Kent County Prosecutor v. Kent County Sheriff

• Decision Date: 07 August 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 74055
• Citation: 391 N.W.2d 341,425 Mich. 718
• Parties: KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR, David H. Sawyer, ex rel., the People of the State of Michigan and the People of the County of Kent, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENT COUNTY SHERIFF, Philip J. Heffron, Defendant-Appellee, Richard E. Hillary, Director, Kent County Office of the Defender, Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 425 Mich. 718, 391 N.W.2d 341
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 341

391 N.W.2d 341

KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR, David H. Sawyer, ex rel., the People

of the State of Michigan and the People of the

County of Kent, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENT COUNTY SHERIFF, Philip J. Heffron, Defendant-Appellee, Richard E. Hillary, Director, Kent County Office of the

Defender, Intervening Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 74055.

425 Mich. 718, 391 N.W.2d 341

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 18, 1985.

Decided Aug. 7, 1986.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., David H. Sawyer, Kent County Pros. Atty., Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Atty., Grand Rapids for plaintiff-appellee.

Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett by Jon F. DeWitt, Jonathan W. Anderson, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee Phillip J. Heffron, Sheriff of the County of Kent.

Michael P. Mathews, Richard E. Hillary, Kent County Office of the Defender, Grand Rapids, for intervening defendant-appellant.

BOYLE, Justice.

In this case, we consider the constitutionality of the county jail overcrowding act, M.C.L. Sec. 801.51 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1748(1) et seq., which allows for the early release of prisoners serving jail sentences when the jail population exceeds a certain percentage of rated design capacity. ¹ The Legislature is afforded plenary power over matters dealing with "[t]he public health and general welfare of the people of the state...." Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 51. In addition, as this Court stated in In re Brewster St. Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313, 333, 289 N.W. 493 (1939):

"In passing upon the constitutionality of State legislation, it is necessary to point out in the Constitution of the State the limitation which has been placed by the people through the Constitution upon the power of the legislature to act, before it may be declared unconstitutional."

Therefore, the county jail overcrowding act must be found to be constitutional unless a specific limitation, contained in the constitution itself, restricts legislative power in this area. I find such a limitation is clearly mandated by the specific grant of power over commutations given by the people to the executive branch.

Const.1963, art. 5, Sec. 14 provides:

"The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after convictions for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and limitations as he may direct, subject to procedures and regulations prescribed by law. He shall inform the legislature annually of each reprieve, commutation and pardon granted, stating reasons thereof."

This power is granted solely to the Governor. There is no provision granting like power to either the legislative or the judicial branch of government. As we stated in Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 446, 62 N.W. 584 (1895), such "power is vested exclusively in the Governor of the State, and any law which restricted this power would be unconstitutional and void." In the same case we also reiterated the reasoning behind the exclusivity of the Governor's commutation power:

"It is therefore of the highest importance to the public that this power should be carefully exercised, and that the fullest responsibility should rest upon the person to whom it is confided. The office of Governor seems to be generally considered the proper one with which to lodge such responsibility, and the public have the right to insist upon his performance of the duty. Not only is it beyond the power of the Legislature to impose the duty upon others, but it should not in any way lessen his responsibility to the public, when he sets aside the judgment of court and jury by opening the doors of a prison to a convicted felon. If the act in question does this, it should not be sustained." Id., p. 442, 62 N.W. 584.

We also recognized the exclusivity of this power in People v. Fox, 312 Mich. 577, 20 N.W.2d 732 (1945), and People v. Whalen, 412 Mich. 166, 169, 312 N.W.2d 638 (1981), where we noted that

"a trial court is without authority to set aside a valid sentence and impose a new one, because to do so 'would infringe upon the exclusive power of the governor under the Constitution to commute sentence.' "

Const.1963, art. 4, Sec. 45 states:

"The legislature may provide for indeterminate sentences as punishment for crime and for the detention and release of persons imprisoned or detained under such sentences."

It was only on the basis of this specific grant of power that we found that the prison overcrowding act, M.C.L. Sec. 800.71; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1437(1), was constitutionally permissible, even though application of the act could result in a reduction of the length of indeterminate sentences. Oakland Co. Prosecutor v. Dep't of Corrections, 411 Mich. 183, 305 N.W.2d 515 (1981).

Jail sentences, as my colleagues agree, are not indeterminate--they are for a fixed and determinate amount of time. Therefore, the grant of power over indeterminate sentences may not properly be applied to find that the Legislature has not unconstitutionally infringed on the Governor's commutation power in adopting the county jail overcrowding act.

In People v. Freleigh, 334 Mich. 306, 54 N.W.2d 599 (1952), this Court determined that determinate sentences which were imposed as on the basis of an earlier mandatory sentencing statute could not constitutionally be reduced by the Legislature's adoption of a later indeterminate sentencing provision. As we clarified in Oakland Co. Prosecutor, supra, p. 196, 305 N.W.2d 515:

"The statute considered in Freleigh, unlike 1980 PA 519, did not provide for ... release of persons imprisoned or detained under indeterminate sentences (emphasis supplied) since, as the Court there observed, the statute had 'retroactive effect upon sentences which were mandatory.' "

Thus, we have determined that commutative power over determinate sentences is not within the specific powers granted to the Legislature. It follows that the county jail overcrowding act is unconstitutional if it operates to commute determinate sentences. I find that it does.

Commutation has been defined as "the change of a punishment to one which is less severe." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed), p. 254. Although my colleagues maintain that a commutation must be an act of individualized clemency, citing for the proposition a concurrence in a California case, Way v. San Diego Co. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.3d 165, 177, 141 Cal.Rptr. 383 (1977), the majority in that case clearly held:

"Amicus curiae suggests that commutation and pardon are not the equivalent of amnesty and that accordingly even if the Legislature does not have the power to grant individual commutations, the legislation must be upheld as an amnesty or general pardon of current ISL prisoners. Such a distinction has deep historical roots. However, it has been firmly rejected by the federal courts, and we are unaware of any state court decision adopting it. Amnesty is nothing more than collective pardon, and the distinction between the two is without legal significance; only the Governor can grant general amnesty, as only he can pardon or commute." (Citations omitted.)

The United States Supreme Court also noted the trivial distinction between individualized and general clemency in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601, 16 S.Ct. 644, 648, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896).

"The distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical importance. It is said in Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152, [24 L.Ed. 442 (1877) ] 'the Constitution does not use the word "amnesty," and, except that the term is generally applied where pardon is extended to whole classes or communities, instead of individuals, the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance.' "

In addition, it cannot be said that the process mandated by the county jail overcrowding act does not involve individualized clemency. Pursuant to Sec. 6, the chief circuit judge for the county is required to review the name of each prisoner, the offense for which the prisoner was convicted, the length of the individual's sentence, the date on which the prisoner began serving the sentence, the release date, and the name of the sentencing judge. The judge then makes an individual determination for each prisoner as to whether or not the sentence should be reduced, based on an assessment of the risk involved.

Clearly, the sentences of the prisoners who benefit from an application of the county jail overcrowding act are reduced from the time specified by the sentencing judge. This, in my estimation, is a commutation in every sense of the word. As we have previously determined that the Governor's power of commutation is exclusive and because there is no constitutional grant of power to the Legislature over determinate sentences, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and find that the county jail overcrowding act is unconstitutional.

RILEY and BRICKLEY, JJ., concur.

ARCHER, J., not participating.

LEVIN, Justice.

The county jail overcrowding act, 1982 P.A. 325, ¹ authorizes a county sheriff to declare a jail overcrowding state of emergency, and sets forth a multistep procedure for reducing the prisoner population of county jails when a state of emergency has been declared.

The question presented is whether Act 325 unconstitutionally contravenes the Governor's commutation power under Const.1963, art. 5, Sec. 14. We conclude that it does not. ²

I

Act 325 provides that a sheriff shall declare a jail overcrowding state of emergency if the general prisoner population of a county jail exceeds one hundred percent of the jail's rated design capacity for seven consecutive days, unless within three business days a majority of the chief circuit judge, chief district judge, and each municipal judge in the county and certain county officials, find that the sheriff acted in error. ³

If the judges and the sheriff are unable by other means ⁴ to reduce the prison population to ninety percent of rated design...