Kelly v. City of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 14 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. C0-97-1206,C0-97-1206
• Citation: 581 N.W.2d 372
• Parties: Virginia KELLY, et al., Appellants, Kenneth Dukes, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 372

581 N.W.2d 372

Virginia KELLY, et al., Appellants Kenneth Dukes, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, et al., Respondents.

No. C0-97-1206.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 14, 1998.

Review Granted Sept. 22, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When the conduct of police officers towards persons they have apprehended and arrested constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress, the conduct also establishes malice, precluding the police officers from claiming entitlement to official immunity.

2. The doctrine of official immunity does not apply to police officer conduct that constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress because, by definition, such conduct is not protected as a proper exercise of police discretion.

3. The trial court did not err in adopting the jury's findings on discrimination, although the Minnesota Human Rights Act requires discrimination issues to be determined by a judge, where the jury's findings were advisory only and where the court made independent findings supporting its decision.

Larry E. Reed, Hassan & Reed, Ltd., Minneapolis, for appellants.

Jay M. Heffern, Minneapolis City Attorney, Edward Backstrom, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Considered and decided by AMUNDSON, P.J., and KLAPHAKE and SHUMAKER, JJ.

OPINION

KLAPHAKE, Judge.

Appellants Virginia Kelly and Antoinette Deyo allege numerous trial errors in their civil action against respondents, the City of Minneapolis, the police chief, and four Minneapolis police officers. They claim error in (1) the trial court's imposition of official immunity to bar two police officers' liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) evidentiary rulings; (3) defense counsel misconduct; (4) jury instructions; (5) special verdict form; (6) court rulings on their motion for a posttrial Schwartz hearing; and (7) findings as contrary to the evidence on their human rights claims. Respondent City of Minneapolis filed a notice of review claiming that the trial court erred in declining to grant their motion for summary judgment on appellants' intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Respondents also move to strike portions of appellants' brief and appendix. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

The parties adamantly dispute the facts of this case. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 29, 1991, respondent Minneapolis police officer Daniel Wells was dispatched to 2932 Humboldt Avenue North to investigate a loud party, and he was advised that "someone" was "screaming." Upon arriving there, he heard noise emanating from a party next door, at 2934 Humboldt Avenue North. Appellant Antoinette Deyo, who acknowledged that she was having a party at her house, approached him. According to Wells, when Deyo declined to identify herself, Wells decided to arrest her for a violation of the Minneapolis noise ordinance. Deyo claimed that Wells was not called to her address and that he was unresponsive to the screaming they could both hear coming from 2932 Humboldt Avenue North.

Wells ordered Deyo into the back of his squad car, and she started to do so, but immediately got out of the car, allegedly to return her friend's car keys. When Wells attempted to physically force Deyo into the car, the two got into an altercation, during which Deyo pulled Wells's sweater over his head, and he pushed her to the ground and put a choke hold on her. She testified that she struggled because he was choking her, and she could not breathe. He alleged that he let her go when she yelled out that he was raping her. She alleged that he called her a "black bitch" and "nigger bitch" and repeatedly threatened to "put [her] out." She also alleged that during the struggle her clothing was torn, exposing her breasts. When Deyo escaped from Wells, she ran into her house.

Believing that Deyo had assaulted him, Wells called for and received back-up assistance from other officers in order to rearrest Deyo. At least six officers entered the house while others remained outside. One of the officers, respondent David Roiger, entered the kitchen and found Deyo clinging to her brother. Roiger claimed that as he attempted to pry Deyo loose, someone jumped on his back and hit him twice on the head. As he turned, Deyo's sister, appellant Virginia Kelly, grabbed him by the sweater and started gouging at his face. Roiger tried to free himself by repeatedly punching Kelly, kneeing her, and grabbing her by the hair. He claimed that at one point she had fallen to her knees facing his crotch, and he was afraid she was going to bite him. Kelly and Deyo testified that Kelly did not attack Roiger and that his assault of her was unprovoked and unnecessarily violent, apparently based on his mistaken belief that Kelly was Deyo (the two were dressed alike). The other officers in the kitchen testified that they did not see Roiger's handling of Kelly because they were occupied with other individuals or with keeping people from entering the kitchen. Wells eventually assisted Roiger in handcuffing Kelly.

Roiger escorted Kelly out of the house and admitted to pulling her hair to keep her from "headbutting" him, but denied intentionally slamming her into objects as she left the house. He also admitted placing her over the trunk of his squad car, but denied slamming her head onto it. Other eyewitnesses testified to seeing Roiger drag Kelly through the house by her hair, slam her into objects in their path, and slam her face onto the squad car trunk and window. At least one of the witnesses testified to hearing an officer say, in regard to Kelly, "This bitch thinks she's bad." Deyo claimed that Officer David Stocke held her in a chokehold and that her breasts were exposed both as she left her house and while she was being processed at the jail.

After they left the scene and drove around the corner to exchange prisoners, Roiger and Wells also denied that Roiger said to Wells, "Look what I did to this black bitch," and Welles replied, "Look what I did to this one." Roiger also denied Kelly's claim that he delayed her medical treatment and called her a "c* * *t" at the hospital.

Wells and Roiger sustained scratches and cuts as a result of the incident that night. Deyo sustained neck injuries, and Kelly sustained a lacerated lip and ripped ear. Both women also claimed that they sustained psychological injuries, including post-traumatic stress syndrome. Deyo and Kelly ¹ initiated a civil action against the City of Minneapolis, the police chief, the four named officers, and other unnamed officers. They asserted claims of false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, unauthorized use of force, and state and federal constitutional violations and statutory human rights violations.

Prior to trial, the court granted summary judgment to respondents on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims and bifurcated the trial of appellants' federal claims against the city and police chief, staying discovery until after the trial involving the four individual respondents. After a six-week trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Wells intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Deyo and awarded her $65,000 for past and future emotional distress, $10,000 for past and future pain and suffering $1,680 for lost earnings, and $5,866 for past and future medical expenses. The jury also found that Roiger intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Kelly and awarded her $66,000 for past and future emotional distress, $3,000 for pain and suffering, and $13,220 for past and future medical expenses. The jury found in favor of respondents on all other claims.

Because the jury found that Wells and Roiger had not acted with malice, the trial court applied the doctrine of official immunity to bar respondents' liability. In its memorandum of law attached to its posttrial order denying JNOV or a new trial, the court stated that it found "certain aspects of [respondents'] conduct * * * personally repugnant" but was bound to apply the law "in this unfortunate case."

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err in applying the doctrine of official immunity to bar the police officers' liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

II. Do other trial errors mandate reversal of the verdict?

III. Did the trial court err in denying appellants' claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act?

IV. Should this court strike portions of appellants' brief and appendix?

ANALYSIS

I.

The common law doctrine of official immunity protects government employees who may be subject to liability due to the performance of their work duties. Davis v. Hennepin County, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.App.1997), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1997). Official immunity protects an employee " 'from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action.' " Janklow v. Minnesota Bd. of Exam'rs for Nursing Home Adm'rs., 552 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1996) (quoting Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn.1988)). Under the doctrine, "individual governmental actors * * * remain immune only if they do not act maliciously or intentionally." Janklow, 552 N.W.2d at 716; see Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn.1991) (conduct malicious or willful only if official intentionally commits act official "then has reason to believe is prohibited").

Official immunity protects actions "exercised on an operational rather than a policymaking level, and it requires something more than the performance of 'ministerial' duties." Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn.1992). The usual duties of police officers are not purely "ministerial" and may have an "executive character involving the exercise of discretion." Id. (quoting Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937)). Police are "afforded a wide degree of discretion precisely because a more stringent standard could inhibit action." Elwoo...