Keys v. Military Dep't Gulfport
| Decision Date | 10 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-WC-00352-COA |
| Citation | 345 So.3d 1206 |
| Parties | Darryl KEYS, Appellant v. MILITARY DEPARTMENT GULFPORT and Mississippi State Agencies Workers’ Compensation Trust, Appellees |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND SMITH, JJ.
SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Darryl Keys appeals from the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission's (Commission) order granting the Military Department Gulfport (Military Department) a credit for indemnity benefits tendered to Keys during the period of June 30, 2017, through October 26, 2017. Based solely on the clear language of Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-3-95(2)(b) (Rev. 2018) and the specific set of facts presented in this case, we find the Commission erred in its determination that the Military Department was entitled to a credit for benefits not ultimately retained by Keys. We therefore reverse the order and remand this case for a calculation of the amount of compensation that the Military Department is indebted to Keys for unpaid permanent total disability benefits.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On February 24, 2017, Keys was injured as a result of a slip and fall accident while operating a machine in the course of his employment with the Mississippi Military Department at the National Guard facility in Gulfport, Mississippi. On July 10, 2017, Keys lost his footing and fell at home and became paralyzed and never returned to work. The Military Department began tendering checks constituting indemnity benefit payments to Keys on July 10, 2017. From July 11, 2017, through October 26, 2017, Keys received his paid sick leave that he had accrued during the course of his employment. During this period, Keys assigned the indemnity benefits payments back to the Military Department according to Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-3-95(2)(b). Therefore, Keys did not retain or receive the monetary benefits of the payments tendered during this period of time. Keys filed his petition to controvert with the Commission on March 5, 2019. The Administrative Judge (AJ) entered an amended order on June 19, 2020, finding Keys was permanently totally disabled and ordering the Military Department and its insurance carrier to pay permanent total disability benefits to Keys beginning on June 30, 2017, Keys's date of disability. The amended order was not appealed and became final.
¶3. On July 21, 2020, Keys filed a motion for lump-sum satisfaction of the amended order awarding permanent total disability benefits. Keys's motion was granted on August 7, 2020; the Military Department and its carrier were ordered to pay Keys lump-sum benefits pursuant to the amended order. Thereafter, on August 20, 2020, Keys filed his motion for payment of back-owed benefits and a determination of proper credits. Keys argued that the Military Department was not entitled to receive a credit for the benefit payments issued from July 11, 2017, through October 26, 2017, because those checks were assigned to the Military Department and those benefits were withheld from him pursuant to section 25-3-95(2)(b). He further requested that the Military Department be ordered to pay him for those benefits improperly withheld from July 11, 2017, through October 26, 2017. The Military Department filed its response on September 4, 2020, and argued that it was entitled to a credit for prior payments because Keys had elected to receive sick-leave pay during the period in question and was restricted from receiving more than one hundred percent of his salary according to the terms of section 25-3-95(2)(b).
¶4. The AJ entered an order on September 24, 2020, denying Keys's motion for back-owed benefits and granting the Military Department a credit for the payments from July 11, 2017, through October 26, 2017. Keys then filed his petition for a review by the full commission on October 9, 2020. Thereafter, on March 4, 2021, the Commission affirmed the AJ's September 24, 2020. Aggrieved, Keys appeals from the Commission's order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. Generally, "[t]he standard of review is limited in regard to review of the decisions of the Commission." Enmon Enters. v. Snyder , 175 So. 3d 541, 545 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). However, this Court "review[s] an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute governing the agency's operation de novo, without deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute." Miss. Mfrs. Ass'n Workers’ Comp. Grp. v. Miss. Workers’ Comp. Grp. Self-Insurer Guar. Ass'n , 281 So. 3d 108, 114 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). "Reversal is proper only when a Commission order is not based on substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, or is based on an erroneous application of the law." Enmon Enters. , 175 So. 3d at 545 (¶10).
ANALYSIS
¶6. The issue raised in this case is whether section 25-3-95(2)(b) applies to the compensation benefits that the employer, Military Department, was ordered to pay to the claimant, Keys. Underlying Keys's challenge to the order granting the Military Department a credit for prior benefits and Keys's request for payment of back-owed benefits is a challenge to the Commission's interpretation of section 25-3-95(2)(b). Specifically, Keys asserts that the Commission misapplied section 25-3-95(2)(b) because the statute's payment restrictions only pertain to claimants receiving temporary disability benefits, and he was awarded permanent total disability benefits.
I. Scope of Section 25-3-95(2)(b)
¶7. To begin, this Court must determine the proper application of section 25-3-95(2)(b). We "will not engage in statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and unambiguous." Lewis v. Hinds Cnty. Cir. Ct. , 158 So. 3d 1117, 1120 (¶6) (Miss. 2015). "Where a statute is unambiguous, the Court must apply the statute according to its plain meaning, refraining from principles of statutory construction." Battise v. Aucoin , 311 So. 3d 588, 591 (¶11) (Miss. 2021). Our supreme court has previously stated:
No principle is more firmly established, or rests on more secure foundations, than the rule which declares when a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, that the Legislature shall be deemed to have intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and, consequently, no room is left for construction in the application of such a law.
Lewis , 158 So. 3d at 1122 (¶13). "The [C]ourt may not enlarge or restrict a statute where the meaning of the statute is clear." Tillis v. State , 43 So. 3d 1127, 1131 (¶9) (Miss. 2010).
¶8. Section 25-3-95(2)(b) states the following:
When an employee's absence is due to a work-related injury for which the employee is receiving temporary disability benefits under Section 71-3-17(b) or 71-3-21, the injured employee shall not use accrued personal and/or medical leave and receive workers’ compensation benefits simultaneously if the combined receipt of both benefits results in the employee being paid, while absent due to the work-related injury, a total amount that exceeds one hundred percent (100%) of his wages earned in state employment at the time of injury. In such cases, the injured employee may use only as much of his accrued personal and/or medical leave as necessary, which may be fewer than eight (8) hours of accrued personal and/or major medical leave in a day, to constitute the difference between the amount of temporary disability workers’ compensation benefits received and one hundred percent (100%) of his wages earned at the time of injury in state employment. It is the intent of the Legislature that no state employee who is absent and disabled from work due to a work-related injury shall receive more than one hundred percent (100%) of his wages earned in state employment at the time of injury through the use of accrued personal and/or medical leave combined with temporary disability benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law.
Miss. Code Ann. § 25-3-95(2)(b) (emphasis added).
¶9. The plain language of section 25-3-95(2)(b) explicitly uses the term "temporary disability benefits" three times, each in conjunction with reference to the workers’ compensation benefits received. Section 25-3-95(2)(b) also specifically points to the subsection of the workers’ compensation statute that defines a temporary disability. The context of section 25-3-95(2)(b) differentiates between the types of workers’ compensation benefits and only includes temporary disability benefits within the scope of the statute.
II. Application of Section 25-3-95(2)(b)
¶10. Under Mississippi law, "[w]hen a claimant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits, his entire disability relates back to the beginning of his rating of temporary disability." Eaton Corp. v. Brown , 130 So. 3d 1131, 1141 (¶49) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). In Eaton , this Court held that "[t]he award of permanent total disability benefits should relate back to" the date the claimant was adjudged to be permanently totally disabled. Id . ¶11. The AJ's amended order entered on June 19, 2020, reads in part:
As in Eaton , Keys's award of permanent total disability benefits relates back to June 30, 2017. Thus, we find it clear that based on the particular set of facts in this specific case, Keys was awarded permanent total disability benefits beginning on June 30, 2017.
¶12. We find it important to acknowledge the narrow application of our ruling in this matter based on the specific facts of this case. The record here shows that neither the claimant nor the employer...
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