Lewis v. Hinds Cnty. Circuit Court

• Decision Date: 19 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2013–CA–01842–SCT.,2013–CA–01842–SCT.
• Parties: Tyrone LEWIS, Sheriff Hinds County, Mississippi v. HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

158 So.3d 1117

Tyrone LEWIS, Sheriff Hinds County, Mississippi

v.HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT.

No. 2013–CA–01842–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 19, 2015.

Dana P. Sims, attorney for appellant.

Anna Marie Livingston, attorney for appellee.

Before WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS and COLEMAN, JJ.

Opinion

COLEMAN, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The instant appeal arises out of a dispute between Sheriff Tyrone Lewis of Hinds County and the judges' chambers of the Hinds County Circuit Court over the role of bailiffs. Lewis attempted to make hiring, firing, and compensation changes affecting bailiffs. In response, the circuit court issued an Order and Opinion in 2012 upholding a previous Order from 1996. The 1996 Order stated that, in several respects, further detailed below, bailiffs fell under the authority of the judiciary rather than the sheriff. Lewis filed a Motion for Relief, and the circuit court subsequently issued another order, granting the power to compensate bailiffs to the sheriff only if he follows the terms of the 1996 Order. Lewis appealed. We hold that the 1996 Order and the 2012 Order and Opinion are void in part to the extent they directly violate the Constitution and statutory law.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

¶ 2. In 1996, the Hinds County Circuit Court issued an Order to Establish Rules and Regulations for Court Bailiffs. The stated purpose of the 1996 Order, signed by all four then-serving Hinds County Circuit Court judges, was to maintain order and efficiency within the Hinds County Circuit Court. The Order addressed the hours, uniform, discipline, and duties of bailiffs. The Order stated: “Court Bailiffs shall not be assigned duties which are non-judicial except upon permission of the Judge ... Bailiffs do not function as part of any law enforcement agency.” The Order also stated:

Bailiffs may be assigned by the Sheriff to special duties such as fair duty, football game duty and other duties of similar nature. Bailiffs may be utilized by the Hinds County Sheriff should they be needed for County emergencies. Salaries for Court Bailiffs shall be set by the Sheriff on an equitable basis.

¶ 3. Sheriff Tyrone Lewis took office in January 2012. Lewis then submitted Special Orders before the circuit court pertaining to the demotion, transfer, and reduction of salaries of bailiffs. In response, the circuit court issued an Order and Opinion on February 12, 2012. The 2012 Order and Opinion stated that the 1996 Order is binding, and bailiffs are court personnel. The Order and Opinion concluded that Lewis's Special Orders violate the 1996 Order and are, therefore, void. Further, the Order and Opinion stated that “any party attempting to violate this order shall immediately SHOW CAUSE....”

¶ 4. Lewis appealed the 2012 Order and Opinion to the Supreme Court, and the circuit court moved to dismiss the appeal. We issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss without prejudice. Subsequently, on April 23, 2012, Lewis filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Opinion in the circuit court. The circuit court did not respond; thus, Lewis again appealed to the Supreme Court. On May 11, 2012, we issued a mandate dismissing the appeal without prejudice and compelling the circuit court to respond. On September 30, 2013, the circuit court finally entered an Order. The Order found that the 2012 Order and Opinion enforced the 1996 Order that Lewis failed to properly appeal; thus, it stands. The Order further found that “the Court has no authority to control salaries of bailiffs so long as the terms of the 1996 Order are met; i.e. [The Sheriff] shall ... set [bailiffs'] salaries on an equitable basis congruent with other deputies.”

¶ 5. Lewis then appealed to the Supreme Court under a Writ of Mandamus, and we dismissed his appeal as moot. Subsequently, Lewis properly appealed the circuit court's September 30 Order to the Supreme Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. The Court “will not engage in statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and unambiguous.” Mississippi Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Mississippi Div. of Medicaid, 21 So.3d 600, 607 (Miss.2009) (citing In re Guardianship of Duckett, 991 So.2d 1165, 1181 (Miss.2008) ). Statutory interpretation is appropriate when a statute is ambiguous or silent on a specific issue. Mississippi Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Center, Inc., 21 So.3d at 607 (citing In re Duckett, 991 So.2d at 1181–82 ). If statutory interpretation is appropriate, the Court has written:

Statutory interpretation is a matter of law which we review in its entirety. Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, 815 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Miss.2002). We presume a statute is constitutional unless the challenging party is able to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id;see also Miss. Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257, 263 (Miss.1984). All doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of a statute. Loden v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 279 So.2d 636, 640 (Miss.1973).

University of Mississippi Med. Ctr. v. Robinson, 876 So.2d 337, 339–40 (Miss.2004). Whether the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous, the “ultimate goal of [the] Court in interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent.”

Allred v. Yarborough, 843 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss.2003) (quoting City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992) ).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

¶ 7. On appeal, Lewis brings three issues, and the circuit court brings two similar issues. We have consolidated the collective five issues into three specific issues.

I. Whether Mississippi Code Section 19–25–19 authorizes a sheriff to appoint, assign, and compensate bailiffs without the express permission of the circuit court.

II. Whether Mississippi Code Section 19–25–21 authorizes a sheriff to enforce the training requirements of Sections 19–25–21 and 45–6–11 for law enforcement officers serving as bailiffs.

III. Whether the circuit court's 1996 and 2012 orders violated the doctrine of separation of powers under Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Mississippi Constitution.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Mississippi Code Section 19–25–19 authorizes a sheriff to appoint, assign, and compensate bailiffs without the express permission of the circuit court.

¶ 8. Lewis argues that Section 19–25–19 expressly authorizes the sheriff to appoint, compensate, and assign deputies to assist in the duties of his office. See Miss.Code Ann. § 19–25–19 (Rev. 2012). Lewis also argues that the plain language of Section 19–25–19 allows the sheriff to remove a deputy at pleasure but requires the court to give notice and hold a hearing to show cause. See id.; In re Bishop, 211 Miss. 518, 520, 52 So.2d 18 (1951).

¶ 9. The circuit court employs case law from outside Mississippi to interpret Section 19–25–19. See Miss.Code Ann. § 19–25–19 ; Frazier v. Meadows, 193 W.Va. 20, 454 S.E.2d 65 (1994). The circuit court argues case law from another state should apply because Mississippi lacks case law on the issue. Following the reasoning of Frazier, the circuit court argues that slight deviation from the plain meaning of the statutes is necessary, and the Court should hold that the sheriff must gain permission to appoint, assign, and compensate bailiffs. See Frazier, 454 S.E.2d at 71.

¶ 10. Mississippi Code Section 19–25–19 states in pertinent part:

Every sheriff shall have power to appoint one or more deputies to assist him in carrying out the duties of his office, every such appointment to be in writing, to remove them at pleasure, and to fix compensation, subject to the budget for the sheriff's office approved by the county board of supervisors.... All sheriffs shall be liable for the acts of their deputies, and for money collected by them. The circuit court, after a notice and a hearing, shall have power to remove such deputies and also bailiffs, upon a showing that the public interest will be served thereby.

Miss.Code Ann. § 19–25–19 (emphasis added). The plain language of Section 19–25–19 empowers a sheriff to compensate and remove deputies at pleasure and makes no distinction between deputies and bailiffs.¹ See id. The only qualifier on the sheriff's power is that the deputies must be assisting the sheriff in carrying out his duties. See id. Thus, to fully understand Section 19–25–19, we look to other statutes defining the duties of the sheriff to determine whether the duties of the sheriff extend to the courts.

¶ 11. Section 19–25–35 pertains to the duties of the sheriff and states that “[t]he sheriff shall be the executive officer of the circuit and chancery court ... and he shall attend all the sessions thereof with a sufficient number of deputies or bailiffs.”Miss.Code Ann. § 19–25–35 (Rev. 2012). The sheriff has the duty to ensure every session of the circuit court has a deputy or bailiff attending. Thus, the sheriff's duties extend to the court.

¶ 12. The Court has stated, where the language in a statute is plain and unambiguous, “[i]t is not within the province of this [C]ourt to add to the law as the Legislature has written it.” First Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Comm'n, 210 Miss. 590, 49 So.2d 410, 412 (1950) (quoting City of Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 96 Miss. 656, 51 So. 890, 891 (1910) ); see also Conway v. Mississippi State Bd. of Health, 252 Miss. 315, 173 So.2d 412, 415 (1965). Section 19–25–19 is plain and unambiguous. Therefore, we will not deviate from the plain language of Section 19–25–19, and the circuit court's argument that a case from another state should be applied to interpret Section 19–25–19 is unfounded.

¶ 13. Legislative intent is considered even when the statute is unambiguous. See Allred v. Yarborough, 843 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss.2003). “[L]egislative intent must be determined from the total language of the act and not from one section thereof considered apart from the remainder.” Lee v. Alexander, 607 So.2d 30, 36 (Miss.1992) (quoting Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. et al. v. Hinds Cnty., et al., 445 So.2d 1330 (Miss.1984) ). The Court also has stated:

No principle is more firmly

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