Kennedy v. State

• Decision Date: 21 April 1894
• Citation: 26 S.W. 78
• Parties: KENNEDY v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

26 S.W. 78

KENNEDY v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 21, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Harrison county; W. J. Graham, Judge.

L. C. Kennedy was convicted of forgery, and appeals. Affirmed.

G. D. Harrison, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was charged with, and convicted of, forging the following instrument:

"45.00. Harrison county, Texas, Jan. 29, 1892. Pay to L. C. Kennedy, or order, the sum of forty-five ($45.00) dollars out of the public school fund apportioned to the ____ School Dist. No. 13, for services as teacher in the public free schools in said community for the month ending the 29th day of January, 1892.

                "To County Treasurer, ____ County, Texas
                                   "(1) J. C. Harcrow
                                   "(2) J. W. Gorman
                                    "(3) ____ ____
                

"Trustees of School District No. 13 in Harrison Co., Tex."

Motion to quash was made because the indictment charges no offense. The particular defect or defects are not sought to be pointed out. We are informed, through brief of counsel for the state, that the contention is that the voucher, not being directed to any person, is not the subject of forgery. Whether being generally addressed to the "Treasurer" is sufficient or not, we take it, is not of great importance. The law points out the treasurer as the party who shall pay school vouchers such as the one in question. Whether named or not, the treasurer is the party who is legally required to pay the voucher. It does not affect the validity that his name be omitted. Instruments of writing may create pecuniary obligations, affect property in some manner, and be the subject of forgery, without being directed or addressed to any particular person. This question was fully investigated in the case of Dixon v. State (decided by the court of appeals of Texas at its Austin term, 1889. opinion by White, P. J.) 26 S. W. 500. In Roscoe's Criminal Evidence it is said: "The prisoner was indicted for uttering a forged instrument for the delivery of goods in words and figures following: `Gentlemen: Be so good as to let bearer have 5½ yards of blue to pattern, etc., and you will oblige W. Reading, Mortimer St.' The request was not addressed to any one. The prisoner being convicted, the recorder respited the judgment, to take the opinion of the judges on the question whether, as the request was not addressed to any individual person by name or description, it was a request for the delivery of goods, within the words and true intent of the statute. All the judges who were present at the meeting held the conviction right." Rosc. Cr. Ev. 555, 556, 583; Rex v. Carney, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 351. In Reg. v. Pulbrook, 9 Car. & P. 37, the judges held that an instrument merely specifying the goods may be shown to be a request by the custom of the trade. See Reg. v. Rogers, Id. 41; Reg. v. Snelling, 1 Dears. Cr. Cas. 219. In Snelling's Case, supra, the following instrument was held to be the subject of forgery, though addressed to no one: "Sirs: Please to pay the bearer, Mrs. J., the sum of 8541. 10s. for me. James Ramsey." In Noakes v. People, 25 N. Y. 382, it was said: "It is insisted on, by the counsel for the prisoner, in support of the first request to charge, that the instrument set out in the indictment is not upon its face the subject of forgery, as it is not addressed to any one. If it be essential that an order or request for delivery of goods, to make it the subject of forgery, should, on its face, be directed to a particular person, there then would, doubtless, be force in this objection. A reference to the language of the section of the statute would seem to indicate that there is not much force in this argument. * * * The paper under consideration would, therefore, seem to fall within the very words of the statute, and is precisely of that character which the legislature, by the forgery of, and the passing or uttering of which, intended to subject the offender to indictment and punishment." Over objection that it was addressed to no one, the following...