Lee v. Commissioner of Revenue

• Decision Date: 01 August 1985
• Citation: 395 Mass. 527,481 N.E.2d 183
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 183

481 N.E.2d 183

395 Mass. 527

John S. LEE et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE et al. ¹ Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Hampden.

Argued April 1, 1985.

Decided Aug. 1, 1985.

Thomas A. Barnico, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Commissioner of revenue.

Peter Benjamin, Springfield, for plaintiffs.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

In this class action, ² the plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a statute granting real estate tax abatements to persons over the age of seventy who have owned and occupied their homes for at least ten years. G.L. c. 59, § 5, Seventeenth C (1984 ed.). ³ The plaintiffs claim that the ten-year waiting period is an unconstitutional infringement of their right to travel. A judge of the Superior Court agreed and ordered that all class members be granted the abatement regardless of the length of time they have owned their home. ⁴ The Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We reverse.

The facts are as follows. The named plaintiffs, John and Catherine Lee, are both over the age of seventy. From 1943 to 1977, they owned and occupied a two-story, eight-room house in Springfield. In 1977, the Lees sold that house to a son and his wife, and purchased their present one-story, five-room house, also located in Springfield. The Lees have assets of less than $40,000, exclusive of their present home, which is assessed at 100% valuation of $42,600. On September 28, 1982, the Lees applied to the Board of Assessors of Springfield for a property tax abatement under G.L. c. 59, § 5, Seventeenth C (1984 ed.), which was denied. The Lees met all the requirements of that statute, except they have not owned and occupied their present home for the requisite ten-year period.

The Lees then instituted this suit in Superior Court, on their own behalf as well as on behalf of all those similarly situated, claiming that the durational requirement of clause Seventeenth C is an unconstitutional infringement of their right to travel. ⁵ On March 8, 1984, the judge found that the statute has an impact on the "ability of the plaintiffs to obtain the necessities of life." Finding this impact "significant," and the right to travel "fundamental," the judge held that the durational requirement was subject to review by the "strict scrutiny" test, and therefore could be upheld only on a showing of a compelling State interest in that requirement. Finding no such State interest in this case, the judge held that the ten-year period "penalizes the fundamental right of interstate travel protected by the United States and Massachusetts constitutions," and therefore that it was unconstitutional. We disagree.

Although the Supreme Court has not held that the right to travel protected by the United States Constitution is applicable when only intrastate rights are involved, we assume, for the purposes of discussion, that the statute in question affects that right. "The right to travel and to move from one state to another has long been accepted, yet both the nature and the source of that right have remained obscure." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 2312 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has generally reviewed right to travel cases under a standard similar to that applied to equal protection claims. Id. (right to travel involves "little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis"); id. at 67, 102 S.Ct. at 2316 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("right to travel achieves its most forceful expression in the context of equal protection analysis"). ⁶ In equal protection cases, a classification involving a suspect group or a fundamental right must be supported by a compelling State interest. Cases not involving a suspect group or fundamental right need be supported only by a rational or conceivable basis. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 21, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977), and cases cited. While the right to travel is considered a fundamental right (see, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2439, 69 L.Ed.2d 118 [1981] ), not every statute that affects the right to travel must be supported by a compelling State interest. Only those classifications that serve to penalize the exercise of that right are tested on that strict scrutiny basis. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 & 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322 1331 & 1333 n. 21, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). See also Milton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 365 Mass. 368, 371, 312 N.E.2d 188 (1974). As the Supreme Court itself has realized, however, "[t]he amount of impact [on the right to travel] required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear." Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, supra 415 U.S. at 256-257, 94 S.Ct. at 1081. See Milton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra.

The determination whether a particular statute imposes a "penalty" on the right to travel includes something more than merely deciding whether the statute denies some other fundamental right or the "necessities of life." Zobel v. Williams, supra, 457 U.S. at 64 & n. 11, 102 S.Ct. at 2314 & n. 11. To determine what level of scrutiny to apply, courts have generally focused on the "nature of the benefit denied." Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629, 635 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 3029, 65 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1980). Only those statutes resulting in some significant effect on the right to travel will be deemed "penalties." Examples of such "penalties" include a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits (Shapiro v. Thompson, supra ); a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 [1972] ); a one-year residency requirement to receive free nonemergency medical care (Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, supra ); a two-year residency requirement to use the State's courts for divorce (Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13, 310 N.E.2d 112 [1974] ). Less significant impositions on the right to travel have been upheld when supported by a rational or conceivable basis. See, e.g., Milton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra (preferential civil service treatment for one-year residents); Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities Div., 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.1981) (lower mooring rates for one-year residents); Kuhn v. Vergiels, 558 F.Supp. 24 (D.Nev.1982) (financial assistance for professional school predicated on five-year residence); Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F.Supp. 38 (W.D.Wash.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057, 94 S.Ct. 563, 38 L.Ed.2d 464 (1973) (lower tuition rates at State colleges for one-year residents); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (D.Minn.1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (same). ⁷ Thus, "a restriction based on residency does not warrant strict scrutiny merely because it impinges to some extent on the right to travel." Matter of Frazier, 594 F.Supp. 1173, 1181 (E.D.La.1984), citing Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, supra 415 U.S. at 256, 94 S.Ct. at 1081. See Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 266, 278 (2d Cir.1985) ("Merely having an effect on travel is not sufficient to raise an issue of constitutional dimension"); Philadelphia Lodge No. 5, Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 599 F.Supp. 254, 258 (E.D.Pa.1984) (only "unreasonable burdens" are penalties). This is simply an accommodation to common sense, for "[a]ny expense imposed on citizens crossing state lines but not imposed on those staying put could theoretically be deemed a penalty on travel; the toll exacted from persons crossing from Delaware to New Jersey by the Delaware Memorial Bridge is a 'penalty' on interstate travel in the most literal sense of all." Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, supra, 415 U.S. at 284, 94 S.Ct. at 1095 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175, 1182 (D.Mont.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172 (1974).

In our view, the right to the real estate tax abatement at issue here simply does not rise to a level of interference with the right to travel that would justify the application of strict scrutiny. The plaintiffs have no right to a particular rate of taxation, and "States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation." Williams v. Vermont, 457 U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2465, 2471-2472, 86 L.Ed.2d 11 (1985), quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1003, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973). The State action in question here does not affect the right to travel in any significant way. It does not interfere with the "vitality of the principle of free interstate migration." Zobel v. Williams, supra, 457 U.S. at 67, 102 S.Ct. at 2316 (Brennan, J., concurring). It does not have a significant impact on the "necessities of life" (Shapiro v. Thompson, supra 394 U.S. at 627, 89 S.Ct. at 1327), or on any other right or privilege. Nor are the plaintiffs in this case members of a group unable to protect their interests through the political process, the historical justification for the application of strict scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-784 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 639 n. 8 (7th Cir.1984). Therefore, we must determine whether the statutory classification is supported by a rational basis. We conclude that G.L. c. 59, § 5, Seventeenth C, meets that test.

The Commissioner states that the local option abatement provisions of cl. Seventeenth C were enacted by St.1981, c. 743, § 1, in response to inflationary increases in real estate values occurring in the 1970's, which led to increases in real...