Kemp v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 151719,151719
• Citation: 901 N.W.2d 534,500 Mich. 245
• Parties: Daniel KEMP, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

500 Mich. 245

901 N.W.2d 534

Daniel KEMP, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 151719

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued October 6, 2016

Decided June 15, 2017

Marshall Lasser, PC (by Marshall Lasser ), for Daniel Kemp.

Kopka Pinkus Dolin PLC (by Mark L. Dolin, Valerie Henning Mock, and Donald A. Winningham ) and Bursch Law PLLC (by John J. Bursch ) for Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan.

Amicus Curiae: Speaker Law Firm, PLLC (by Liisa R. Speaker and

Jennifer M. Alberts), and Sinas Dramis Brake Boughton & McIntyre PC (by George T. Sinas and Stephen H. Sinas ) for the Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Viviano, J.

At issue in this case is whether plaintiff, Daniel Kemp, is entitled to personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act¹ for injuries he allegedly sustained while unloading personal belongings from his parked vehicle.² We hold that plaintiff created an issue of fact regarding whether he satisfied the parked motor vehicle exception in MCL 500.3106(1)(b) and the corresponding causation requirement. We also hold as a matter of law that plaintiff satisfied the transportational function requirement. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On September 15, 2012, after plaintiff finished working, he placed his briefcase, overnight bag, thermos, and lunch box on the floor behind the driver's seat of his 2010 Chevy Silverado 1500 extended cab truck. He then drove home. When he arrived, he parked in his driveway, stepped out of the vehicle, and went to retrieve his belongings. Plaintiff opened the rear door, reached into the vehicle for his belongings, and sustained an injury as he was lowering them from the vehicle.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed suit against his auto insurer, defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan, seeking no-fault benefits under § 3106(1)(b). Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to no-fault benefits because (1) his injury did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, (2) his injury did not meet the parked motor vehicle exception in § 3106(1)(b), and (3) his injury did not have a causal relationship to the parked motor vehicle that was more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for. In response, plaintiff asked the trial court to deny defendant's motion and to grant plaintiff judgment under MCR 2.116(I)(2).³ The trial court granted defendant's motion.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in a split decision.⁴ The Court of Appeals majority concluded that plaintiff's "injury had nothing to do with 'the transportational function' of his truck."⁵ According to the Court, "the removal of personal effects from a parked vehicle ... cannot be said to result from some facet particular to the normal functioning of a motor vehicle" because similar movements routinely occur in other places.⁶ Rather, the majority reasoned, plaintiff's vehicle was used as a "storage space for his personal items" and was "merely the site" of the injury.⁷

Dissenting, Judge BECKERING concluded that plaintiff had satisfied the parked motor vehicle exception set forth in § 3106(1)(b).⁸ The dissent further concluded that plaintiff had satisfied the transportational function requirement because "it is axiomatic that when one travels in a vehicle, one will take personal effects along for the ride and will seek to unload those personal effects when the drive is finished."⁹ Finally, the dissent reasoned that "plaintiff's injury had a direct causal relationship to the parked vehicle" because it was the act of retrieving his personal effects from his vehicle that caused his injury.¹⁰

Plaintiff then sought review in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on plaintiff's application, directing the parties to address

(1) whether the plaintiff's injury is closely related to the transportational function of his motor vehicle, and thus whether the plaintiff's injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of his motor vehicle as a motor vehicle; and (2) whether the plaintiff's injury had a causal relationship to his parked motor vehicle that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for. McKenzie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 458 Mich. 214, 217 n. 3, 580 N.W.2d 424 (1998).^{[11 ]}

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).¹² MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary disposition is appropriate when, "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." In determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.¹³ "[W]here there is no dispute about the facts, the issue whether an injury arose out of the use of a vehicle is a legal issue for a court to decide and not a factual one for a jury."¹⁴

Issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo.¹⁵ When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, focusing first on the statute's plain language.¹⁶ "In so doing, we examine the statute as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme."¹⁷ "When a statute's language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written."¹⁸

III. ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND

"The Michigan no-fault insurance act requires a no-fault automobile insurer to provide first-party injury protection for certain injuries related to a motor vehicle ...."¹⁹ The no-fault act's initial scope of coverage for PIP benefits is set forth in MCL 500.3105(1), which provides that under "personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter." However, when an injury involves a parked motor vehicle, coverage is generally excluded unless the claimant demonstrates that one of three statutory exceptions applies.²⁰ Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to PIP benefits under the parked motor vehicle exception contained in the second clause of § 3106(1)(b), which provides:

(1) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any of the following occur:

* * *

(b) ... the injury was a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used, or property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.^[21]

This Court has provided a three-step framework to analyze coverage of injuries related to parked motor vehicles.²² First, the claimant must demonstrate that his or her "conduct fits one of the three exceptions of subsection 3106(1)."²³ Second, the claimant must show that "the injury arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle[.]"²⁴ Finally, the claimant must demonstrate that the "injury had a causal relationship to the parked motor vehicle that is more than incidental, fortuitous, or but for."²⁵ We analyze each of these requirements in turn.

B. STEP ONE: PARKED MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION IN § 3106(1)(b)

We must first determine whether plaintiff's conduct falls within the parked motor vehicle exception contained in the second clause of § 3106(1)(b), which provides coverage when "the injury was a direct result of physical contact with ... property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process."²⁶

In this case, plaintiff established a question of fact concerning whether he was injured as he lowered his briefcase, overnight bag, thermos, and lunch box (all of which were bundled together) from his vehicle to the ground during the unloading process. Those items are "property" because they are things "owned or possessed" by plaintiff.²⁷ And plaintiff testified that he was in physical contact with his property and lowering it from the vehicle when he sustained the injury.

That leaves only the question whether a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's injury was the "direct result" of this physical contact with the property. At an earlier stage of this case, defendant argued that the statutory phrase "direct result" means that the injury must be "due to" physical contact with the property—a position that the dissent now advances. We agree. Plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by contact with the property being loaded or unloaded.²⁸

Here, plaintiff testified: "I leaned in the vehicle, picked up my items, brought them outside as I twisted to set them down. That's when I heard bang, stuff fell to the ground, I fell in the truck." The dissent contends, in essence, that this testimony establishes only a temporal, rather than a causal, relationship between plaintiff's contact with the property and his injury and is therefore insufficient to create a jury question. It is true, of course, that plaintiff did not himself testify as to causation, but we do not believe it follows that a jury could not reasonably infer causation from plaintiff's testimony and other evidence in the record.²⁹

We can cite, and indeed the dissent also cites, several cases in which a plaintiff's injury was caused (or alleged to be caused) by the kinetic energy, weight, or some other physical property associated with the thing being loaded or unloaded...