Kenneth C., Matter of

• Decision Date: 23 May 1984
• Parties: In the Matter of 1 KENNETH C., Kevin J., Rodney M., Miguel O., Alleged to be Juvenile Delinquents, Respondents. Family Court, Kings County
• Court: New York Family Court

Page 396

479 N.Y.S.2d 396

125 Misc.2d 227

In the Matter of ¹ KENNETH C., Kevin J.,

Rodney M., Miguel O., Alleged to be Juvenile

Delinquents, Respondents.

Family Court, Kings County.

May 23, 1984.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel by Terrence J. McElrath, Brooklyn, for petitioner.

Lenore Gittis, Legal Aid Society by Virginia Geiss, Brooklyn, Law Guardian (Miguel O.).

James J. Kelly, Brooklyn, for respondent (Kenneth C.).

Frederic P. Schneider, New York City, for respondent (Kevin J.).

Howard D. Pariser, New York City, for respondent (Rodney M.).

DECISION ON MOTIONS ^1a

GEORGE L. JUROW, Judge:

The four juvenile respondents before this court--Kenneth C. (13); Kevin J. (14); Rodney M. (12); and Miguel O. (11) (ages at time of alleged incidents)--are charged with, during May 27, 1983 and May 29, 1983, acting in concert with each other and with two adults, Pedro Alarcon, and Jose Delapaz, unlawfully entering Public School 377 in Brooklyn and committing acts of vandalism resulting in substantial damage to the interior of the building and its contents. The specific acts charged include, Burglary in the third degree; Criminal Trespass in the third degree; and Criminal Mischief in the second, third, and fourth degrees.

It is acknowledged that the school break-in resulted in substantial media publicity. In addition, a $1000.00 reward had been offered for information leading to the apprehension of the perpetrator(s).

The four juveniles were arrested on or soon after midnight, June 1, 1983, following an all day investigation by detectives operating out of the 83rd Police Precinct in Brooklyn. The arrests followed alleged oral confessions made by the four juveniles to detectives at the Precinct. In addition three of the four juveniles subsequently provided confessions in video-taped form to an Assistant District Attorney in the early morning hours of June 2, 1983.

Following arraignment, all four respondents moved to suppress their oral and video-taped confessions as involuntarily made, and not the product of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of their rights to counsel and to remain silent. Petitioner Corporation Counsel (the "presentment" or prosecuting agency) conceded that sufficient grounds existed to warrant a hearing on the suppression motions (see People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179) and a Huntley hearing was begun in the fall of 1983.

The testimony focused on two broad issues: First, were the confessions themselves voluntarily made? Second, because the confessions were obtained at the 83rd Precinct, and because each of the respondents came to be present at the Precinct through varying efforts and participation of the Precinct detectives, respondents challenge the legality of the police conduct in obtaining their presence at the Precinct. The latter issue is necessarily a proper subject of inquiry in a Huntley hearing because, as noted in People v. Misuis, 47 N.Y.2d 979, 419 N.Y.S.2d 961, 393 N.E.2d 1034, "Clearly, statements obtained by exploitation of unlawful police conduct or detention must be suppressed, for their use in evidence under such circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment It is therefore incumbent upon the suppression court to permit an inquiry into the propriety of the police conduct.... Unless the People establish that the police had probable cause to arrest or detain a suspect, and unless the defendant is accorded an opportunity to delve fully into the circumstances attendant upon his arrest or detention, his motion to suppress should be granted...."

2. PLACE OF QUESTIONING

Respondents' claim that, in violation of the then applicable Family Court Act section 724(b)(ii) (now § 305.2) they were not questioned in the room designated by the Appellate Division for the questioning of juveniles. The credible evidence indicates that, however, with the exception of the first confession of respondent C., the juveniles were questioned in and the confessions obtained in the room properly designated by the Appellate Division.

Respondent Kevin J's. Exhibit B, in evidence, consists of a certified order of the Appellate Division indicating that at the time of questioning the designated area for questioning of juveniles at the 83rd Precinct was the "Community Assistance Office, Room 108, 1st Fl.". Petitioner's photo Exhibit 2N, in evidence, indicates that room 108 at the 83rd Precinct was labeled the "Juvenile Interrogation Room" (by sign), and was identified by Detective Sanchez as the Juvenile Interrogation Room, and by A.D.A. Wiseman as the Juvenile Room where he obtained the video-taped confessions. In addition, Detective Cardi testified he obtained the non-video confessions in the "Juvenile Room".

Some ambiguity concerning what room at the Precinct was utilized arose because the detective witnesses referred also to a "Juvenile Area" which was described as consisting of three adjacent and almost identical rooms known as, respectively, the "Juvenile Room", the "Community Affairs Room", and the "Lieutenant's Locker Room". The ambiguity arises because the Appellate Division designation refers to a "Community Assistance Office, Room 108". However, because the evidence indicates that, with the exception of C.'s first confession, the respondents' were all questioned in Room 108, the ambiguity appears to relate to changes in the names of the rooms at the Precinct (some of which had multiple uses and labels) rather than a change in the actual room designated in the Appellate Division Order.

However, in the instance of C.'s first confession Detective Sanchez acknowledged that it was not obtained in the Juvenile Interrogation Room (Room 108). It appears that, while C.'s confession was obtained in a room located in the "Juvenile Area", it was most likely obtained in a room adjacent to Room 108, known as the Community Affairs Office. The question is whether the failure to initially question C. in the properly designated room, in this instance, makes C's first confession inadmissible as a matter of law. For the reasons noted below, this court holds that this defect does not render C's confession inadmissible.

In Matter of Emilio M., 37 N.Y.2d 173, 175, 371 N.Y.S.2d 697, 332 N.E.2d 874, under circumstances where the Appellate Division had not yet designated any facilities in the First Department for the questioning of children, the court noted that precise compliance with the Family Court Act was not possible, and noted that "since there is no evidence of willful or negligent disregard of the statutory requirements in this case and no evidence of inattention to such requirements as a pattern or practice, no sufficiently useful prophylactic purpose would be served in penalyzing the police for failure to conform to the terms of the statute taken literally." The few other lower court decisions on this point are divided. In Matter of Matthew F., 87 Misc.2d 644, 386 N.Y.S.2d 534, the court required literal compliance with the statute and excluded a confession not taken in the authorized room. In Matter of Turner, 56 Misc.2d 638, 289 N.Y.S.2d 652, the court accepted a statement taken in an "office-like atmosphere", although it was not the authorized facility.

Although the instant case can be distinguished from Emilio M. in that the Appellate Division had made a designation, it is also true that the pattern of police conduct by the detectives of the 83rd Precinct similarly did not indicate a willful or negligent disregard of the statutory requirements. Rather, the mitigating factors in this case included, first, the fact that respondent C. was questioned in a room virtually identical and adjacent to the designated room; second, that the room, although not the designated room, was in an area removed from public access and not used for the detention of adult defendants (that is, the basic policies underlying the designation of separate juvenile interrogation rooms were adhered to; Cf. Unif.F.Ct.Rules, § 2503.1); third, that a multiple number of juveniles were at the Precinct for questioning at approximately the same time; and fourth, in all instances, save one, the detectives did conform to the statutory requirement.

Under the circumstances of this case, for the court to adopt a per se exclusion rule would be to exalt form over substance and, as the court noted in Emilio M., supra, would serve no "useful prophylactic purpose". Accordingly, this court holds respondent C.'s first confession to be admissible, notwithstanding the fact that it was not taken in the specific designated room for juvenile questioning.

3. KENNETH C. CONFESSIONS

Two confessions were obtained from Kenneth C., a first oral confession taken at the 83rd Precinct on the evening of June 1, and a second video taped confession taken at 3:45 a.m. on the morning of June 2.

Respondent challenges his confession mainly on the basis of the length of time C. was in the hands of the police, combined with the fact that C. had a relatively low I.Q., resulting in confessions that were supposedly the product of fatigue, pressure, and incapacity to exercise free will in waiving his rights and voluntarily making the statements. These arguments deserve close scrutiny because of C.'s juvenile status, the length of time he spent with the police, and his arguably limited intelligence. A careful scrutiny of the credible evidence, however, does not sustain C.'s arguments.

Respondent C.'s presence in the company of the police during June 1 and June 2 was unique, in relation to his correspondents. In contrast to the other juveniles, who were all located and brought to the Precinct in one manner or another by the police, C spent much of the day of June 1, and perhaps into the early evening hours as well, as a cooperating volunteer witness for the police. With the apparent motive of attempting to claim the $1000.00 outstanding reward for information about the break-in (T XVI, 58) C. voluntarily went to P.S. 377...