetts to another, not restricting movement from state to state. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 277. "Such a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if it was applied intentionally against travelers from other States, unless it is applied discriminatorily against them." Id. Moreover, as this Court can judicially notice, there are several other means to access Boston aside from the two tunnels and the bridge. Therefore, the plaintiffs are unable to allege that the toll program placed an unlawful burden on their right to enter or leave the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the plaintiffs do not allege that the toll program uses an impermissible classification to penalize the exercise of their right to interstate travel. Thus, their equal protection claim does not meet the criteria to be subject to strict scrutiny review.
Kelen and Pachus contend that merely alleging a violation of the right to travel is enough to get over the hurdle of Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). However, not every action that affects the right to travel must be supported by a compelling state interest. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981); see also Lee, 395 Mass. at 531. "Only those classifications that serve to penalize the exercise of that right are tested on that strict scrutiny basis." Lee, 395 Mass. at 530. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricona County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974).
A way courts may determine the level of scrutiny to apply is by focusing on the "nature of the benefit denied." Lee, 395 Mass. at 530. Only those actions resulting in some significant effect on the right to travel will be deemed "penalties." Id. See Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-60 (1972) (); Mem'l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269-70 (). "Any expense imposed on citizens crossing state lines but not imposed on those staying put could theoretically be deemed a penalty on travel; the toll exacted from persons crossing from Delaware to New Jersey by the Delaware Memorial Bridge is a 'penalty' on interstate travel in the most literal sense of all." Lee, 395 Mass. at 531, quoting Mem'l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 284.
Here as stated above, the toll program's burden on interstate travel is minimal and does not violate a fundamental right. This toll program is located wholly within the Commonwealth, only minimally burdens intrastate activity and does not prevent any movement between the states. ...
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