Kester v. Shawnee Mission Unfied School Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2003
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 01-2476-CM.
• Citation: 252 F.Supp.2d 1180
• Parties: Lee K. KESTER, Plaintiff, v. SHAWNEE MISSION UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 512, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

252 F.Supp.2d 1180

Lee K. KESTER, Plaintiff, v. SHAWNEE MISSION UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 512, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 01-2476-CM.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

March 17, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William S. Robbins, Jr., Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, PC, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

Curtis L. Tideman, Tammy M. Somogye, Lathrop & Gage L.C., Overland Park, KS, Rebecca L. McGinnis, Lathrop & Gage, L.C., Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURGUIA, District Judge.

Plaintiff Lee K. Kester filed suit against defendant Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512, alleging that defendant, her former employer, subjected her to unlawful discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Pending before the court is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is

•Facts¹

• Plaintiffs Employment with Defendant

Plaintiff was hired by defendant in 1995. During the 2000-2001 school year, plaintiff was employed as a Personnel Administrator for defendant. The contract between plaintiff and defendant in effect during the 2000-2001 school year incorporated by reference the defendant's Personnel Policies. On August 30, 2000, defendant suspended plaintiffs employment.

• The Board of Education Proceedings

On September 25, 2000, defendant's administrators recommended to the Board of Education (hereinafter "Board") that plaintiffs employment contract be terminated. On September 25, 2000, the Board adopted a resolution that plaintiff be given notice of its intent to terminate her contract of employment for the following reasons: 1) tape-recording confidential conferences with defendant's legal counsel without the consent of defendant; 2) refusing to relinquish the audio-recording of the confidential communications when instructed to do so by her supervisor; 3) demonstrating combative behavior toward supervisors and peers; 4) demonstrating insubordination in dealing with the decisions of her supervisors; and 5) demonstrating an unwillingness to accept and perform job assignments.

The Personnel Policies incorporated into plaintiffs 2000-2001 contract with defendant provide:

Whenever the Board of Education proposes to terminate the contract of employment of an administrator, except supplemental contracts entered into under the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5412a written notice of the proposed termination shall be given to such administrator. Such written notice shall include (1) a statement of the reason for the proposed action, and (2) a statement that the administrator may have the matter heard by the Board of Education upon filing a written request for hearing with the Clerk of the Board within fifteen (15) days from the date of such notice of proposed termination.

(Def.'s Mem. Exh. A2). The Clerk of the Board notified plaintiff on September 26, 2000, of the Board's resolution to terminate her contract. On October 5, 2000, plaintiff requested a hearing before the Board. On October 13, 2000, the Clerk of the Board notified plaintiff that the Board would hold her requested hearing on November 8, 2000. The Board held plaintiffs hearing on November 8 and 17, 2000.

At the hearing before the Board, witnesses testified on behalf of plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff did not have the power to subpoena witnesses on her behalf. However, defendant offered to assist plaintiff in procuring witnesses she designated for testimony to come to the Board hearing. In addition, plaintiff did not have the power to engage in discovery in preparation for the hearing. However, defendant offered to use reasonable efforts to respond to requests for specific information in advance of the Board hearing.

On November 27, 2000, the Board issued its decision, finding "good cause" to terminate plaintiffs contract. The Board notified plaintiff of its decision on November 28, 2000. The Personnel Policies incorporated into plaintiffs 2000-2001 contract with defendant further provide:

Unless otherwise agreed to by both the administrator and the Board, the Board shall render a written decision on the proposed termination within fifteen (15) days after the close of the hearing, setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions. Such written decision shall be made available to the administrator. The decision of the Board of Education shall be final, subject to appeal to the district court as provided by K.S.A. 60-2101.

(Id.).

• The Johnson County State Court Proceedings

On December 27, 2000, plaintiff filed a Petition in Johnson County District Court, naming Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512 as the defendant. Plaintiffs Petition included claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract, and in the alternative, a request for judicial review of the Board's decision under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2101. Defendant moved the court to dismiss plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract on the basis that an appeal under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2101 was her exclusive remedy. Plaintiff did not oppose defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, on July 12, 2001, in a journal entry, the Johnson County District Court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims with prejudice. The state court's journal entry indicated, "Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Motion and does not oppose it. For good cause shown, the Motion is Granted. Counts I and II of Plaintiffs Petition [declaratory judgment and breach of contract] are hereby dismissed, with prejudice." (Def.'s Mem. Exh. E).

With respect to plaintiffs remaining state law claim, defendant argued that plaintiff did not follow the appropriate procedure for appealing the Board's decision regarding the termination of her contract and, accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear her untimely appeal. On October 30, 2001, the court dismissed plaintiffs request for judicial review, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal due to plaintiffs failure to appeal timely the Board's decision.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court's October 30, 2001 decision. After reviewing the pleadings on file and hearing the arguments of counsel, the court denied plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration on December 11, 2001. Plaintiff did not appeal the court's dismissal of her judicial review claim.

• The United States District Court for the District of Kansas Proceedings

On September 25, 2001, plaintiff filed a federal complaint against defendant in this court. Plaintiffs Complaint includes claims for sex discrimination, retaliation for engaging in activities protected by Title VII, violation of the FMLA, violations of the EPA, and violations of the ADA. Each of plaintiffs claims arise from her employment with defendant. Prior to filing her federal Complaint, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on December 11, 2000. On July 25, 2001, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to plaintiff.

• Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 670-71. In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Id. at 671 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 n. 1 (concerning shifting burdens on summary judgment). The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. "To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein." Id.

Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting ...