Keller v. DISTRICT LODGE NO. 19 WORKERS

• Decision Date: 18 April 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3:94-0137.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Gary F. KELLER, Homer C. Miller, Keith E. Sansom, and Curtis F. Woods, Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT LODGE NO. 19, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendant.

882 F. Supp. 560

Gary F. KELLER, Homer C. Miller, Keith E. Sansom, and Curtis F. Woods, Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT LODGE NO. 19, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 3:94-0137.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Huntington Division.

April 18, 1995.

Robert V. Berthold, Jr., Charleston, WV, Robert L. Templeton, Ashland, KY, for plaintiffs.

Robin Jean Davis, Segal & Davis, Charleston, WV, Michael S. Wolly, Zwerdling, Paul, Leibig, Kahn, Thompson & Driesen, Washington, DC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HADEN, Chief Judge.

Pending are the Defendant's motions for partial summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and for summary judgment on the merits based on the duty of fair representation. For reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on claims barred by the statute of limitations is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Further, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the merits is GRANTED.

I

A principal purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of meritless litigation. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard used to determine whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted or denied was stated recently by our Court of Appeals:

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). See Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.1979).

A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. The plaintiff is entitled to have the credibility of all his evidence presumed. Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists; he may not rest upon mere allegations or denials. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994). Accord Riffe v. Magushi, 859 F.Supp. 220, 222, n. 1 (S.D.W.Va.1994); Cornell v. General Electric Plastics, 853 F.Supp. 221, 225-26 (S.D.W.Va. 1994); Thomas v. Shoney's, Inc., 845 F.Supp. 388, 389-90 (S.D.W.Va.1994) (Haden, C.J.).

II

The material facts are undisputed. The Plaintiffs, Gary F. Keller, Homer C. Miller, Keith E. Sansom, and Curtis F. Woods, are CSX Transportation (CSXT) machinists based in Huntington, West Virginia, who were furloughed November 9, 1988 as part of a systemwide furlough of over 600 employees. Over one hundred machinists were furloughed from the Huntington shops.¹ The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) and the Defendant, its District Lodge No. 19, are the exclusive collective bargaining representatives for the CSXT machinists under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).

Initially, CSXT offered a buy-out to the furloughed machinists, but that proposal was not acceptable to the union. Instead, the IAM filed claims for protective benefits on behalf of all machinists furloughed. The union asserted all the furloughs stemmed from mergers and consolidations of facilities that CSXT accomplished under authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1980 and 1982.² On August 11, 1989 all the claims filed were denied by CSXT, which maintained the furloughs were based on purely economic considerations unrelated to the earlier transaction triggering eligibility for the protective benefits.

While the claims filed by the union for the Plaintiffs and other machinists were pending, the sheet metal workers union arbitrated two sets of claims filed on behalf of its members furloughed by CSXT on October 12, 1988 from Corbin, Kentucky and Waycross, Georgia. The sheet metal workers lost both sets of claims for protective benefits in arbitration.

After the IAM learned of the poor results of the sheet metal workers' arbitration, the union decided to choose one of the machinists' furlough locations for arbitration as a test case. The union chose to arbitrate the claims of thirteen machinists furloughed at Waycross, Georgia. The claims of other machinists were held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Waycross claims. Plaintiffs Keller and Miller were informed in August 1992 their case were being held while the sheet metal workers attempted to arbitrate their similar dispute with CSXT.

On March 4 and April 5, 1993 Plaintiffs, through counsel, inquired about the status of their claims and of the union's rejection of a CSXT offer to buy-out jobs in 1988. The union responded April 12, 1993 that the claims of the Waycross machinists would be arbitrated first and explained its position on why the earlier buy-out offer was not acceptable to the union. On August 3, 1993, the arbitrator denied the Waycross machinists claims for protective benefits.

On August 20, 1993 the union sent a copy of the Waycross arbitration award to Plaintiffs Keller and Miller. The union explained that given the losses in the sheet metal arbitration and the loss on the Waycross claims, it would not attempt to arbitrate the Huntington machinists' claims and their files would be closed.

On February 18, 1994, the Plaintiffs filed this action against District Lodge No. 19 and IAM. The Complaint alleged the Defendants breached their duties of fair representation through:

the decision, made formally and communicated to the Plaintiffs on or about August 20, 1993, to refuse to proceed with arbitration or otherwise pursue claims previously made for protective benefits from CSXT; depriving the Plaintiffs of the benefits offered to them by CSXT in the form of voluntary separation benefits; electing an ineffectual remedy with little likelihood of success; subordinating claims of the Plaintiffs to less meritorious claims of other constituents; failing to vigorously, competently, and effectively present cases in arbitration upon which the claims of the Plaintiffs were made dependent; and otherwise unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminating against these Plaintiffs.

Complaint, p. 3.

Defendant IAM was dismissed from the suit pursuant to Rule 4(m), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for the Plaintiffs' failure to effectuate service within 120 days. Plaintiffs did not respond to IAM's motion and could not show good cause for their late service of IAM on their following motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, Defendant District Lodge No. 19 filed the pending motions for summary judgment. The motion for partial summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue was filed January 13, 1995. The Defendant's second motion for summary judgment on the merits was filed January 23, 1995.

The Plaintiffs twice sought extensions of time in which to file their response to the first motion. The Court granted both motions and the Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum was filed February 1, 1994. Although the Defendants moved for partial summary judgment with attached depositions, Plaintiffs' response denying Defendant's allegations did not provide any supporting depositions or affidavits in opposition. Instead, Plaintiffs referred to a response they intended to file to the other motion for summary judgment on the merits filed by District Lodge No. 19. Plaintiffs stated:

They expect to more fully articulate the details of their theory of the case, supported by ample references to the evidence thus far, in their anticipated Response to the separate "Motion for Summary Judgment on the Merits" which has apparently been filed by the Defendant.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 4-5 (footnote omitted).

Prior to filing its responsive memorandum to the Defendant's second motion for summary judgment on the merits, the Plaintiffs three times moved for extensions to respond. Attached to their third motion was the Plaintiffs' proposed responsive memorandum and a motion to file a memorandum in excess of twenty pages. Plaintiffs sought to exceed the twenty-page limit established by the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, because they had

filed a relatively short Memorandum in response to this earlier Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and indicated that a more complete explanation of the merits of the claims by the Plaintiffs, with references to the deposition testimony and documentary evidence of record, would be set forth in their response to the second dispositive Motion which the Plaintiffs expected to receive from the Defendant.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Twenty Pages, 1-2.

On March 2, 1995, the Court granted the third motion to extend time but denied the motion to file a memorandum in excess of twenty pages because the Plaintiffs had not shown good cause to file a brief in excess of the page limit. Plaintiffs were allowed to file a memorandum in accordance with the Local Rules by March 8, 1995. Attached to the filed memorandum was Plaintiffs' counter-statement and supplementation of material facts as to which there is no dispute. In the counterstatement, Plainti...