Killian v. City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 24 January 1978
• Citation: 143 Cal.Rptr. 430,77 Cal.App.3d 1
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert KILLIAN et al., Plaintiffs, Respondents and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants, Appellants and Respondents. Civ. 39059.

Page 430

143 Cal.Rptr. 430

77 Cal.App.3d 1

Robert KILLIAN et al., Plaintiffs, Respondents and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants, Appellants and Respondents.

Civ. 39059.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 24, 1978.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 21, 1978.

Hearing Denied March 23, 1978.

John L. Anderson, Jerome M. Garchik, Neyhart & Anderson, San Francisco, for plaintiffs, respondents, and cross-appellants.

Morris Lowenthal, John R. Jacobson, Lowenthal & Lowenthal, San Francisco, Special Counsel for appellants and respondents City and County of San Francisco, and the Board of Supervisors.

RACANELLI, Presiding Justice.

The City and County of San Francisco and its Board of Supervisors (hereinafter City and Board, respectively) appeal from the judgment ¹ of the trial court issuing a peremptory writ of mandate based upon a theory of estoppel. The action was instituted by five labor organizations ², representing craft members employed by the City, together with several individual employees of the City on behalf of themselves and all employees similarly situated. The writ mandates the Board to adopt an appropriate ordinance amending the salary ordinances of the City (and to appropriate sufficient funds) to provide increases in wages and other benefits to certain City employees as certified by the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter Commission) for the 1974-1975 fiscal year, and awards costs and attorney fees. Plaintiffs and respondents (hereinafter Petitioners) cross-appeal from those portions of the judgment requiring delivery of executed and ratified agreements by no later than July 1. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the writ was properly issued; however, we modify the judgment and affirm the judgment as so modified.

The dispute turns upon the proper interpretation and application of section 8.403 ³ of the city charter, the crafts salary standardization ordinance. The pertinent ⁴ part thereof provides as follows: ". . . provided, that the civil service commission shall review all such agreements as of July 1st of each year and certify to the board of supervisors on or before the second Monday of July any modifications in rates of pay established thereunder for such crafts or groups as herein provided. The board of supervisors shall thereupon revise the rates of pay for such crafts or groups accordingly and the said revised rates of pay so fixed shall be effective from July 1st of the fiscal year in which such revisions are determined. . . ."

The City and Board contend that the proper interpretation of the language of the proviso means that only modifications (of underlying collective bargaining agreements) in existence and received by or delivered to the Commission on or before the following July 1 may be appropriately reviewed and thereafter certified by the Commission. Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the construction historically employed by the Commission, namely that agreements executed and delivered to the Commission after July 1 but on or before the second Monday in July, may be certified by the Commission, is the more reasonable one. A subsidiary question concerning a precondition of membership ratification is also presented.

The facts are not in substantial dispute.

For a great many years the consistent practice of the Commission has been to accept and certify to the Board modifications in wage rates contained in collective bargaining agreements executed on or before the second Monday of July, so long as the rates were effective July 1 (payable retroactively for work on or after July 1). ⁵

By July 8, 1974 (the second Monday in July), the Commission had received from each of the Petitioner unions notification of the newly negotiated wage rates. The date on which each agreement was reached, its effective date, and the date the new rate information was delivered to the Commission are summarized in the margin. ⁶ As appears, in each case the wage rate information was delivered to the Commission after July 1 and reflected rates of pay effective before July 1. ⁷ On July 8, the Commission verified that the increased rates of pay set forth in the new collective bargaining agreements were effective as of July 1, and transmitted its report certifying such rates to the Board as required by the ordinance.

On July 22, 1974, the Board met to consider the salary standardization ordinance. Because some members of the Board expressed uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase "agreements as of July 1st" within the intendment of section 8.403, an advisory opinion from the city attorney was requested. The city attorney rendered a written opinion concluding that collective bargaining agreements executed on or after July 1 and not later than the second Monday in July were properly certifiable provided the modifications therein were as of July 1 of that year, the term "as of" being interpreted to mean effective retroactively from the date of execution. Notwithstanding, the Board declined to accept the questioned wage rate agreements certified by the Commission and deleted such increased pay rates from the salary ordinance amendment upon the ground that certification of wage rates established by agreements executed and delivered after July 1 failed to comply with charter requirements.

The trial court found, inter alia: (1) that all of the Petitioner unions (except Teamster Local No. 216) had delivered to the Commission on or before July 8, 1974, previously executed modifications of collective bargaining agreements establishing rates of pay effective and payable retroactively to July 1, 1974; (2) that such agreements were accepted by the Commission as timely and the new wage rates certified to the Board on or before July 8, 1974. ⁸ In granting relief to Petitioners upon a theory of estoppel (discussed infra), the trial court determined that section 8.403 required that modifications of collective bargaining agreements originally certified on or before the preceding April 1, be in existence, ratified where necessary, and delivered to the Commission on or before the succeeding July 1; that thereafter the Commission must "review and certify" such newly established crafts rates by no later than the second Monday of July. In our view a reasonable construction of the controlling section cannot support such conclusion.

Construction of Section 8.403

I. It is elementary that the construction of a statute [or ordinance] and its applicability is solely a question of law. (6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed.) §§ 209-210, pp. 4200-4201, and cases there cited.) In undertaking such interpretation, we rely upon familiar principles of statutory construction in order to "ascertain the intent of the . . . (lawmakers) so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 675.) "In determining such intent '(t)he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1 . . . cert. den. 340 U.S. 879, 71 S.Ct. 117, 95 L.Ed. 639.) We are required to give effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' (In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 737, 265 P. 947, 949 . . . ; see also Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 918, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33 . . . ; Chavez v. Sargent (1959) 52 Cal.2d 162, 203, 339 P.2d 801 . . . , disapproved on another ground in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, etc., Local No. 88, 53 Cal.2d 455, 473-475, 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76 . . . .) 'If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 676); . . . 'When used in a statute (words) must be construed in context, keeping im mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.' (Johnstone v. Richardson (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 41, 46, 229 P.2d 9 . . . ; see also West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594, 608, 86 Cal.Rptr. 793, 469 P.2d 665 . . ..) Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 148, 514 P.2d 1224; see also 45 Cal.Jur.2d, pp. 625-626 and cases there cited.)

Initially we focus our attention upon the language of the ordinance requiring the Commission to "review all such agreements as of July 1st of each year" in fulfilling its duty to certify rate modifications to the Board by no later than the second Monday of July.

While our research discloses no case squarely on point, this court has on more than one occasion reviewed and interpreted certain language of the same salary ordinance now before us (formerly § 151.3). In Butler v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 104 Cal.App.2d 126, 130, 231 P.2d 75, 77, the question framed by this court was whether the Board was required to fix the wage rate based on collective bargaining agreements "executed after the second Monday in July and prior to the adoption of the amendatory (salary and appropriation) ordinances." (Emphasis added.) We there held that the Commission's certification (five days before the second Monday in July) of rates of pay "in effect as of July 1, 1948 . . ." and the Board's adoption by ordinance of the old wage rates rather than the modifications executed on July 19 and delivered to the Commission the following day, constituted faithful compliance with the charter provisions. (Id. at p. 131, 231 P.2d 75.)

In Thomlinson v. City, etc., of San Francisco (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 619, 38 Cal.Rptr. 863, we considered the question whether under charter section...