Kelley v. Bonham
| Decision Date | 11 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5-17-0103,5-17-0103 |
| Citation | 2018 IL App (5th) 170103 -U |
| Parties | CASSIE L. KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANK S. BONHAM, RIDES MASS TRANSIT DISTRICT, and SHANDRIL DAYTON, Defendants (Frank S. Bonham and Rides Mass Transit District, Defendants-Appellants). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/11/18. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County.
¶ 1 Held: We answer the trial court's certified question in the affirmative based upon the facts of this case. Where Cassie L. Kelley was not a passenger of the Rides Mass Transit District bus driven by its employee, Frank S. Bonham, the "common carrier" exception from the one-year statute of limitations applicable to local governmental entities does not apply. Where Cassie L. Kelley did not file her complaint against Rides Mass Transit District and its employee, Frank S. Bonham, within one year of the accident, her claim is time-barred, and must be dismissed.
¶ 2 Plaintiff, Cassie L. Kelley, was operating a vehicle that became involved in a three-vehicle accident. One of the vehicles was a bus operated by Rides Mass Transit District (RMTD) and driven by Frank S. Bonham, RMTD's employee. Bonham and RMTD filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Kelley's complaint was filed after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations for local public entities as required by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2010)). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss finding that because RMTD was a common carrier, the one-year statute of limitations did not apply. Id. § 2-101(b). Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), the trial court certified the statute of limitations question. This court granted the Rule 308 application for leave to appeal on May 16, 2017. For the reasons stated in this order, we affirmatively answer the certified question in favor of Bonham and RMTD and remand the case to the trial court with directions to dismiss Kelley's complaint.
¶ 4 The motor vehicle accident occurred on December 5, 2011, in Marion, Illinois. All three drivers were traveling westbound. Kelley was in the first vehicle. She slowed to a stop at a red light behind other vehicles. Shandril Dayton, who was driving the vehicle immediately behind Kelley's vehicle, also slowed to a stop because of the stopped traffic at the red light. Frank S. Bonham was operating an RMTD bus directly behind Dayton. Bonham struck the rear of Dayton's vehicle which resulted in Dayton's vehicle striking the rear of Kelley's vehicle.
¶ 5 Kelley filed a personal injury complaint against Bonham, his employer RMTD, and Dayton on November 27, 2013. Dayton filed her answer and also filed a counterclaim against Bonham and RMTD for contribution. Bonham and RMTD1 filed a motion to dismiss Kelley's complaint that alleged the complaint was barred by the Tort Immunity Act's one-year statute of limitations for local public entities.
¶ 6 Kelley asked the trial court for the opportunity to conduct discovery and for additional time to respond to the motion to dismiss. She filed a request to admit facts directed to RMTD. In its response, RMTD admitted that it was a common carrier serving the public and that Bonham was its employee. Kelley then filed her response to the motion to dismiss arguing that RMTD's admission that it was a common carrier precluded its reliance on the one-year statute of limitations.
¶ 7 On January 28, 2016, the trial court entered its order denying the motion. RMTD filed a motion to reconsider. The trial court denied this motion on April 19, 2016.
¶ 8 RMTD asked the trial court to certify a question for immediate appeal. The court granted the motion certifying the question in orders filed February 15, 2017, and March 7, 2017.
¶ 9 We granted RMTD's application for leave to appeal to this court on May 16, 2017.
¶ 11 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 provides a means for parties to appeal a nonfinal order if the order "involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Here, the trial court certified the following legal question:
"Whether a 'local public entity' (as that term is defined by § 1-206 of the Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act ('Tort Immunity Act') (745 ILCS 10/1-206)) operating as a common carrier is afforded the protection of the one (1) year statute of limitations contained within 745 ILCS 10/8-101 which states (a) no civil action other than an action described in subsection (b) may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one (1) year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued."
¶ 12 Our review of this issue is de novo for two reasons. First, the applicability of the one-year statute of limitations raises a legal issue. Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324, 332, 898 N.E.2d 631, 636 (2008) (). Second, the underlying motion denied by the trial court was a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)). When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619, the defendant is admitting the legal sufficiency of the complaint but is asserting affirmative matter that may defeat the claim. Hubble v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, 238 Ill. 2d 262, 267, 938 N.E.2d 483, 488 (2010) (); Glasgow v. Associated Banc-Corp, 2012 IL App (2d) 111303, ¶ 11, 980 N.E.2d 785 ().
¶ 13 In section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature established the time limits to file a personal injury action. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2010). "Actions for damages for an injury to the person *** shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of action accrued ***." Id.
¶ 14 If the plaintiff files a complaint for personal injury against a local governmental entity and/or its employees, the action may be governed by the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2010). Following the supreme court's abolition of sovereign immunity in 1959 (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959)), the legislature passed the Tort Immunity Act in 1965 in order to "protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government." 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 2010).
¶ 15 We turn to the statute at issue in this appeal. The applicable portion of section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act provides: "No civil action *** may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued." Id. § 8-101(a). The term "local public entity" is defined as including:
Id. § 1-206.
¶ 16 To interpret this section of the Tort Immunity Act, we must primarily determine and then execute the legislature's intent. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388, 665 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996). If the legislature's intent is evident from the plain language of the statute, then that intent must be followed and we must not read any exceptions, limitations, or conditions into that language that would conflict with the Tort Immunity Act's plain language. Id.
¶ 17 The legislature had two primary intentions with the passage of the Tort Immunity Act. The first primary intention was the protection of public funds. DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (2006) (quoting Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490, 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (2001)); see also Prough v. Madison County, 2013 IL App (5th) 110146, ¶ 22, 984 N.E.2d 1177. The second intention was to expedite early investigation into any claim filed at a time "when the matter is still fresh, witnesses are available, and conditions had not materially changed." Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2d 288, 293, 348 N.E.2d 176, 179-80 (1976). The supreme court has stated that the shorter limitations...
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