McKenzie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 10 September 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. 103676,No. 7,7
• Citation: 580 N.W.2d 424,458 Mich. 214
• Parties: Francis McKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 424

580 N.W.2d 424

458 Mich. 214

Francis McKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 103676.

Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 7, 1998.

Decided July 14, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1998.

[458 Mich. 215] Goren & Goren, P.C. by Steven E. Goren, Bingham Farms, for plaintiff-appellee.

Becker, Lanctot, McCutcheon, Schoolmaster, Taylor & Hom by A.J. Galsterer, Detroit (Gross, Nemeth & Silverman, P.L.C., by James G. Gross, Detroit, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

TAYLOR, Justice.

This case presents the issue whether plaintiff is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, M.C.L. § 500.3101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 24.13101 et seq., for injuries sustained when he was nonfatally asphyxiated while sleeping in a camper/trailer attached to his pickup truck. We conclude that plaintiff's injury is not covered by the no-fault act because it did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle" as required by M.C.L. § 500.3105(1); M.S.A. § 24.13105(1). Whether an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle" turns on whether the injury is closely related to the transportational function of automobiles. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

I

The basic facts are undisputed. ¹ While on a hunting trip, plaintiff and Hughie McKenzie slept in a camper/trailer attached to the back of plaintiff's pickup truck. The camper/trailer was equipped with a propane-fueled, forced-air heater. Ostensibly, because of either poor ventilation or improper exhaust in the unit itself, carbon monoxide fumes from the heater leaked into the camper/trailer and overcame the two men. Fortunately, they were found the following day and recovered after being hospitalized.

Plaintiff filed the present suit for PIP benefits under his no-fault insurance contract with defendant. Defendant moved for summary disposition, contending that there was no coverage because the camper/trailer was not being used "as a motor vehicle" at the time the injury occurred as required by § 3105. The trial court granted summary disposition for plaintiff, finding Koole v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 126 Mich.App. 483, 337 N.W.2d 369 (1983), ² controlling. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 211 Mich.App. 659, 536 N.W.2d 301 (1995).

II

This case turns on whether plaintiff's injury, incurred while sleeping in a parked camper/trailer, arose out of the use of a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle" as contemplated by § 3105. We are able to arrive at this ultimate question because all agree that this injury was occasioned while a person was occupying the vehicle as required by M.C.L. § 500.3106(1)(c); M.S.A. § 24.13106(1)(c). ³

It is well to begin our analysis with the basic axioms of statutory construction:

The rules of statutory construction are well established. First and foremost, we must give effect to the Legislature's intent. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted. Further, we are to give statutory language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. [Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135-136, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996) (citations omitted).]

The "use of a motor vehicle 'as a motor vehicle' " limitation on no-fault coverage ⁴ had its origins in the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act. Thornton v Allstate Ins. Co., 425 Mich. 643, 657, 391 N.W.2d 320 (1986). As noted in Thornton,

[T]he commentary to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA), 14 ULA 55-56, § 1, explains that injuries covered by the act are limited by § 1(a)(2), (6) to those arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle:

"[T]he requirement that use of the motor vehicle be 'as a motor vehicle' qualifies the term so that both the tort exemption and the availability of basic reparation benefits are more nearly limited to activities whose costs should be allocated to motoring as part of an automobile insurance package. For example, it has no application to an injury which occurs when a person slips and falls inside a travel trailer which has been parked at a camp site."

While the commentary acknowledges the remaining ambiguity of the definition and the resultant possibility that some accidents "too far removed from the general activity of motoring" might be construed as being covered, the commissioners left more specific definition in borderline cases to the courts. [Id. at 657-658, 391 N.W.2d 320.][ ⁵

As a matter of English syntax, the phrase "use of a motor vehicle 'as a motor vehicle' " would appear to invite contrasts with situations in which a motor vehicle is not used "as a motor vehicle." This is simply to say that the modifier "as a motor vehicle" assumes the existence of other possible uses and requires distinguishing use "as a motor vehicle" from any other uses. While it is easily understood from all our experiences that most often a vehicle is used "as a motor vehicle," i.e., to get from one place to another, it is also clear from the phrase used that the Legislature wanted to except those other occasions, rare as they may be, when a motor vehicle is used for other purposes, e.g., as a housing facility of sorts, as an advertising display (such as at a car dealership), as a foundation for construction equipment, as a mobile public library, or perhaps even when a car is on display in a museum. On those occasions, the use of the motor vehicle would not be "as a motor vehicle," but as a housing facility, advertising display, construction equipment base, public library, or museum display, as it were. It seems then that when we are applying the statute, the phrase "as a motor vehicle" invites us to determine if the vehicle is being used for transportational purposes. ⁶

Lending support to this logical reading of the statutory language is that the Motor Vehicle Code states in pertinent part, " 'Vehicle' means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway...." M.C.L. § 257.79; M.S.A. § 9.1879. Similarly, the dictionary definition of "vehicle" is "any device or contrivance for carrying or conveying persons or objects, esp. over land or in space...." Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition.

Accordingly, we are convinced that the clear meaning of this part of the no-fault act is that the Legislature intended coverage of injuries resulting from the use of motor vehicles when closely related to their transportational function and only when engaged in that function. ⁷ Moreover, requiring that an injury be closely associated with the transportational function of a vehicle before coverage is triggered has support in much of our prior case law. We acknowledge that the expressed rationale of these cases was not articulated in terms of transportational function, and, indeed, some cannot be reconciled with this approach, but many are consistent with a focus on transportational function to determine whether the injuries at issue in those cases arose out of the use of a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle."

In Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995), a truck involved in a multiple vehicle accident smashed into a building and started a fire when the truck's gas tank exploded. This Court held that the damage to the building arose out of the use of the truck "as a motor vehicle." Id. at 32, 528 N.W.2d 681. This holding was not surprising in that it indicated that no-fault insurance generally covers damage directly resulting from an accident involving moving motor vehicles. This, of course, is consistent with the approach that focuses on transportational function because moving motor vehicles are quite obviously engaged in a transportational function.

In Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of America, 454 Mich. 626, 636-637, 563 N.W.2d 683 (1997), this Court held that injuries incurred while entering a vehicle with the intent to travel arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Because entering a vehicle in order to travel in it is closely related to the transportational function, Putkamer also comports with this approach.

In Winter v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 433 Mich. 446, 446 N.W.2d 132 (1989), this Court denied no-fault insurance coverage when it held that an injury resulting when a cement slab fell from a crane attached to a parked tow truck did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle." The Winter Court's holding turned on the fact that the truck was parked and none of the exceptions set forth in § 3106 applied. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to explicitly consider whether the injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle "as a motor vehicle," as opposed to some other use. However, this holding is nonetheless consistent with the approach posited here because the injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as a foundation for construction equipment and was not closely associated with the transportational function.

In Thornton, supra at 660-661, 391 N.W.2d 320, and Bourne v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 449 Mich. 193, 203, 534 N.W.2d 491 (1995), this Court held that injuries arising from assaults in motor vehicles lacked a sufficient causal connection to the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle to be compensable under the nofault act. ⁸ These holdings also support the approach articulated here because assaults occurring in a motor vehicle are not closely related to the transportational function of a motor vehicle.

Additionally, the analysis in Thornton supports this approach. In Thornton, the Court held that injuries sustained by a taxi driver in the course of an armed robbery did not arise out of the use of a motor...