Khoyan v. Turner
| Decision Date | 09 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 372,372 |
| Citation | 255 Md. 144,257 A.2d 219 |
| Parties | Vahan KHOYAN v. Richard E. TURNER. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Milton C. Gelenian, Kensington, for appellant.
Charles C. Carlton, Bethesda (Shapiro & Weil, Bethesda, on the brief) for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and MARBURY, BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.
On 19 March 1968 the appellant (Khoyan), a citizen of Virginia, sued the appellee (Turner), a citizen of Maryland, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. In his declaration Khoyan alleged that on 27 March 1967 Turner 'negligently and in violation of the District of Columbia Code and the Maryland Code left the keys to his automobile in the ignition,' and as a result of 'such negligence' his car was stolen. (Emphasis added.) He further alleged that, on the same day, while being driven by the thief, Turner's vehicle 'was caused to collide with * * * (Khoyan's) automobile, which was lawfully parked in the District of Columbia.' On 10 July Turner pleaded the general issue. Khoyan served interrogatories on Turner on 16 July seeking information as to the place from which the automobile had been stolen and 'whether the keys * * * were in the ignition, or in some other accessible and visible place in the automobile * * *.' (Emphasis added.) On 22 July Turner moved for a summary judgment on the ground that 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in issue' and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion was accompanied, not by an affidavit, but a 'Memorandum of Points and Authorities' in which Turner stated that he had parked his car 'in Bethesda, Montgomery County, Maryland.' Khoyan opposed Turner's motion on the grounds that 'the substantive rights of the parties * * * are governed by the laws of * * * (the District), where the accident occurred' and that Turner's 'failure to remove his automobile keys from the ignition * * * (was) a proximate cause, as a matter of law, of the accident * * *.' 'Wherefore' he prayed 'that he be granted summary judgment against' Turner. In his 'Memorandum of Points and Authorities,' filed with the opposition to the motion, he assumed that the 'material allegations of his declaration' were admitted for the purposes of the motions for summary judgment.
On 5 August Turner filed his answers to Khoyan's interrogatories. He stated that his car had been stolen 'from the main visitors' well at Microbiological Association on River Road, Bethesda, Maryland,' into whose building he had gone and where he had remained 'for two to three minutes,' but he refused to answer in respect of the ignition key. Khoyan, on 7 August, excepted to his refusal to answer and, after a hearing, Turner was ordered to answer. On 21 October he filed the following supplementary answer:
(Emphasis added.)
On 14 November 1968 the trial judge, R. B. Mathias J., granted Turner's motion...
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