Emilio M. v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 24 June 1975
• Citation: 371 N.Y.S.2d 697,332 N.E.2d 874,37 N.Y.2d 173
• Parties: , 332 N.E.2d 874 In the Matter of EMILIO M., a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 697

371 N.Y.S.2d 697

37 N.Y.2d 173, 332 N.E.2d 874

In the Matter of EMILIO M., a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 24, 1975.

Adrian P. Burke, Corporation Counsel (Irving Cohen and L. Kevin Sheridan, Brooklyn, of counsel), for appellant.

Michael Gage, Brooklyn, William E. Hellerstein, New York City, and Charles Schinitsky, Brooklyn, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM.

While it does appear that there was not precise compliance with the provisions of section 724 of the Family Court Act, there was substantial compliance and the record discloses no prejudice or suggestion of significant prejudice to respondent.

After the arrest of respondent and his two companions in connection with serious crimes of violence and their identification by one of their victims from his hospital bed, the arresting officers took respondent to the precinct station house where he was given preinterrogation warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) and his mother was notified without undue delay. Prior to her arrival respondent was questioned by the police officers. After her arrival the warnings were read for a second time, to both respondent and his mother and permission was requested to question the boy again in his mother's presence. Both mother and son consented and respondent made a further statement which was reduced to writing and signed by both of them.

The hearing court suppressed testimony as to the boy's oral statements made prior to his mother's arrival at the station house but denied the motion to suppress his signed written statement.

After a fact-finding hearing Family Court, in some reliance on respondent's signed admissions, determined that respondent had committed acts which if done by an adult would constitute the crimes of manslaughter first degree, assault third degree, and possession of a dangerous instrument. After a dispositional hearing respondent was committed to the Elmira Reception Center for a period not to exceed three years. On appeal the Appellate Division, one Justice dissenting, reversed the order of disposition and remitted the case to Family Court for further proceedings. The Appellate Division concluded that, while respondent's written statement was not tainted by the questioning which occurred before his mother's arrival at the station house, there was such failure to comply with the requirements of section 724 as to have called for suppression of the boy's written statement. The issue of taint, of course, as at least a mixed question of fact is beyond review in our court. We accept the determination as to the absence of taint; we disagree that the written statement should have been suppressed for failure to comply with section 724.

Three assertions of noncompliance are advanced: (1) that failure to call the boy's mother until arrival at the station house was a violation of the statutory mandate that 'the peace officer shall immediately notify the parent' (§ 724, subd. (a)); (2) that because of failure on the part of the Appellate Division to do so, the station house to which respondent was taken was not 'a facility designated by the appropriate appellate division of the supreme court as a suitable place for the questioning of children' (§ 724, subd. (b), par. (ii)); and (3) that there was...