Kerr v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 23 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | CA-IC,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 530 P.2d 1139,23 Ariz.App. 106 |
| Parties | Stanley L. KERR, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Sage Communications, Inc., Respondent Employer, Argonaut Insurance Company, Respondent Insurance Carrier. 1046. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This appeal from a denial of compensation by the Industrial Commission focuses upon the 'going and coming rule.'
Appellant Stanley L. Kerr was employed by Sage Communications, Inc., as a lineman and foreman. Sage laid communication cable primarily in California and Arizona; the nature of the work necessitated travel by its employees. Mr. Kerr resided with his family in Las Vegas, Nevada. The job which gave rise to this case was in Show Low, Arizona, approximately 400 miles from Las Vegas.
The workers at the Show Low project worked an eighty-hour shift and then were off for four days. While at the worksite they stayed at a nearby motel. The company provided transportation from the motel to the worksite. Each employee, however, provided his own transportation from his permanent residence to the jobsite. Mr. Kerr was injured in a one-car accident after he had completed the eighty-hour shift and was returning to his permanent residence.
Mr. Kerr contended that the injury he sustained arose in the course of employment and fell within an exception to the going and coming rule. The hearing officer found the injury to be within the perimeter of the general rule denying compensation when an injury was sustained going to or coming from work. We affirm the decision.
The going and coming rule was first enunciated in Arizona in Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P.2d 703 (1937):
'It is of course the general rule in compensation cases, subject to a few exceptions, that a man does not enter an employment until he reaches the place where the work of his employer is to be carried on, and similarly, when he has finished all the work required by his duties and leaves the place of business of his employer to go to his own home, he has left the employment, and that an accident which may occur to him on his way to or from his work is not in the due course of his employment.' 50 Ariz. at 521--522, 73 P.2d at 705.
Appellant Kerr claims that this case falls within two exceptions to the general rule: 'Special hazards on route and the journey itself being part of the service.'
Mr. Kerr apparently believes that the special hazard in this case was the 400 mile distance which he was required to travel to reach the worksite. The basis of this argument is 1 A. Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 15.13 at 4--7. We are unable to discover authority which supports appellant's contention. Rather, the hazards, if any, which he would encounter in traveling from his home to the worksite are not distinguishable from those 'risks (which) are shared with the members of the general public.' Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Lines, 8 Ariz.App. 184, 186, 444 P.2d 741, 743 (1968). If special hazards did exist in making the trip the evidence presented to the hearing officer did not reflect them. We do not believe that the distance of the trip, standing alone, is the type of special hazard which was intended to serve as an exception to the going and coming rule.
The second exception which appellant seeks to fall under is that the journey was itself part of the employment. He claims that since the trip home was necessary to complete the cycle of employment the accident incurred arose in the course of employment and therefore should be compensable.
Appellant Kerr cites Larson as the foundation for his argument:
'The rule excluding off-premises injuries during the journey to and from work does not apply if the making of...
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...employment. However, they argue that the special hazards exception to the coming and going rule recognized in Kerr v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz.App. 106, 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), and the dual purpose exception to the rule discussed in Anderson and Faul apply in the present case. We do not agr......
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Lazarus v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
...per diem allowance which was paid regardless of actual travel and which the employee could use for any purpose (Kerr v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz.App. 106, 530 P.2d 1139 (1975)). Lazarus asserts that "average monthly wage" should include the share of health insurance premiums CPES paid on ......
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Brooks v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 1
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Willey, Matter of
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