Kennedy v. Caruso
| Decision Date | 19 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-cv-260(VLB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | James Kennedy, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Frederick Caruso, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiffs-James Kennedy (“Kennedy”) and Besa Kennedy-bring this action against the Town of Fairfield (“Town”) Detective Frederick Caruso (“Caruso”), Detective Sergeant Frederick Hine (“Hine”), and Carmina Hirsch (“Hirsch”) (collectively “Defendants”) alleging various federal and state law claims stemming from an Incident Report drafted during a two week period in which Kennedy had legal custody of his two minor children pursuant to an emergency, temporary ex parte order issued by the Connecticut Superior Court. Kennedy[1] generally alleges that Hirsch and Caruso conspired to draft a false incident report (“Incident Report”) that Hirsch would provide to the Connecticut Superior Court adjudicating Kennedy's custody of his children and the school officials of the schools where the children attend for the purpose of interfering with his custodial rights. Kennedy further alleges that Hine, as Caruso's superior, signed off on the Incident Report knowing it contained false statements and was generally negligent in his supervision of Caruso. Lastly Kennedy alleges that the Town is liable for Caruso and Hines conduct.
Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment filed by Caruso, Hine, and the Town (collectively “Fairfield Defendants”) and Hirsch seeking summary judgment on all counts. [Dkts. 154, 155, respectively]. Plaintiffs have filed oppositions to each. [Dkts. 157, 158].
For the following reasons, Defendants' motions are GRANTED.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). “Material facts are those which ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and a dispute is ‘genuine' if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Coppola, 499 F.3d at 148 (citing to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Liberty Lobby”)). But “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Wang v. Hearst Corp., 877 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing to Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 248)). Whether a fact is material is determined by the substantive law. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
On a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Green v. Town of E. Haven, 952 F.3d 394, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing to Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250). “Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘the district court is required to resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.'” Id. ().
“The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact . . . .” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 486 (2d Cir. 2014). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by ‘point[ing] to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's' case.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. (citing to Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to back them up, are not sufficient.
Welch-Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No. 3:03-cv- 481, 2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, 817 F.Supp.2d 28, 37 (D. Conn 2011). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing to Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252)). Where there is no more than a scintilla of evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record, summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604 F.3d 712, 727 (2d Cir. 2010).
A party's own affidavit may be enough to fend off summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and its credibility is buttressed. See Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1998) (); Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). However, if the affidavit is inconsistent with prior deposition testimony or pleadings, it does not create “a genuine issue for trial.” Hayes v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996); see Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) ().
Kennedy is self-represented (also known as pro se). Ordinarily, courts liberally construe a complaint filed by a pro se party to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See e.g., McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2020). “This policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the understanding that ‘[i]mplicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training.'” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006). Kennedy is not entitled to liberal construction because he is a lawyer. See Harbulak v. Suffolk County, 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). See also Holtz c. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001). With that said, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counsel courts to construe pleadings “so as to do justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e). Thus, the Court will address the claims and arguments raised by Kennedy “so as to do justice.”
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and only repeats those relevant to this decision.
The facts as outlined below come from the parties' Local Rule 56(a) statements of fact, exhibits attached to the motions, and information the Court can judicially notice. The Court will address the rules relating to Rule 56(a)2 statements to demonstrate flaws in Kennedy's filings and the impact those flaws have on the Court's recitation of the facts relevant to this decision and adjudication of the motions for summary judgment.
Local Rule 56(a) statements “must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial, or (2) other evidence that would be admissible at trial.” Local Rule 56(a)3.
The "specific citation" obligation of this Local Rule requires parties to cite to specific paragraphs when citing to affidavits or responses to discovery requests and to cite to specific pages when citing to deposition or other transcripts or to documents longer than a single page in length. Failure to provide specific citations to evidence in the record as required by this Local Rule may result in the Court deeming admitted certain facts that are supported by the evidence in accordance with Local Rule 56(a)1, or in the Court imposing sanctions, including, when the movant fails to comply, an order denying the motion for summary judgment, and when the opponent fails to comply, an order granting the motion if the motion and supporting materials show that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c) (emphasis added). In reviewing a motion for summary...
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