Kidder Peabody Acceptance Cor. Poration v. Old Colony R. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1926
• Parties: KIDDER PEABODY ACCEPTANCE COR. PORATION v. OLD COLONY R. CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

256 Mass. 41

152 N.E. 313

KIDDER PEABODY ACCEPTANCE COR. PORATION

v.OLD COLONY R. CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

May 27, 1926.

Case Reserved and Report from Superior Court, Bristol County; Marcus Morton, Judge.

Petition by the Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corporation for assessment of damages for taking of land in proceedings for abolition of grade crossing by Old Colony Railroad Company and others. On reservation and report by judge of superior court, after filing of answer in abatement by respondents. Petition dismissed.

H. W. Brown, of Boston, for plaintiff.

J. L. Hall and M. Jenckes, both of Boston, for defendants.

CROSBY, J.

This is a petition to the superior court for the assessment by a jury of damages caused by the taking of land in the city of Taunton in proceedings for the abolition of certain grade crossings. It is alleged in the petition that the taking in question was made by virtue of a decree of the superior court entered on June 10, 1913, under the provisions of St. 1906, c. 463, part 1, § 36, and acts in amendment thereof and in addition thereto; that among other lands taken for railroad or highway purposes was a portion of a parcel owned by the New England Cotton Yarn Company; that since the date of the entry of the decree the petitioner has acquired by conveyance and assignment from that company all its title and interest in the said parcel of land subject to the taking, and to the right to recover damages on account of such taking.

The petition was filed on December 24, 1923. The respondents filed an answer in abatement. The petitioner admits the truth of all the allegations of fact contained in the answer. The case is reserved by a judge of the superior court for the determination of the questions of law raised by the answer in abatement.

The statute in force at the time of the taking relating to the bringing of petitions for the assessment of damages was St. 1906, c. 463, part 1, § 37, as amended by St. 1908, c. 390, § 1, and St. 1911, c. 486, § 1. It is conceded by the petitioner that the time for the bringing of petitions for damages under section 37 was not affected by the above amendments. This section provided in part as follows:

‘If the parties interested cannot agree upon said damages, any party may have the damages determined by a jury in the superior court for the county in which the property and crossing are situated, on petition, brought within one year after the time the property is entered upon and work actually begun thereon, in the same manner as damages may be determined which are caused by the taking of land for the locating of railroads and the laying out or discontinuance of public ways, respectively, in such city or town.’ It is alleged in the answer and admitted by the petitioner ‘that there has been no entry upon the property by the respondents or commencement of work thereon.’

The petitioner contends that under the statute (section 37) a petition may be brought at any time after the taking and not later than one year after the entry. The respondents contend that the petition cannot properly be brought until entry has been made and that it must be brought within one year thereafter.

The language of section 37 is not ambiguous nor uncertain. In clear and unequivocal words it permits the petition to be brought within one year after entry on the premises and the actual commencement of work thereon. To authorize a petition to be maintained before entry and before any work had been done on the premises would be contrary to the plain implication of the statute. This construction seems to be in harmony with the natural interpretation of the words used and to be in accord with previous and subsequent legislation and with the decisions of this court. R. L. c. 111, § 153; St. 1903, c. 478; St. 1906, c. 463, part 1, § 37; St. 1908, c. 390, § 1; St. 1911, c. 486; St. 1918, c. 257, §§ 187, 204; Hay v. Commonwealth, 183 Mass. 294, 67 N. E. 334.

In Everett v. Fall River, 189 Mass. 513, 75 N. E. 946, it was held that, under R. L. c. 48, §§ 13, 27, and 28 (which was similar to the statute in the case at bar), a petition for the assessment of damages for the taking of land in the laying out of a highway, filed before any entry had been made upon the land for the purpose of constructing the way must be dismissed as prematurely brought. And it was said by Sheldon, J., at page 517 (75 N. E. 948):

‘The natural construction of this statute is that the right to file the petition does not accrue until the right to compel payment of the damages to be assessed arises, i....