Kersting v. Replogle
| Decision Date | 07 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | WD 78983 |
| Citation | 492 S.W.3d 600 |
| Parties | In re: Graham Kersting, Respondent, v. Superintendent Ron Replogle, Missouri State Highway Patrol, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
George A. Batek and Nancy A. McKerrow, Columbia, MO, for respondent.
Andrew J. Crane, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
Before Division Four: Alok Ahuja, C.J., Mark D. Pfeiffer, J., and J. Dale Youngs, Sp.J.
Graham Kersting filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Boone County to have his name removed from Missouri's sexual offender registry. Kersting's petition alleged that the crime to which he had previously pled guilty did not subject him to the registration requirement. The circuit court agreed, and removed Kersting from the registry. The Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, one of the respondents named in Kersting's petition, appeals. We affirm.
On March 24, 2004, Kersting pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Boone County to unlawful use of a weapon and felonious restraint. The charges stemmed from an incident in which Kersting, then eighteen years old, drove a knife into a door behind which his fifteen-year-old brother was hiding. Kersting was intoxicated at the time. There was no allegation that Kersting's offense was sexual in nature.
Two years later, Kersting was advised that he was required to register as a sexual offender, even though there was no sexual component to the offenses of which he had been convicted. Kersting was told he had to register because he had pled guilty to “felonious restraint when the victim was a child” within the meaning of § 589.400.1(2),1 and was therefore subject to the statutory registration requirement. Kersting has registered as a sexual offender since that time.
On March 4, 2015, Kersting filed a petition under § 589.400.8 to have his name removed from the sexual offender registry.2 Following an evidentiary hearing at which Kersting and his mother testified, the circuit court ordered Kersting's removal from the registry. The court held that § 589.400.1(2)'s reference to “felonious restraint when the victim was a child” should be interpreted to mean a “child under the age of 14.” Because Kersting's brother was fifteen when Kersting feloniously restrained him, the court concluded that Kersting's crime did not involve a “victim [who] was a child,” and therefore did not trigger the statutory registration requirement.
The Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol (the “State”) now appeals.3
The State argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that Kersting was not required to register as a sexual offender. According to the State, “ ‘child’ is defined throughout the Revised Statutes of Missouri as being under seventeen,” and the circuit court therefore erred in interpreting the word “child” in § 589.400.1(2) to refer only to persons less than fourteen years old. Because Kersting's victim was fifteen at the time of his offense, the State contends that he is subject to the statutory registration requirement.
Although the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing before issuing its judgment, the only issue on appeal concerns the proper interpretation of § 589.400.1(2). “Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. ” Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Mo.banc 2016)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to effectuate legislative intent through reference to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. This Court must presume every word, sentence or clause in a statute has effect, and the legislature did not insert superfluous language. When the words are clear, there is nothing to construe beyond applying the plain meaning of the law. A court will look beyond the plain meaning of the statute only when the language is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd or illogical result.
Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo.banc 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Rev enue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo.banc 2014)
(citations omitted).
A statute is ambiguous when its plain language does not answer the current dispute as to its meaning. Ambiguities in statutes are resolved by determining the intent of the legislature and by giving effect to its intent if possible. When determining the legislative intent of a statute, no portion of the statute is read in isolation, but rather the portions are read in context to harmonize all of the statute's provisions. Rules of statutory construction are used to resolve any ambiguities if the legislative intent is undeterminable from the plain meaning of the statutory language.
BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 392 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Mo.banc 2012)
.
Section 589.400.1 identifies the persons subject to sexual offender registration. It provides in relevant part:
(Emphasis added.)
Although § 589.400.1 distinguishes between a “child” and a “minor,” the word “child” is not defined for purposes of the statute.
“Child” is also not defined in the statute criminalizing felonious restraint, under which Kersting pled guilty. Instead, § 565.120.1 provides that “[a] person commits the crime of felonious restraint if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his liberty and exposes him to a substantial risk of serious physical injury”; § 565.120.2 classifies the offense as a class C felony. Section 565.120 does not distinguish between “child” and “adult” victims.
While “child” is not defined for purposes of either §§ 565.120 or 589.400, the context in which the statutes appear contains multiple, persuasive indications that the legislature used the word “child” to refer to a person less than fourteen years of age. For example, § 565.120.1 provides that, to constitute felonious restraint, the victim must be restrained “without consent.” Section 565.100.3(1) provides that, for purposes of §§ 565.110 through 565.130, “[a] person is deemed incapable of consent if he is ... [l]ess than fourteen years old....” The statutory section immediately preceding the felonious restraint statute—§ 565.115—defines the crime of “child kidnapping” as involving the removal or confinement of “a child under the age of fourteen.”
Similarly, the sexual offender registration statutes distinguish crimes committed against persons less than fourteen years of age. Section 589.425 specifies the punishments for those who fail to comply with the statutory registration requirements. Section 589.425.1 provides, in part, that “[f]ailing to register as a sex offender is a class D felony unless the person is required to register based on having committed ... a felony involving a child under the age of fourteen, in which case it is a class C felony.”
It is also significant that several of the offenses listed in § 589.400.1 appear in chapter 573 of the Revised Statutes, which addresses pornography and related offenses. For purposes of chapter 573, “child” means “any person under the age of fourteen,” while a “minor” is defined as “any person under the age of eighteen.” §§ 573.010(1), (10).
Kersting also cites § 491.075, which establishes the admissibility of a child's out-of-court statements in the prosecution of certain criminal offenses (including many of the offenses which trigger sexual offender registration requirements). Section 491.075.1 provides that “[a] statement made by a child under the age of fourteen ... relating to an offense under chapter 565, 566, 568 or 573, performed by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in the courts of this state as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if” the court finds the statement to be...
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