Kenyon v. State
Decision Date | 02 August 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-285.,98-285. |
Citation | 986 P.2d 849 |
Parties | Robert Dale KENYON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Monique McBride, Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.
Appellant Robert Kenyon appeals from the judgment and sentence which was entered after he was convicted of grand larceny.
We reverse and remand.
Kenyon presents the following issues for our review:
Kenyon and his fiancee, Kelly Crossfield, went on a trip around the United States during the summer of 1997. They were returning to their home in Oregon when their van broke down in Kansas. Kenyon and Crossfield could not afford to repair the van, so they placed it in storage and hitchhiked to Denver, Colorado. They planned to stay with Crossfield's sister, who lived in Denver, but she did not have room for them. Kenyon and Crossfield continued hitchhiking and eventually ended up in Cheyenne.
In early September 1997, Kenyon and Crossfield entered the Southside Furniture store. Kenyon spoke with James Sanchez, who was a store employee, and told him that he and Crossfield were hungry and did not have a place to stay. Sanchez gave Kenyon and Crossfield some money and told them that they could stay in a trailer which was parked next to the house he shared with his fiancee. Sanchez asked the couple to do some odd jobs in exchange for being allowed to use the trailer.
The trailer did not have running water; consequently, Sanchez left the back door to his house unlocked so that Kenyon and Crossfield could use the bathroom. Sanchez also allowed Kenyon and Crossfield to use his truck on several occasions. Kenyon used the truck to run errands, seek employment, and accomplish odd jobs for Sanchez.
On September 28, 1997, Sanchez allowed Kenyon to use the truck to go to his work-site. Crossfield accompanied Kenyon in the truck. A police officer stopped Kenyon for speeding and discovered that Kenyon's driver's license had been suspended. The officer took Kenyon and Crossfield to Sanchez's home and explained the situation to Sanchez. Sanchez was upset because Kenyon had been driving his truck without a valid driver's license, and he told Kenyon that he could not use his truck any longer.
Shortly thereafter, Crossfield spoke with her children, who were living in California with their father. The children told her about a family emergency. On September 30, 1997, Crossfield and Kenyon took Sanchez's truck and went to California to retrieve Crossfield's children. Sanchez reported to the police that his truck had been stolen.
Kenyon and Crossfield were arrested in Oregon on October 12, 1997. Kenyon pleaded guilty in Oregon to one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. He was subsequently extradited to Wyoming and charged with grand larceny. The trial court held a jury trial on May 11, 1998, and the jury found Kenyon guilty of the crime. The trial court entered a judgment and sentence which was consistent with the jury's verdict, and Kenyon appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Kenyon maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to testify that Crossfield told him Sanchez had given them permission to use the truck. We agree with Kenyon.
A trial court has discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and the Wyoming Supreme Court will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings unless the trial court abused its discretion. Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Wyo.1996). A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we must decide the ultimate issue of whether or not the court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Clark v. Gale, 966 P.2d 431, 435 (Wyo.1998).
Kenyon was tried for the crime of grand larceny as proscribed by Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LEXIS 1999). That statute states:
Section 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i). Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 6-3-401(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) states that "deprive" means:
Kenyon testified on his own behalf at the trial. He was the only defense witness. The defense attorney sought to elicit testimony from Kenyon that, before they left Cheyenne, Crossfield told him Sanchez had given them permission to use his truck. The following exchange occurred at the trial:
The trial court conducted a bench conference to consider the admissibility of the proffered testimony. During the bench conference, the defense attorney argued that Crossfield's out-of-court statement was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule set out in W.R.E. 803(3). The trial court ruled that Crossfield's statement did not fall within the purview of W.R.E. 803(3) and, accordingly, refused to admit the evidence under that rationale. Kenyon concedes on appeal that the trial court's ruling concerning W.R.E. 803(3) was correct. He asserts, however, that he also argued that Crossfield's out-of-court statement was admissible to show its effect on the listener himself—and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. His defense counsel stated:
Although the trial court did not expressly rule on this aspect of Kenyon's argument, it obviously did not agree with Kenyon because it did not allow him to testify about Crossfield's statement.
Kenyon claims that the trial court erred by excluding Crossfield's statement because the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that Sanchez had, in fact, given Crossfield permission to use the truck—but, rather, was offered to show its effect on him. He argues that the testimony would have bolstered his defense that he did not harbor the criminal intent to permanently deprive Sanchez of his truck.
The state does not respond on appeal to the substantive portion of Kenyon's argument. It asserts that Kenyon...
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...Rather, they were offered for the purpose of showing the effect the statements had upon Martinez and [Proffit] See Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 853-54 (Wyo.1999) (credibility of the declarant not the issue). The fact that Hicks' statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter......
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