Kennedy v. State
| Decision Date | 01 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2391,91-2391 |
| Citation | 641 So.2d 135 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1421 Brian P. KENNEDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Alan H. Landman and Maureen M. Matheson of Reinman, Harrell, Graham, Mitchell & Wattwood, P.A., Melbourne, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Brian P. Kennedy timely appeals the trial court's order adjudicating him guilty of first degree felony murder, robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle. He also appeals the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress confessions, admissions and statements. We affirm.
Kennedy's convictions stem from an incident in which Stephen Dumont, the manager of an Exxon station along I-95 in Titusville, was robbed and killed with a shotgun. Before Dumont died, he told police that the crime had been committed by two black males and a white male in a silver car. Kennedy, a white youth, was found sleeping in a stolen silver car parked "in the black area of Mims."
Kennedy was taken to an interrogation room, read his Miranda rights, and initialed each of the warnings on the written Miranda form. At some point during the interrogation, Kennedy asked what would happen to him if he told the detective his story. The detective asked Kennedy if he had ever heard of immunity and then proceeded to explain immunity to him. The detective, immediately realizing that he had made a mistake by mentioning immunity, informed Kennedy that he, as a police officer, could not grant immunity, but that the state attorney could. However, when the detective offered to get a state attorney, Kennedy said Kennedy then confessed to his involvement in the robbery of the Exxon station.
Kennedy moved to suppress his confession and admissions on the basis, among other reasons, that they were obtained because of the promise of immunity.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but entered an order containing the following provisions:
The Defendant was sold a "bill of goods" by the interrogating officer with references to vague promises of immunity, statements not to be used against him in court and threats that the Black Defendants were going to gang up and blame everything on him.
The Court finds that despite the fact that the Defendant ... was sold a "bill of goods" by the interrogating officer, there was no sufficient coercion which would have overcome his free will. The statements made by Defendant ... were free and voluntary with full knowledge of the meaning and effect and designed by him to gain favorable consideration in the charging of the crimes or the prosecution thereof.
The only issue that we find merits discussion is Kennedy's contention that the court, by finding that he was "sold a bill of goods" on the promise of immunity, should have suppressed the confession and admissions.
We acknowledge an apparent inconsistency within the court's ruling on the motion to suppress. However, it is the entire ruling that must be read in order to determine what the court meant by its inartful and confusing finding that Kennedy was sold a "bill of goods" by the officer making "references to vague promises of immunity, statements not to be used against him in court ..." A complete reading of the court's ruling convinces us that there was no finding that a promise of immunity was even vaguely made.
Had the trial court, based on its "bill of goods" finding, suppressed the confession, this matter could be resolved by simply relying on the presumption of correctness of the trial court's ruling. But that is not the case here. The trial court ruled, in spite of such "finding," 1 that Kennedy's confession was "free and voluntary with full knowledge of the meaning and effect and designed by him to gain favorable consideration in the charging of the crimes or the prosecution thereof." This was the trial court's interpretation of the effect of all the evidence.
The supreme court in Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 211 (Fla.1990), stated our obligation in this matter as follows:
The ruling 2 of the trial court on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness and we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inference and deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling. (Emphasis added).
The court's finding that Kennedy was "sold a bill of goods" is confusing but is not necessarily inconsistent with the court's acceptance of the officer's testimony that, although he mentioned the word "immunity" and tried to define it, he immediately advised Kennedy that he, as a police officer, was not authorized to grant immunity but that he would get a lawyer from the state attorney's office if Kennedy desired. The officer testified that Kennedy declined the offer. Even Kennedy did not testify that the officer said "you will get immunity if you confess." To the contrary, he testified, not that he had been given immunity, but that he believed that the officer "could get me immunity." The "bill of goods" finding indicates that the court believed that Kennedy thought that even if the officer lacked authority to grant immunity, he would speak to the state attorney's office on Kennedy's behalf. In fact, the officer did tell Kennedy that he would inform the prosecutors of Kennedy's cooperation--and he did. The court did not find a quid pro quo agreement. 3
In order to determine whether the court erred in its resolution of the motion to suppress, we are compelled to view the "totality of the circumstances" 4 in "a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." And by that standard, although it would have been better had the officer not mentioned the term "immunity," the trial court could properly find that the reference to immunity in the context of this case did not constitute "coercion" nor did it "delude the prisoner as to his true position" or "exert an improper and undue influence over his mind." Because the record justifies this conclusion, the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Although the case is a close one, I would reverse the trial court's order denying Kennedy's motion to suppress confessions, admissions and statements. I do not disagree with the law stated by this court, however, I disagree with the application of the law to the facts of this case. I supplement the facts in this court's opinion to support my dissent.
In addition to being sixteen years old at the time of his apprehension, Kennedy had run away from home four days before his arrest. He was tired and hungry. 1 He was awakened by a barking police dog and then apprehended in the stolen car where he was sleeping. Shortly after his arrest, he was taken to Titusville to be interrogated. Kennedy was read his rights and he did waive them before he made his statement. Prior to discussing immunity, Detective Carter began to "bluff" Kennedy to get him to confess by telling him various things that were not true. The detective told Kennedy there was a video camera at the Exxon station that taped the license tag of the stolen car; that Jerome Allen, one of Kennedy's two codefendants, had informed the police that Kennedy was involved in the robbery and that Kennedy had done the shooting; and that Kennedy should tell his story because the two black guys would gang up on him because he was white. All of these things were false. Kennedy then asked what would happen to him if he told the detective his story. That is when the detective discussed the issue of immunity with Kennedy. Kennedy gave a statement that was not taped, then he gave a taped statement.
Kennedy moved to suppress his confession and admissions, as well as all evidence derived from the statements, on the basis that the multiple confessions were not voluntary because they were obtained by lies, misrepresentations and a promise of immunity. His attorney argued that Detective Carter never offered to get a state attorney during his interrogation after he was offered immunity. He did state that the detective offered to get him a lawyer and Kennedy told Detective Carter that he did not need one because he was giving his statement voluntarily. He said he gave the statement because he believed the detective could get him immunity and a new identity. 2
To be held admissible, a confession must pass muster under the Florida Constitution; only if it passes muster under Florida law need it be re-examined under federal law. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla.1992) () (citations omitted). The Florida Supreme Court defined the basic contours of Florida's Self-Incrimination Clause, FLA. CONST., art. I, sec. 9, in Traylor. Id. at 961-66.
The supreme court explained that the basic contours of Florida confession law were defined long ago in our common law and the main focus "has always been on guarding against one thing--coercion." Traylor, 596 So.2d at 964. The abiding standard for determining the admissibility of a confession was defined nearly a century and a half ago:
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