Kelly v. Parole Bd.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 334960,334960 |
| Parties | TREVOR KELLY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. PAROLE BOARD, Respondant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Wayne Circuit Court
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and CAVANAGH and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
Respondent, the Michigan Parole Board ("the Board"), appeals by leave granted1 a September 6, 2016 order of the Wayne Circuit Court reversing and remanding the Board's decision to revoke the petitioner's parole. We affirm.
"[T]he Parole Board is an administrative body," Morales v Mich Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 34; 676 NW2d 221 (2003), and "[p]arole revocation proceedings are contested cases under the Administrative Procedures Act, [MCL 24.201 et seq.]," In re Parole of Bivings, 242 Mich App 363, 369; 619 NW2d 163 (2000). "This Court has limited review of a trial court's review of an agency determination." Dana v American Youth Foundation, 257 Mich App 208, 211; 668 NW2d 174 (2003). "This Court reviews a lower court's review of an administrative decision to determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency's factual findings, which is essentially a clearly erroneous standard of review." Vanzandt v State Employees Retirement Sys, 266 Mich App 579, 585; 701 NW2d 214 (2005). "A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the record, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. This Court reviews the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. Davis v State Employees' Retirement Bd, 272 Mich App 151, 152; 725 NW2d 56 (2006). "Great deference is accorded to the circuit court's review of the administrative agency's factual findings, however, substantially less deference, if any, is accorded to the circuit court's determinations on matters of law." Mericka v Dep't of Community Health, 283 Mich App 29, 36; 770 NW2d 24 (2009).
On appeal, the Board first alleges that the circuit court improperly applied a de novo standard of review when it determined that the Board's revocation was contrary to law. We disagree.
"Whether a circuit court applied the appropriate standard of review is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Natural Resources Defense Council v Dep't of Environmental Quality, 300 Mich App 79, 87; 832 NW2d 288 (2013) (NRDC).
Although the circuit court did not explicitly state which standard of review it employed, the Board asserts that the circuit court's review was de novo because its decision was limited to conclusions without legal reasoning, failed to address the decision of the administrative law examiner ("ALE"), and invoked the circuit court's own policy decisions regarding the cost of incarceration to substitute for the discretion of the Board. The Board does not challenge any of these actions as individual errors on the part of the circuit court, and we need not address them as such. The Board argues only that these factors support the conclusion that the circuit court exercised its review of the Board's decision without granting the appropriate deference.
The Board asserts that the circuit court's chosen standard of review was de novo, but provides little argument for its assertion that the circuit court's standard of review was wrong. Therefore we could consider the issue to have been abandoned on appeal. DeGeorge v Warheit, 276 Mich App 587, 594-595; 741 NW2d 384 (2007) () In support of its argument, the Board simply quotes Article 6, § 28 of Michigan's 1963 Constitution, which sets forth guidelines for the judicial review of administrative actions. Const 1963, art 6, § 28. Article 6, § 28 of the Michigan Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. [Const 1963, art 6, § 28.]
Based on this provision, the Board suggests that the proper standard for judicial review of administrative cases is simply whether the decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. However, the Board forgets that a circuit court's review of an agency decision includes evaluating whether the decision was "authorized by law." Indeed, the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), MCL 24.201 et seq., sets forth a number of circumstances to support the finding that an agency decision was not authorized by law, specifically directing trial courts:
"[T]he APA's standards of review coincide with the authorized-by-law standard provided in the [C]onstitution[.]" Northwestern Nat Cas Co v Ins Com'r, 231 Mich App 483, 489-490; 586 NW2d 563 (1998), citing MCL 24.306. The Michigan Constitution therefore sets forth the minimum requirements, but the more specific guidelines enunciated in MCL 24.306 govern in a contested agency case. Id at 490. Notably, the APA's language is mandatory, requiring a trial court to hold unlawful and set aside an agency decision contrary to law in any of the listed ways. MCL 24.306(1). Contrary to the Board's assertions on appeal, neither the Constitution nor the APA's guidelines permit an inference of necessary discretion to an agency decision when matters of law are at issue. "The circuit court's review of an administrative agency's decision on a matter of law is limited to determining whether the decision was authorized by law." City of Romulus v Mich Dep't of Environmental Quality, 260 Mich App 54, 64; 678 NW2d 444 (2003). However, "[a]n agency's decision that is in violation of statute [or constitution], in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, made upon unlawful procedures resulting in material prejudice, or is arbitrary and capricious, is a decision that is not authorized by law and must be set aside." Id. (quotations and citations omitted.)
The circuit court rested its ultimate decision on perceived legal errors, including "significant due process issues," concluding that the Board's revocation decision was "contrary to law." Thus, the Board is incorrect when it argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review.
Next, the Board contends that the circuit court erred when it found that there was insufficient evidence to support the ALE's finding of constructive possession of a firearm. We disagree.
Whether knowing intent to exert control is an element of constructive possession is a legal question requiring the interpretation of administrative rules. This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and application of unambiguous administrative rules. City of Romulus, 260 Mich App at 64-65. Regarding unambiguity, "this Court will generally defer to the construction of the statute or administrative rule given by the agency charged with administering it." Id. at 65. This Court does not defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of a rule where thelanguage of the rule is unambiguous, or when it is convinced that the agency's interpretation is clearly wrong. Id. at 65-66.
"The circuit court's review of an administrative agency's decision on a matter of law is limited to determining whether the decision was authorized by law." City of Romulus, 260 Mich App at 64. MCL 24.306 states that a circuit court "shall hold unlawful and set aside a decision or order of an agency if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the decision or order is . . . [i]n violation of the constitution or a statute," MCL 24.306(1)(a), or "[a]ffected by other substantial and material error of law," MCL 24.306(1)(f). Generally, a lower court reviews an agency's factual findings to determine if " 'the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.' " Detroit Pub Sch v Conn, 308 Mich App 234, 245; 863 NW2d 373 (2014), quoting Const 1963, art 6, § 28. Substantial evidence is defined as "that which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a decision, being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the evidence." Vanzandt, 266 Mich App at 584. On review, the circuit court may not invade the province of the agency as fact-finder, resolve evidentiary disputes, or pass on witness credibility. Id. at 588.
The Legislature has prescribed a higher standard for the sufficiency of evidence to support violations of parole, requiring through MCL 791.240a that a parole violation be supported by a preponderance of the evidence before revocation of parole may be considered. MCL 791.240a(8)-(10). Because this burden of proof is statutorily mandated, any parole violation finding not supported by a preponderance of the...
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